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 In this study, I explore the problem of 21st century educator existential 
oppression (my term) as the negation of personal and pedagogical personhood that I 
experienced as a result of my confrontations (across three separate schools) with 
oppressive policies and practices instituted by the neoliberal business model within the 
institution of education. I use my story to reflect the individual educator’s situation of 
dehumanization as it has become embedded within a neoliberal pedagogy of 
standardization, measurement, and objectification, asserting that this is an increasingly 
common phenomenon among contemporary educators. I discuss philosophical 
conceptions of oppression, personhood, and pedagogy through the lens of existentialism, 
positioned as a humanizing response to the dehumanization of neoliberal educational 
ideology. Emphasizing the existential attitude of intentional self-consciousness for self-
reclamation (personhood) and resistance to oppression, I also address existential tenets 
that inform my current efforts toward teaching for freedom in the undergraduate 
classroom. Four existential questions frame the conclusion of this study, the responses to 
which prioritize the concept of integrity as fundamental to the pursuit of an individual 
pedagogy of personhood and the rehumanization of education, even inferring the 
community at large. The methodology of this study is an integration of philosophical 
analysis and scholarly personal narrative writing (SPN), the latter including reflections 
and commentaries interspersed throughout the study, along with excerpts from post-class, 
	  
teaching field notes (spring 2013, the University of North Carolina at Greensboro), most 
notably in Chapter IV.  
Keywords: educator existential oppression, existentialism, neoliberal, oppression, 
personhood, Scholarly Personal Narrative Writing (SPN) 
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CHAPTER I 
 
SELF-PORTRAIT: AN ILLUSTRATION OF EDUCATOR EXISTENTIAL 
OPPRESSION 
 
 
Background Reflections on the Situation of Educator Existential Oppression: 
Written at the 2013 South Atlantic Philosophy of Education Society (SAPES) 
Conference 
 
 
At this 2013 SAPES conference, it is fitting that I recall personal reflections of the 
2012 SAPES conference. Around this time last year, professors, scholars, 
students, and philosophical advocates came together to present and discuss their 
work, many troubled by the ongoing dominance of economized and politicized 
educational policies associated with a conservative, marketplace agenda, 
commonly defined or labeled as neoliberalism. Throughout the proceedings, I 
heard echoing calls for resistance to ideologies of standardization and testing, 
privatization, and hard-line budgets that minimize or eliminate the humanities 
and the arts in school curriculum. Voices rose in unified agreement, arguing for a 
more humane approach to education for all human beings. I recall experiencing a 
sense of righteous support for my own, humanistic sensibilities while, at the same 
time, still aware of mounting frustration with an educational system that I view as 
dehumanizing to teachers and students alike. At an academic conference such as 
this, like-minded participants tend to critique the status quo with candor. 
Nonetheless, as a collective, we were speaking to the proverbial “choir,” an 
audience of academics, scholars, students, and philosophical advocates who may 
not all have agreed on every point raised, but who all shared in an existential 
exercise of thoughtful interchange in the spirit of intellectual and philosophical 
camaraderie.  
 
Was this conference experience reflective of a collective “existential attitude” 
(Solomon, 2005, p. xi) grounded in overt actions of resistance to a present 
oppressor; that is to say, an attitude of self-awareness within oneself and of one’s 
present situation from which the individual or group chooses to act on their 
freedom? Not in that moment, I would assert, because the existential attitude, as I 
interpret it, emerges from an acutely internalized consciousness of self “facing a 
confused world that [I] cannot accept” (Solomon, 2005, xii), a world in which I 
do not find myself “at home” (Solomon, p. xii). It is from this grounding that I 
must first announce to myself and then decide, with purposeful intention, that I 
must do something to change my situation because I can no longer tolerate my 
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existence as it is. This is to say that I can no longer tolerate a dehumanizing 
experience of existence in which I am not affirmed as a subjectively 
thinking/choosing/acting person. So, instead, I think the conference served as a 
reminder of the possibilities that might emerge from within the individual 
educator upon awakening to her existential attitude and deciding to act.. From 
this basis, the individual educator can choose to act as resistor and/or liberator 
within her particular situation; not with a guarantee of success, but yet as a self-
empowered individual intent on a vision of personal and pedagogical freedom. In 
other words, for those of us who believe in educating for the individual and 
collective good, I suggest that we each step outside the doors of safe communion 
and individually advance our conception of education as a decidedly human 
project. 
   
An Educational Journey from Freedom to Existential Oppression 
Overview 
 In my case, to viscerally know the phenomenon of educator existential oppression 
is to have first known its opposite: existential freedom in the realm of education. Thus, 
my experience of existential oppression did not manifest immediately, instead creeping 
into the crevices of my being after an initial five years of knowing a sense of personal 
and professional integrity in the workplace. In fact, the first five years of my employment 
as an elementary school library media specialist could be defined as an ongoing  
experience of freedom—personal and pedagogical—encouraged by a particularly 
enlightened administrator within a particular school setting. As a result, with personal, 
intellectual, and professional integrity validated on a regular basis in this environment,  
classroom teachers, academic specialists, and staff members could define their purposes 
and act out their roles as affirmed individuals who had chosen one of the “impossible 
professions” (Britzman, 2009, p. 3) through which to enact their life projects as they 
understood them at that moment in time. 
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 In my case, as an academic specialist whose focus was library-based instruction 
and management over thirteen years of employment in the public school system, the 
terminology used to designate my position has been both variable and interchangeable: 
school librarian, teacher-librarian, media coordinator, school library media coordinator, 
and school library media specialist, to name the most common descriptors used. 
Underscoring these somewhat convoluted terms is the fact that I was an educator, with an 
obligatory Master’s degree in Library Science and Information Studies, whose classroom 
was the school library; or, to accommodate the technological orientation of late 20th 
century and 21st century perspectives, the  school library became known as the media 
center.  
 With my role as “school library media specialist” initially understood as a 
centralized position intended to serve students, teachers, staff, and school operations in a 
variety of ways (both academic and non-academic), I welcomed the challenge of 
integrating my roles as educator, library manager, information specialist, collection 
development specialist, and school leader. Library management skills and collection 
development notwithstanding, I vigorously embraced the role of teacher-librarian as the 
most important of my many functions and considered teaching the most significant and 
meaningful component of my work. In fact, and in line with the emphasis on teaching 
promoted by my master’s degree program, I placed strategic emphasis on my role as 
educator, envisioning what a vibrantly intellectual, viable, and accessible school library 
program should look like, and how it should function. In other words, I made the library 
my classroom by correlating library-based instruction with traditional classroom 
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curriculum. Meeting with classroom teachers on a weekly basis, I created lesson plans 
that integrated core curriculum with the district’s information skills curriculum  across 
grade levels and academic disciplines, including English/Language Arts, Social Studies, 
Science, and Geography. Essentially, I crafted my project as a teacher/librarian with a 
purposeful intent that reflected my subjective stance as a person choosing to do the work 
of educating in my particular way. I chose and acted from a stance of personhood that 
was consistent with my personal and professional values.  
 Not pressed or required to outrightly define or defend  my pedagogical stance at 
the time, I now realize that my pedagogical orientation has always been grounded in 
personhood, an orientation through which I have naturally manifested my subjective self 
and my personally conceived purpose as an educator. It makes sense, then, that this 
organically derived pedagogy of personhood would lead to subsequent choices and 
actions undertaken to advance my vision of education as a continuing human relationship 
of personal and inter-personal dimensions, built upon a foundation of intellectual 
freedom, interactive dialogue, and subjective modes of meaning making. Such a 
pedagogy of personhood is not defined by objective measures or narrowly outlined 
standards of performance. Rather, a pedagogy of personhood aligns with Pinar’s (2012) 
description of curriculum as “complicated conversation” (p. xv), reinforcing my view of 
pedagogy as a uniquely human undertaking in which the teacher’s (and student’s) 
subjectivity is integral to the dialogical moment and to the critical meaning making that 
ensues from it. Therefore, to understand a pedagogy of personhood as rooted in dialogical 
relationships is to understand “subjectivity’s significance to the complicated conversation 
5 
	  
	  
that is the school curriculum” (p. xv) because, as human subjects, we (teachers and 
students) are wholly essential to creating that conversation and the meaning that can be 
derived from it. Furthermore, and from the perspective of a critically oriented pedagogy 
and its relation to teacher subjectivity, Freire (1998) provides a conception of education 
as “that specifically human act of intervening in the world” (p. 99), a pedagogical 
orientation that is only possible in a space of intellectual freedom because, as Freire 
states, “I cannot be a teacher if I do not perceive with ever greater clarity that my practice 
demands of me a definition about where I stand” (p. 99). On all these points, teacher 
subjectivity remains an issue of existential, political, pedagogical, and ethical 
proportions, especially in these neoliberal times.  
 To reiterate, it is quite clear to me that my vision of a pedagogy of personhood 
was, in fact, supported by a uniquely visionary principal, Mr. H, who sat at the helm of 
the first school in which I worked. Despite the fact that this particular elementary school 
was steeped in the impoverishment of an extremely economically depressed 
neighborhood, it was, nevertheless, especially enriched by the earthy humanity of its 
students and their families, further supported by the school’s creatively dedicated 
teachers and staff members. In this setting, under these circumstances, and under the 
liberating direction of Mr. H, I experienced the freedom that I associated and continue to 
associate with a pedagogy of personhood; that is, a teaching practice that affirms both 
teachers and students as subjective individuals and as pedagogical partners. As a direct 
result of this pivotal, first-time teaching experience, a benchmark was established. Stated 
another way, a precedent was set from which I could envision the advancement of my 
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project of personal, professional, and intellectual freedom in the realm of education. 
 However, with a changing of the guard after the first five years, the abrupt 
experience of repression wrought by new leadership disrupted previously embraced 
conceptions and practices of pedagogical freedom under Mr. H. In effect, to have gone 
from freedom to oppression, seemingly overnight, was a shock to the very foundation of 
what I intrinsically understood as the integrity and authentic expression of my 
personhood in my role as educator. This is to say that my very freedom to be who I knew 
and crafted myself to be, in my role of teacher and from my self-conceived wholeness as 
a human being, was no longer affirmed. Encapsulating this situation as an existential 
problem of teacher subjectivity and integrity set against the demands of an anti-human 
pedagogy, Palmer (2007) states,  “good teaching cannot be reduced to technique; good 
teaching comes from the identity and integrity of the teacher” (p. 10). With the denial of 
my being, I understood that my humanity as an agentic subject was threatened, as was my 
pedagogy of personhood. How could I be and teach from a coherent space of integrity, 
grounded in humanistic modes of connection and conversation, when a 21st century, 
neoliberal pedagogy of objectification (of knowledge and people), standardization, and 
technicism was becoming evermore entrenched in the public school system?   
 It took transfers to two additional school settings, marked by progressively 
oppressive experiences in each, before I fully awakened to my own existential attitude of 
non-compliance with an intolerable status quo. In my acute awareness of my own 
situation of existential oppression, a state of being that I could no long mask or tolerate, I 
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knew that I had to decide what I would do to advance my quest for personal and 
pedagogical freedom in the world of education   
 I have, thus, situated the course of my journey as an educator in a large public 
school system, beginning with an idealized experience of existential freedom that, over 
time and across three different school settings, retreated into a dehumanizing experience 
of educator existential oppression. From a decidedly personal perspective, I use my story 
to subjectively contextualize the inhumanity of 21st century, neoliberal educational 
policies and practices as they work to break down the individual educator’s sense of self 
in both the public and private realms of her existence. Because this actually happened to 
me, one of multitudes of educators in my city and beyond, I believe that aspects of my 
experience will resonate with other persons currently working in the field. It could be that 
another educator will recognize and claim her own experience of workplace existential 
oppression; and, in doing so, possibly decide that resistance to her situation is possible, if 
for no other reason than for  the reclamation of herself should attempts to change her 
situation within the system prove unsustainable. On this note, I suggest that reclamation 
of self is not only the first step toward resistance, it is the most fundamental step for 
being able to live with a sense of existential wholeness that can be eventually, at some 
point in time and somewhere, be translated into a humanizing pedagogy that 
encompasses attitudes of present resistance and future possibility.  Only then, I believe, 
might we each be able to infuse our teaching practices with integrity and authenticity, 
even within the neoliberal gates that seek to enclose us. 
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 Next, I present the specifics of my journey from academic freedom to existential 
oppression, focusing on individual schools and their attendant scenarios along the way. I 
refer to each school in which I worked by using the first letter of the school’s name, 
followed by either elementary school or middle school. Subsequent references to these 
particular schools will take the form of complete initials. For example: P Elementary 
School (initial reference) will become PES (relative to subsequent references to that same 
school). 
P Elementary School (PES): An Introduction to Personhood and Academic 
Freedom in the Elementary School 
 
 I approached my first job in the public school system (1998) with the new 
educator’s idealistic frame of mind and purpose, positioned as a school library media 
specialist in a Title I elementary school located in the heart of a low-income community 
that served grade levels Pre-K-5. As a Title I school, my new workplace was eligible to 
receive 
 
financial assistance [provided] through state educational agencies (SEAs) to local 
educational agencies (LEAs) and public schools with high numbers or 
percentages of poor children to help ensure that all children meet challenging state 
academic content and student academic achievement standards. (National Center 
for Education Statistics [NCES], n.d., “Response:,” para. 1) 
 
Undeterred by the challenge of working in a school where students were typically short 
on academic resources and foreigners to financial privilege, I overflowed with creative 
ideas about how to engage and empower students with the love of literature, reading, and 
conducting research, from the printed page to the Internet. I was well prepared to 
collaborate with classroom teachers so that I could create library-based lessons that 
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would support and reinforce classroom instruction in novel (no pun intended) and 
alternative ways. I was ready to serve the school with programs and materials that would 
encourage use of the library for both whole classes and individual students relative to 
instruction, research, and certainly for discovering previously unknown worlds and ideas 
to be found in literature. 
 From the very beginning of my tenure at this elementary school, I was received as 
a valued member of the community, keenly aware that my expertise and skills were 
needed and welcomed. Here, the broaching of new ideas to broaden the scope and depth 
of library usage (for students and teachers alike) was an exercise in democratic action 
because shared discussions opened windows of possibilities and opportunities in which 
we could all potentially share and benefit. In this small school culture that celebrated 
diversity, democracy, and individuality, I was enabled to teach library-based lessons 
across most of the academic disciplines, including language arts, science, history, 
geography, art, and music, subsequently integrating these disciplines with the library and 
information skills curriculum for which I was solely responsible. Additionally, I created 
and co-created (with classroom teachers) school-wide programs to support the infusion of 
social justice issues within the academic curriculum, annually inviting guest speakers to 
participate in these specially created programs. In particular, a fifth-grade program, 
“Positive Role Models for Youth,” became an annual event in the school library and 
included the participation of local government and community leaders invited to serve as 
panel members. From an academic standpoint and from my position as library educator, 
what is important to understand here is that the “Positive Role Models for Youth” event 
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was the culmination of a 4-5 week-long literature study unit on social justice issues 
represented in children’s literature. As such, I conducted weekly author study classes 
across grades K-5, doing “real-life” teaching, in preparation for the culminating panel 
discussion event. 
I loved being that kind of school library media specialist because I was living my 
educational philosophy, a philosophy grounded in existential principles of individual 
freedom and subjectivity for both teachers and students, intellectual freedom, and an 
emphasis on pedagogy as a dialogical and critical endeavor. I was being myself, naturally 
living my personhood within and through my project of teaching and learning, doing 
good and meaningful work. My pedagogical values were not compromised because they 
served, in fact, as an extension of my personal values. With my personhood intact and in 
sync with my way of being a teacher, I felt an integrity that one might say speaks to both 
the mind and the spirit. I was not in conflict with myself in this particular educational 
scenario. Furthermore, my pedagogical values were consistently affirmed through my 
interactions with co-workers and school administration. In this way, my humanity was 
affirmed, externally and internally, reinforcing the experience of myself as an agentic 
subject in my role as educator.  
Specifically, I attribute much of my professional freedom at PES to a principal 
who was an independent thinker, an administrative leader who vocally expressed his 
opposition to micro-management and school bureaucracy. He often said to me, “I figure 
that you know a lot more about libraries than I do, so keep doing what your are doing. If I 
have to get involved in a decision, I will let you know.” Mr. H let all staff members know 
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that he respected individuality, personal passion, and demonstrated competence. On the 
other hand, he had absolutely no appetite for bureaucratic manipulation or for in-house 
gossip. He also maintained a cardinal rule that he would never be a “mass punisher.” In 
other words, if he ascertained a problem pertaining to either personal or organizational 
misbehaviors, he addressed the issue with the individual(s) or groups involved, in privacy 
and with appropriate discretion.  
This unusual elementary school principle, clearly not cut from either the cloth of 
conformity or the hegemonic fabric of power, maintained another simple but profound 
adage that I carry with me to this day, “If you make it an issue, it will become an issue.” 
In other words, we are each responsible for our teaching praxes and for our professional 
conduct, and we must choose that which we wish to emphasize in our interactions with 
students and with our peers. Above all, Mr. H was a particular individual who, by 
example, advanced the ideal of a pedagogy of personhood because he lived his words; 
because he demonstrated “the virtue of coherence” (Freire, 1998, p. 100) between his 
theory and his practice, between his personal values and pedagogical values, living the 
integrity of his personhood. Therefore, as a leader and as an administrative role model, 
Mr. H’s example inspired the teachers at this school to pursue their own pedagogies of 
personhood. 
 PES: Regime change and the introduction of neoliberal leadership. Although 
all staff members at my school were subject to end-of-grade testing procedures and other 
forms of neoliberal standardization policies and procedures as dictated by the school 
district and the state, for the most part, the negative effects of neoliberal ideology did not 
12 
	  
	  
infect this school’s culture over the initial five years of my employment under Mr. H’s 
leadership. However, things changed abruptly when my independent-thinking principal 
decided to retire, to be followed by a micro-managing principal, Ms. M, who represented 
herself as a proud follower of district policy and the expanding political-economic turn in 
education at the time (mid-2000s). Not only did this new, in-coming principal dictate a 
different agenda for the school, symbolizing her critical judgment of the program 
inherited from her predecessor, she even imposed her judgmental gaze on the educator’s 
physical being. During a specific encounter in the school library in which we were 
discussing my teaching/academic priorities and the school library program as a whole, I 
became uncomfortably aware of her visibly surveying the landscape of my attire, as if to 
assess the worthiness of my appearance in accordance with her particular ideals of 
correctness, her vision of the proper educational “look” for the staff she had inherited. 
 When school administrations change, there will certainly be adjustments with 
which all teachers, staff, and students must contend. However, Ms. M’s leadership style 
was clearly autocratic, evidenced by the implementation of micro-management policies 
that reeked with authoritarianism, harshness, and objectification of teachers and staff 
members. In horrifying contrast to Mr. H’s support of a pedagogy of personhood, this 
new wave of administrative and pedagogical authoritarianism, embodied in the form of 
one particular person, crashed into this school’s cultural frameworks with a powerful 
force, resulting in numerous teacher transfers at the end of Ms. M’s first year of tenure. 
Worse, this new wave of authoritarian leadership paved the way for the development of a 
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new school culture bred on distrust, competition, and outright fear of reprisal for being 
oneself, for being an individual, and certainly for practicing a pedagogy of personhood.   
 PES under neoliberal leadership: School personnel cuts. My last year at PES 
(my sixth year in total at this school), and my first year working under Ms. M’s 
dictatorial regime, coincided with worsening budget cuts approved by state education 
legislation that encompassed elimination of key assistant positions, including that of my 
media assistant, along with the elimination of the school’s technology teacher/facilitator. 
As a direct result of these cuts, my job became more technical, clerical, and task-driven 
because it was my media center assistant who had previously attended to all the clerical 
duties essential to making the school library operate, allowing me to focus on teaching 
and academic programming. Therefore, whereas previously my assistant’s valuable work 
allowed me to drive my academic vision forward, I now had to reverse the order of 
priorities in my work. The library had to function. Books (current and newly purchased) 
had to be processed and checked out. Thousands of dollars’ worth of newly mandated 
Guided Reading sets, intended for classroom use, had to be processed and distributed 
(manually and electronically) through the library’s automation system, and a whole new 
section of the library had to be revamped in order to accommodate housing these 
materials. As such, and as the newly assigned warehouse for these sets, it took the entire 
school year for me, alone, to complete this particular project. Beyond that, classroom 
equipment had to be maintained, either earmarked for repair or replaced with the 
purchase of new equipment, and the generation of help-desk tickets for computer-related 
problems became a major daily undertaking. Clearly, my roles as educator, information 
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specialist, and library programmer were submerged under the weight of these newly 
mandated clerical roles and tasks.  
 The rumblings of my existential discontent, meaning my increasing sense of 
imprisonment within the oppressive confines of the neoliberal agenda enacted by this 
new, dictatorial administrator, grew increasingly louder as I experienced myself 
becoming a piece of the anti-human machinery, held in check and maintained in “proper” 
place in order for the media center to operate according to the technicist priorities of the 
neoliberal plan. As such, and with the loss of key personnel, it became undeniably 
evident that technical tasks would be given priority over human interactions; academic 
activities would become increasingly rote, while objectification of teachers and their 
pedagogical practices would be the new norm of PES’s instructional focus. I felt 
personally affronted by the officially sanctioned objectification of both my academic 
standards and my standing as an independently thinking educator. Ultimately, I vowed to 
myself that I would transfer to another school in the district for the upcoming school year, 
and I did just that. I suppose that I instinctively understood, at that situated point in time, 
that an oppressive work environment would be an unhealthy one, and I saw no way to 
successfully resist the oppressive policies put in place under this new leadership.  
 In looking back on my motivations for leaving, I now understand that I attributed 
this unanticipated experience of educator existential oppression specifically to the 
decisions and actions of one individual, Ms. M. As a result of her powerful position as 
the new school leader, buttressed by her adherence to hard line, neoliberal policies, Ms. 
M’s willingness to effect swift and sweeping changes during that first year of regime 
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change was indisputable. I feared what was to come the next year. Moreover, even 
though my sense of self as an independently thinking individual was still intact at the 
time of my decision to transfer, this unexpected introduction to workplace oppression 
came as a genuine shock to my system. Thus sensitized and keenly aware of dangers 
lurking ahead, all I could envision for my immediate future at PES was a progressively 
encroaching devaluation of my subjective stance as an individual, the marginalization of 
my intellectual values and principles as an educator, and the overall dehumanization of 
the school environment. I perceived this devaluation, marginalization, or outright denial 
of my individual stance as a very real threat to the foundation of my personal, 
philosophical, and pedagogical being. Ultimately, my perception of this new regime and 
its leader as a real and present threat to my personal and professional existence loomed 
far larger than any desire or challenge I could muster to convince myself to stay put and 
express resistance from within.  
H Elementary School (HES): Transferring to a New Elementary School  
 I transferred to a different elementary school setting within the same public school 
system, H Elementary School, another Title I school located in a very rough part of the 
city. The school’s location never bothered me. I liked working with diverse students and 
teachers. I liked the realness of interacting with people from all backgrounds and all 
walks of life. Essentially, I endeavored to create a library program similar to the one I had 
originally created at my previous school, PES. I even had a half-time assistant in the 
mornings who drove a school bus in the afternoons. Things were going well enough at 
first, but once again, bureaucratic changes were steadily and firmly infiltrating school 
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culture by way of neoliberal policies and mandates, centralizing around an increasingly 
overriding emphasis on prescriptive, standardized teaching methods and incessant testing 
activities that began to take over the library space and my teaching schedule. The fear and 
dread I had associated with the previous year’s brush with existential oppression and the 
dehumanization of school culture, embodied by Ms. M and the implementation of her 
neoliberal agenda at PES, began to surface again, and with alarming intensity.  
 Within a short period of time since transferring to my new school, it became quite 
clear that my experience of pedagogical freedom during my first five years of 
employment under Mr. H’s administrative watch at PES, was not to be duplicated here at 
HES. The refuge that I had sought with this transfer, hoping to recover a former sense of 
personal and professional integrity,was not to be. While my new principal was generally 
reasonable and open to hearing alternative, sometimes critical points of view, she was 
visibly compromised in her role as school leader by the narrow policies of 
standardization imposed by the neoliberal agenda. Thus, it was important for me to 
understand that HES, too, had clearly become another casualty of the neoliberal regime. 
In this case, the presence of a more humane principal was rendered ineffective because of 
the overpowering controls imposed by the district school system in response to the No 
Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), It seemed that with each passing year since this 
school reform legislation was passed, the controls associated with its standardizing, data-
driven pedagogical frameworks had become increasingly tightened. *Note that the 
historical contexts of NCLB , as they pertain to the encroachment of neoliberal ideology 
in education, will be addressed in chapter II.  
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 At this juncture in the journey, then, it is important to pause the story in order to 
underscore a more fundamental understanding of neoliberal culture’s impingement on a 
view of education as a phenomenon of humanization. In essence, neoliberalism 
represents a business ideology that has been adapted to the educational setting. According 
to Pinar (2012), who refers to neoliberal education as “school deform” (p. xiii), American 
public education has been re-visioned and remodeled as a corporate entity in which 
individual “schools have been converted from educational institutions to businesses, in 
their latest incarnations as cram schools” (p. xi); schools in which students “are pressed 
to do one thing: produce higher scores on high-stake standardized exams” (p. xii). As 
such, the bottom line of business, monetary profit, has been refitted to the realm of 
schooling, the bottom line of which is test scores, the latest currency of student and 
teacher success. To be more specific, success for the student equates to a one-size-fits-all 
test performance resulting in high scores. Success for the teacher is based on her 
students’ test performances, with “accountability” being the operative word to measure 
her effectiveness (and worth to the school and the greater school system) for successfully 
teaching to the test. On this view, everything and everyone involved in education has a 
data-driven price tag. With the educational business transaction ostensibly accomplished, 
I am compelled to ask, “At what price to genuinely human development, creativity, and 
responsible citizenship?” Pinar (2012) responds, “Installing the instrumentalization of 
teaching as preparation to standardized tests vitiates academic study by stripping it of 
both subjectivity and the world, leaving us with neither intellect nor soul” (p. 33). It 
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would seem, then, that we are paying the price for an anti-human pedagogy with our 
uniquely human intellectual capacities and the subjective truths of our souls.  
 Amidst such conditions of school deform at HES, I experienced a mounting 
tension between my waning existential and pedagogical freedoms and the experience of 
dehumanization wrought by neoliberal policies and practices as they intruded upon my 
daily life there. The anxiety of working in conflict with my professional beliefs and 
personal values consistently simmered beneath the surface of the “ordinary” school day, 
progressively encroaching upon my now fragile connections to my own selfhood and 
resulting in a philosophical war within myself. While this kind of tension was sometimes 
visible in specific situations, it was yet chronically present as an invisible, oppressive 
weight upon my soul, adding to an unabiding sense of personal and pedagogical 
marginalization. Still, in my own mind, I continued to search for a rationale behind the 
experience of school-based existential oppression that would not close the doors to my 
career in public education.  
 A rationale for my experience of existential oppression: Elementary school 
culture. As I increasingly withered and cowered under the neoliberal storms of 
objectifying rules and regulations now overtaking HES, my transfer school, I developed a 
rationalistic story (my emphasis) to explain the situation in which I now found myself at 
HES. Different from my previous experience of existential oppression at PES under the 
dictatorial leadership of Ms. M (which, in retrospect, I naively attributed to her alone, as 
opposed to seeing her as representative of the larger system of neoliberal oppression in 
education), I could not blame the principal at HES because she was not dictatorial by 
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nature or design. She, too, was oppressed in her role as school administrator, having to 
comply with the system’s mandates in order to keep her job. Nonetheless, despite the 
various overt and covert signals of system-wide oppression, I found myself unprepared, 
unable, or unwilling to recognize the larger picture of dehumanization represented by the 
expansion of the neoliberal agenda across all levels of the school system. I did not want 
to believe that there was no longer a place for me in K-12 public education. So, I chose to 
shield my eyes from the bigger picture, rationalizing that neoliberal policies were more 
purposefully targeted at elementary schools where younger children and their teachers 
could be more easily manipulated and controlled. I convinced myself that because 
elementary education centers on the youngest of learners, learners requiring much more 
structure, control, and parental-type authority, that elementary school educators were 
categorized in a like manner. In other words, and in kind, elementary school teachers 
needed to teach from the standpoints of structure, control, and authority. But, does such a 
rationale ever justify the imposition of oppressive policies and practices at any level of 
schooling? Certainly not. Nevertheless, and already existentially oppressed, I could think 
of no other option, but escape, because my individual efforts at pursuing a pedagogy of 
freedom and personhood were continually subverted under teaching and testing mandates 
that co-opted my pedagogical priorities, my time, my physical teaching space, and my 
existential integrity and well-being. 
 Ultimately, I convinced myself that the cultures of the middle and high schools 
were less susceptible to neoliberal education’s oppressive tactics because adolescents and 
teenagers, while also needing structure and certain controls, were not as easily 
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manipulated intellectually and emotionally. I convinced myself that the notion of 
intellectual freedom and a more challenging style of pedagogy could still be effected at 
these levels. Again, in retrospect, I now believe that this was wishful thinking on my part, 
but my rationale at that time also indicated that I was not yet ready to either fully accept 
neoliberal educational culture nor quit public education. My attempts at resistance in the 
elementary school setting being short-lived and futile, I was yet seeking an alternative 
venue in the public school system that might prove to be a haven of hope for possibilities 
of existential and  pedagogical  freedom.  
 Thus giving myself an out with which I could choose to believe that moving to a 
higher level within public school education would afford me the personal and academic 
freedom I was desperately seeking, I sought a transfer to a middle school for the 
following academic year, after having worked only one year at HES. Besides, on the 
middle and high school levels, full-time media assistants were still the norm while, on the 
elementary school level, media assistants were virtually eliminated or, in a few isolated 
cases, kept as part-time employees. Perhaps I could resume being a teacher-librarian in 
the middle school setting, an educator hungry for personal and intellectual freedom, 
hoping to reclaim her right to a pedagogy of personhood. 
M Middle School (MMS): Transferring to the Middle School  
 After just one year spent at a second elementary school where existential 
oppression emerged, in my mind, as a phenomenon of elementary school culture, I 
successfully negotiated a transfer to a middle school position. Surely, I would be 
regarded as a well-educated and responsible adult in the middle school setting, capable of 
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implementing and managing an effective school library program in which study, 
erudition, research skills, and a decided emphasis on literature could co-exist with 
technology as a tool of support with which to advance the causes of study and intellectual 
freedom. Point in fact, technology became an immediate issue in my tenure in the middle 
school because, inheriting a 20-year-old library program in which my predecessor 
resisted many of the necessary and advantageous aspects of the district’s library 
automation system, I was charged with updating the middle school library’s circulation 
and library management systems with the district’s designated software programs. To me, 
this particular use of technology was not only essential, but it made complete sense 
because such operations-focused software programs and the tasks that drove them (i.e., 
clerical work in a technological sense) could be delegated to the media assistant (a 
position still retained at the middle and high school levels), thereby affording me the 
opportunity to establish a school library program dedicated to a broad range of academic 
and library-related pursuits. Not only was I hopeful regarding my move to the middle 
school environment, I was also looking forward to building a sense of community with 
presumably like-minded individuals, educators dedicated to sharing their subjective 
stances across their intellectual and pedagogical projects. 
 The middle school: A culture of affluence and influence. Having only worked 
in Title I elementary schools prior to the middle school, I had never experienced a school 
environment in which capitalism seemed to be so foundational to the school’s values and 
cultural environment, and supported by a community of amenable administrators, 
compliant staff members, and very significantly, a core group of affluent and influential 
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parents. The latter group, parents, was a visible source of power and influence at this 
school, located in an upper middle class neighborhood surrounded by tree-lined streets 
and mansion-sized homes, because a great many of them chose not to work outside the 
home. Along with their family and social agendas, they involved themselves, to both 
greater and lesser degrees, in the school as PTA officers, tutors, and social events 
planners. 
 To be fair, the school also “served” a large population of refugee students and a 
student population classified as “low-income” (primarily students representative of racial 
and ethnic minorities) who were bussed into this neighborhood. While it was a fortunate 
and laudable state of affairs that these socially and financially powerful parents (as well 
as some other parents not so socially embedded or financially able) saw fit to provide 
tutoring services and donated clothing to students identified as “needy,” I found it yet 
ironic that this same group of socio-economically privileged parents would routinely 
determine how the school library was to be utilized in terms of their social and political 
agendas. Whether co-opting the library teaching and circulation schedules for PTA 
sponsored fundraisers, special events, and programs, or taking over the library as a space 
in which to provide their volunteer services (many of which were justifiable and many of 
which were not in my view), they profoundly hindered (with the backing of school 
administrators) my ability to establish a library program that might challenge the status 
quo of school library as a special events venue and as a testing center (to be addressed 
more fully in the following section). On this point, it became very evident to me that my 
predecessor, along with her long-time (and my current) assistant, had not only complied 
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with, but advocated for the school library as the social center of the school, thereby 
maintaining a view of the library setting as a venue under the purview and control of 
outside authorities rather than as an academic site managed under the jurisdiction of the 
teacher-librarian.  
 A few months into my first of six years at this school, I came to understand how 
the library program was, for the most part, pre-determined by the school’s culture of 
affluence and influence, at the beck and call of parents whose wishes and priorities were 
supported by an accommodating school administration. Without realizing it when I 
accepted this position, I had walked into a pre-fabricated culture of power relationships, 
the actors involved seemingly unaware or uncaring about the credibility and integrity of 
educator personhood; that is, unless the educator chose to go along with the status quo, 
ready and willing to advance the social programming function of the library as it was 
instituted many years prior. In fact, when I questioned the situation and attempted to 
make certain changes, my assistant typically responded, “This is the way we have always 
done things here.”  
 How does a school culture of affluence and influence support neoliberal 
educational ideology? Clearly, both are grounded in socio-economic priorities purposed 
toward particular goals and power structures. I posit the assumption that the goals of the 
parent-base at this school were in line with the neoliberal agenda of education as it was 
implemented there because private school, as an alternative option to this public middle 
school, was certainly a financially doable option for a great many of them. Why did these 
parents, as a collective entity, not resist the standardization and objectification measures 
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that dominate neoliberal ideology? Did they, in fact, agree with neoliberal educational 
policies and practices? Or, were they and their children simply comfortable in this 
insulated environment of affluence and influence? I do not know.  
 Neoliberal ideology and middle school culture. 
 Appropriation of the school library as testing center. Over the course of my first 
year at the middle school, my vision of a more sophisticated, intellectual, and open-
minded school culture began to fade away while my consternation and disappointment 
increased in proportion to the escalating use of the school library as a catch-all location 
for any number of programs and events beyond the purview of the library program. 
Within a few months of my employment at MMS, I began to understand that my position 
at the middle school was not that of a school library media specialist understood as 
educator or teacher-librarian, but as a coordinator of events and, most especially, as 
overseer of the school’s centralized testing facility. As such, I became the figurehead of a 
library space that was seen as the school’s command center/site for standardized testing 
(regularly administered Benchmark tests, ESOL-English for Speakers of Other 
Languages tests, Exceptional Children tests, End of Grade tests, End of Course tests, etc.) 
throughout the school year. It is also important to clarify that with the provision of each 
specific test, there were follow-up dates scheduled for retests and make-up tests. For 
example, each time a Benchmark test was scheduled for a particular week, it was 
understood that retests and make-up tests (for absent students) would follow days, 
sometimes a week, later, thereby extending the “occupation” of the library as testing site. 
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 I grew increasingly agitated by the frequency with which I had to close the library 
for testing purposes. In fact, many teachers and students would stop by and ask me, 
“When will the library be open again for book check-out?” “When can I schedule lessons 
with you in the library?” In other words, not “when will the library be closed?” Being 
regularly closed (my emphasis) for testing purposes became the norm, the default setting, 
of the school library schedule. On the other hand, being regularly open and accessible 
became the exception. Finally, out of mounting frustration and as a strategic act of 
resistance, I calculated the amount of hours, days, and weeks that the library was out of 
commission due to testing during a particular academic year, the total amounting to three 
full months out of a ten-month school year in which approximately two weeks in 
December and a week between March and April are lost due to the Christmas/Winter 
holiday break period and spring break. In addition, it should be noted that the month of 
May is primarily a testing period (as opposed to instructional month), with the 
culminating end-of-grade tests dominating the operations of the school. I showed this 
information to my principal who understood my concerns, but maintained that there was 
no other viable venue on the school campus that could accommodate testing procedures 
for such large and varied numbers of students. In this way, closing the library was 
justified, with no possibilities for change. To my disappointment and mounting 
frustration, the library would remain the school’s centralized testing center. 
 Objectification of the educator. With my role reduced to that of testing facilitator, 
event scheduler, and technology help-desk overseer, I came to believe that academics and 
opportunities for intellectual flourishing were not associated with the functions of this 
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school library. The curricular course of study under my authority, library and information 
skills, was not part of the “tested” curriculum and, consequently, not subject to end-of-
grade testing mandates. As such, the subjects and skills I taught were superfluous to the 
bottom line of test scores, teacher accountability, and so-called school “success.” 
Furthermore, my experience in school library management was evidently a non-essential 
asset in this middle school because, as I came to realize, this library was already 
“managed” in a style conditioned to the wishes and priorities of the school’s stakeholders 
and gatekeepers. While I may have held the position of teacher-librarian or school library 
media specialist, it was in name only, the realization and ramifications of which 
contributed to an enlarging sense of ontological invisibility and violability. My 
personhood was dissolving in the everydayness of institutionally sanctioned existential 
oppression while the school’s academic imprint was linked to a status quo attitude, 
submerged within a subversive and seductive call to teamwork, because “this is the way 
we do things here.” 
 What does “dissolving personhood” feel like? I could say that it feels like a slow 
meltdown from self-connection to disconnection, a progressive unknowing of myself as a 
viable human being. Or, I could say that it feels like the slow melting of the form and 
substance of  self-identity, until that form and substance deteriorate into a flatness, a 
nothingness of not being, of not feeling the energy of my own humanity. This is not 
Sartre’s (1984) “Nothingness” (p. 44) of which I am speaking because Sartre’s 
Nothingness is expressed as an integral connection (my emphasis) to one’s being in the 
world as a “being-for-itself” (p. 117). “Nothingness is the peculiar possibility of being . . . 
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Since nothingness is nothingness of being, it can come to being only through being itself. 
. . . it comes to being through a particular being, which is human reality” (Sartre, 1984, p. 
126). On this view, Sartre’s Nothingness is the necessary counterpart to the possibilities 
attendant to a consciousness of being-for-oneself as a freely functioning subject in the 
world. In contrast to Sartrean Nothingness, what I describe as the nothingness of 
dissolving personhood represents the opposite pole of possibility, thus better understood 
as an emptiness that, for me, felt like impossibility each time my subjective stance was 
ignored, unaffirmed, or outrightly denied by the other who, ostensibly, held power over 
me. As such, my case of dissolving personhood emanated from my increasing sense of 
powerlessness and alienation in the middle school environment, disrupting my 
connection to being-for-myself as a freely choosing/acting individual.  
 Peripheral to my experience of objectification in MMS, but equally frustrating, 
was my expanding role as schedule planner and hostess for a plethora of non-library 
related meetings, workshops, class and grade-level parties and celebrations, and even 
private (non-school related) functions such as staff baby showers. The latter, functions 
organized around personal desires and private purposes, were imposed upon me and my 
workspace by school administration, seemingly in response to a school culture steeped in 
social appearances and conformity. Furthermore, as food and drink were always 
necessary features of these events, I was inadvertently delegated hostessing duties that 
included moving and setting up library furniture to accommodate the event at hand, 
serving, and cleaning up, thereby demonstrating my loyalty to the school as a team player 
(not to mention my concern for preserving the physical integrity of the library).  
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 I wish to highlight two key points that reinforce my view of this particular middle 
school as a microcosm of social conformity and individual objectification; points that 
make even more relevant a conception of existential oppression as not only a 
political/economic manifestation of neoliberal ideology transposed to the educational 
arena, but equally a phenomenon of social and cultural indoctrination. First, we must 
nuance our understandings of conformity as a social phenomenon and objectification of 
the individual as the targeted dehumanization of one’s personhood.  
 Conformity speaks to the individual’s acquiescent behavior, as a follower, in 
yielding to the pressures exerted by the dominant group in one’s socio-cultural realm. 
The exertion of pressure to conform may be overt in nature, such as when conformity is 
enforced by laws or by repressive actions exerted by the dominant group upon a weaker 
individual or group. Conformity can also be accomplished through more covert 
manipulations associated with entrenched societal norms that are mechanistically 
reinforced by family traditions, educational and cultural institutions, and the blare of 
media messages that assault our senses every day. While it may appear that conformity 
can be consciously chosen as one’s preferred social stance, the question remains as to 
whether or not the conforming choice is made within a space of conscious criticality; that 
is, within the critical awareness of one’s own subjectivity, leading to the assumption that 
the choice to conform has been freely and unconditionally made. On the other hand, it is 
possible to assume that, in relation to the breadth and depth of family, institutional, and 
societal pressures, individual subjectivity can be sufficiently compromised so that the 
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choice to conform is not only rendered available, but for many, absolutely necessary in 
terms of psychic and/or physical survival.  
 Objectification, in my view, speaks to a personally experienced process of 
dehumanization by which individual subjectivity and worth lose their relevance and value 
as qualities of personhood, certainly in the eyes of the oppressor and, over time, often in 
the eyes of the individual who is oppressed. For the perpetrator of dehumanizing policies 
and practices, objectification of the other manifests as a result of the actions taken that 
deny the other’s humanity. Paradoxically, the dehumanizer of the other becomes, himself, 
less human as oppressive behavior becomes the normative feature of daily life. For the 
human target of dehumanizing policies and practices, objectification becomes the 
condition that dehumanization seeks to achieve. In essence, objectification of the 
individual functions not only as the conceptual opposite of human subjectivity, it is, in 
actual practice, the enemy of subjectivity. In his discussion of objectivism as an anti-
human ideology, Palmer (2007) addresses objectivism’s war with human subjectivity.  
  
Objectivism was never content to quarantine subjectivity in order to stop its 
spread. It aimed at killing the germ of “self” to secure objective truth—just as 
dictators kill dissenters to secure the ‘public order,’ and warriors kill the enemy to 
secure the “peace.” (p. 54) 
 
 A question remains regarding the relationship of conformity to objectification: 
Can the individual be objectified without conforming? I posit that once the habitual 
practice (my emphasis) of objectification becomes the existential condition (my 
emphasis) of objectification within the oppressed individual’s own psyche, then that 
individual’s subjective capacities have been so compromised that conformity becomes a 
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given, as opposed to a choice. If, however, the process of objectification is not 
internalized, despite dehumanizing assaults upon the psyche, it is conceivable that the 
individual can remain in possession of her subjectively existential stance. Victor Frankl 
(2006) stands out as an extreme example of an individual whose personhood was not 
destroyed by dehumanization despite his horrific experience as a concentration camp 
prisoner during the Holocaust, famously documented in his book, Man’s Search for 
Meaning. Recounting his treatment as an inhuman object, Frankl asserts that he did not 
internalize his own objectification. While he conformed to Nazi demands at the cost of 
his life, he did not yield his subjectively inward stance, his very humanity, to his 
oppressors, to his fellow prisoners, and certainly not to himself. According to Frankl 
(2006), personhood is dependent upon the individual’s “will to meaning” (p. 99), a will 
that can only emerge within a state of being that is subjectively human and self-
conscious.  
 Returning to my characterization of MMS as a microcosm of social conformity 
and individual objectification, I make this claim based on my experience of bumping up 
against what emerged (for me) as an iron-clad cultural mindset of superficial social and 
political priorities and power games that permeated the school environment, taking 
precedence over academic freedom and professional integrity and responsibility. In spite 
of voicing my concerns (as an act of resistance) to appropriate administrators about the 
ongoing take-over of the school library by non-library related power groups, I continued 
to feel the degrading effects of personal objectification as my concerns were either 
ignored or negated. Ultimately, frustrated and increasingly powerless, I experienced 
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myself as a bystander to the events that were planned and carried out, on a regular basis, 
without regard for my integrity as an educator or the integrity of the library as an 
educational space intended to serve the educational needs of the school’s students and 
staff. For example, (a) I learned that teachers took for granted their “right” (upheld by 
school administration over the years) to hold class parties in the school library. 
Consequently, it was routine for them to request (and expect) that I block out library 
space for these class celebrations (typically including the mess of food and beverages), 
overriding my teaching and circulation schedules, with many teachers even going so far 
as to write in their class celebration dates/times on my library calendar without first 
talking to me; and (b) I was confronted with a culture of affluence and influence, 
symbolized by the school’s core group of parental stakeholders, who also took for 
granted their “right” to block out library space for their meetings and fundraisers during 
the school day, exercising their social privilege while objectifying my professional 
standing. While I certainly realized the importance of supporting school culture as a 
member of the faculty, in my view, the almost “at-will” confiscation of the school library 
program went far beyond any show of support I could legitimately sustain. I felt, and still 
feel, that these functions were subversive to my academic program and to my autonomy 
and authenticity as an educator.  
 Participating in my own objectification by continuing to work under these 
circumstances, despite failed attempts at resistance, not only weakened my academic 
visions and my pedagogical integrity, it contributed to a growing sense of loss, alienation 
from myself, as a subject in both the private and public realms of my existence. 
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Alternately resistant and acquiescent, always conflicted, I marched on for another three 
years, vowing with each summer break that I would somehow create changes that would 
assert my leadership of the school library program. For some reason, I was not yet ready 
to give up the vision. 
 Increase in staff budget cuts. Due to evermore system-wide budget cuts targeting 
school personnel, occurring approximately mid-way through my six years in the middle 
school, our technology teacher-facilitator position was eliminated. Consequently, I 
became the “go-to” person for technology matters, including trouble-shooting hardware 
and software issues, setting up equipment in each of the classrooms situated across two 
large classroom buildings, and functioning as the Help Desk liaison for a school of 1000 
plus students and 60 plus employees. I also took on rudimentary maintenance duties for 
the school’s two computer labs, still designated for use by whole classes of students 
throughout each school day. Although accompanied by classroom teachers, there was no 
real instructional oversight of students’ use of the labs; no trained technology 
professional to oversee the operation and proper maintenance of computers and related 
equipment, and certainly no technology educator to instruct students about the best and 
most appropriate uses of technology in education. While thankful that I was not 
additionally charged with the duties of technology teacher, which would have been quite 
ironic since my function as teacher-librarian had already been usurped, technology and 
related clerical matters became a primary feature of my position, right alongside my 
responsibilities as overseer of the school library as the school’s centralized testing site. 
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 Unsuccessful resistance, and waning personhood. Over time, I continued to 
voice my concerns to the principal regarding the ways in which the school library was 
being co-opted to address priorities that had nothing to do with direct academic 
instruction and support, research skills instruction and support, or the provision of library 
resources. We also discussed how the loss of key personnel impacted the nature and 
quality of my work as well as the work of classroom teachers who were always under the 
gun to teach to the test and “produce” high test scores. While she (the principal) seemed 
to sympathize, conversations always ended with a hollow resignation, “This is just the 
way things are,” and “There are no alternatives to your situation at this time.”  
 Clearly, attempts at resistance to entrenched policies of standardized testing, to 
inappropriate (in my opinion) uses of the school library, and to the altering of my 
professional duties as a teacher-librarian were not successful, leaving no real prospects 
for positive change in the foreseeable future. With that realization imprinted in my 
psyche, my “situation” began to deteriorate more rapidly, to the point of becoming 
untenable as I experienced, on a daily basis, an unabiding sense of powerlessness to be 
the person I wanted to be and to do the kind of work I desperately wanted to do; work 
that would resonate with humanistic meaning and relevance consistent with my 
pedagogical passions and my vision of the school library as an authentic educational 
resource for students and faculty alike. By compromising my personal and pedagogical 
values in surrender to the dominant ideology of the school and the system at large, I felt 
inauthentic to myself and to those with whom I worked. In this state of “bad faith” 
(Sartre, 1984, p. 89), a state in which my thoughts and my actions were out of sync with 
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the “truth” of my own subjectivities, I ultimately relinquished any sense of ownership of 
the library as my “classroom,” my academic home. Furthermore, the experience of 
personal and philosophical isolation, now experienced on a daily basis, was so pervasive 
that physical symptoms of anxiety were beginning to rule my daily life. In retrospect, I 
understand that I was experiencing the effects of pervasive alienation: from the school 
system, from the specific middle school in which I was working, and alienation from 
myself (my personhood) as I tried to navigate and stay afloat between two increasingly 
different worldviews about education.  
The Present Challenge 
 While my particular experience of K-12 educator existential oppression is now in 
the past, it continues to inform the present moment in my work as a PhD candidate and 
educator of undergraduate students. My scholarly interests in philosophy of education, 
existentialism, and cultural studies have led me to the higher education classroom where I 
encounter, all too frequently, the effects of long-standing existential oppression embodied 
in many of my students. This phenomenon, in itself, is not terribly surprising since 
students, like teachers, have been and continue to be targets of oppression in the world of 
neoliberal education. As such, students exhibit their own branding of neoliberal 
thinking—typically expressed in their preferences for rubrics, academic work predicated 
on right and wrong answers, Power Point notes, and an obsession regarding grades—
gleaned from years of indoctrination to standardized schooling practices. When they 
encounter the dialogical space of my seminar classroom, along with my emphasis on 
deep reading and reflective writing activities, they frequently register puzzlement and 
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concern. Why don’t I give them prepared templates and rubrics? Why don’t I give them 
pre-written, PowerPoint notes that they can copy and memorize? How do I grade their 
efforts if absent numerical test data? 
 This is the irony that emerges from my self-study of pedagogical personhood: the 
fact that a majority of my students are enrolled in the university’s teacher education 
program, preparing to become teachers, themselves, in the K-12 sector. As products of 
standardized education and, now, standardized teacher training, they represent an 
alternative phenomenon of resistance; that is, many of these students resist critical 
educational practices that provoke questioning of their current and, often conventional, 
assumptions about the purpose and meaning of education. Subsequently, I find myself 
confronted with the new challenge of introducing students to a critical and philosophical 
pedagogy that, at least initially, feels foreign and uncomfortable to them. I embrace the 
challenge and make meaning of it as my continuing path of resistance to the neoliberal 
agenda. To be clear, my pursuit of a pedagogy of personhood is not a crusade. It is simply 
my way of being a scholar and an educator for freedom—individual, intellectual, and 
socially democratic freedom. Existentially, it is my way of expressing a wholeness and 
consistency of integrity in my chosen life project. It is simply my way of expressing and 
affirming my personhood in the world. If I touch a few students’ hearts and minds in the 
process, possibly opening them to more deeply consider the existential and ethical 
possibilities of their own projects, I will feel grateful to have made that kind of human 
connection. 
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Closing  Commentary 
 The narrative structure of this first chapter is intended to set the stage for the 
larger philosophical/narrative study of oppression, personhood, and existentialism as 
these themes constitute the study, and as they further inform my claim that educator 
existential oppression is a present and festering reality in the lives of contemporary 
educators, most obviously those in the  K-12 arena. I will also address productive 
possibilities for those of us committed to educating for freedom, for re-humanizing 
pedagogical practice. In this vein, I will consistently refer to the pursuit of a pedagogy of 
personhood rooted in existential tenets of individual freedom, subjectivity, choice, action, 
and personal responsibility. 
 Next, in Chapter II, I specifically address the frameworks of this study, including 
a restatement of the problem of educator existential oppression; an examination of 
neoliberal education and culture, referencing noted philosophers, educators, and cultural 
theorists; and an explanation of my unconventional choice of methodology that integrates 
philosophical analysis with scholarly personal narrative writing (SPN). 
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CHAPTER II 
 
FRAMING THE STUDY 
 
 
The Philosophical Problem: Existential Oppression of the 21st Century Educator 
 Educator existential oppression can be framed in the context of Freire’s (2000) 
discussion of oppression as a system of dehumanization, situated and exercised within an 
historical milieu, yet also situated within the existential character of the individual as an 
unfinished being for whom humanization is still possible. “Within history, in concrete, 
objective contexts, both humanization and dehumanization are possibilities for a person 
as an uncompleted being conscious of their incompletion” (Freire, 2000, p. 43).  
 The unfinished quality of being human underscores that which is unique about 
human personhood, particularly from the existential perspective. Because the individual 
is not a predetermined entity, fixed and unchangeable as is an inanimate object, the 
notion of human becoming takes on a uniquely evolutionary significance linked to both 
formal and informal modes of teaching and learning. Further, existential themes 
encompassing principles of individual freedom, subjectivity, choice, action, and 
responsibility reinforce the conception of human existence as a process of continual 
development in which a humanizing educational experience is paramount. On the 
existentialist view, then, humanizing educational experiences can only be affirmed in 
freedom, and it is from a space of freedom that the individual chooses herself and her 
“fundamental project” (Sartre, 1984, p. 617) in life. 
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The free project is fundamental, for it is my being. . . . For the present we can say 
that the fundamental project which I am is a project concerning not my relations 
with this or that particular object in the world, but my total being-in-the-world; 
since the world itself is revealed only in the light of an end, this project posits for 
its end a certain type of relation to being which the for-itself [the free individual] 
wills to adopt.  (Sartre, 1984, p. 617) 
 
On this view, educator existential oppression signifies both the process perpetrated and 
the outcome achieved by the oppressive system of neoliberal education through its 
dehumanizing policies and practices.  
 What, then, constitutes the threat of educator existential oppression as it relates to 
the individual educator’s project of becoming herself, as an individual and as a teacher, in 
the world of neoliberal education? I argue that existential oppression of the 21st century 
educator is the purposeful dehumanization of the educator’s personal and professional 
being through the enactment and reinforcement of neoliberal educational policies and 
practices that deny the subjective nature of the individual, along with the exercise of her 
intellectual freedom. This dehumanization process is achieved by redefining education as 
a process of standardization and objectification based on a business model purposed 
toward power and profit in what is commonly referred to as the 21st century global 
marketplace. Thus, students are purposed toward education as a training ground for their 
roles as indoctrinated contributors to the profit-making goals of the nation, and teachers 
are purposed toward educating in the guise of obedient puppets, dehumanized to the 
status of objects that are manipulated and managed by the neoliberal regime. Objectified, 
rendered thing-like in this way, the individual educator can acquiesce or adapt to this 
anti-human scenario, compromising her own project of personal and professional 
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freedom in the process. Or, the conscious educator who does not want to relinquish her 
freedom as an independently thinking/choosing/acting individual might choose to resist 
in whatever small ways she can muster to advance her pedagogical project and, with that, 
her existential integrity. Regardless, the dehumanizing effects of existential oppression 
take their toll by compromising, at minimum, and eliminating, maximally, the educator’s 
educational praxis as a project of freedom, humanization, and possibility for herself, for 
her students, and for the social good. 
Why Focus on the Educator in These Neoliberal Times? 
 One of the most significant, but often overlooked, human casualties of the 
neoliberal educational system is the educator. I submit that this is because neoliberal 
ideology prioritizes assessment and standardized testing as the most important strategies 
in contemporary teaching/learning practices, the end purpose of which is to shape 
students into highly competent test takers who can achieve high test scores. On this view, 
a neoliberal conception of student personhood (i.e., successful test-taker), while skewed 
and deficient in my opinion, is necessarily highlighted over any substantive notion of 
teacher personhood since the student represents neoliberal education’s hope for the future 
as a profit-oriented contributor to the wealth of the nation. In this educational climate, 
teachers are reduced to the role of transmitters of predetermined, mandated information 
that students must memorize in order to answer the calculated questions that comprise 
typical testing instruments. As such, neoliberal teaching in the 21st century perpetuates 
Freire’s (2000) “‘banking’ concept of education . . . in which the scope of action allowed 
to the students extends only as far as receiving, filing, and storing the deposits” (p. 72). 
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Describing the banking concept as a model of pedagogical oppression, Freire focuses on 
the student as the intended target of its dehumanizing practices. On the other hand, Freire 
(2000) positions the teacher as an authority figure who “presents himself to his students 
as their necessary opposite; by considering their ignorance absolute, he justifies his own 
existence” (p. 72). I want to take Freire’s representation of the “banking” teacher in 
another direction; that is, to depict the teacher as another target of educational oppression 
because, as someone trained or commanded to dehumanize others, the teacher is 
simultaneously devalued and dehumanized, lost to herself as a subjectively empowered 
individual and, thus, marginalized and isolated from her own existential project. In 
essence, I suggest that today’s teacher is, at best, a manager of information and, at worst, 
a puppet, an object that performs or responds to the manipulations of those in charge of 
creating educational policies and implementing prescriptive educational practices.  
 How does the contemporary K-12 teacher respond or react to a situation in which 
she is no longer regarded as a person in the fullest sense of the word; a situation in which 
her personal and pedagogical values and expertise have no foothold in neoliberal 
education? According to Pinar (2012), many “teachers abdicate their professional 
authority and ethical responsibility for the curriculum they teach” (p. 4) because they 
succumb to their own state of disempowerment. More pointedly, “Teachers have been 
forced to abdicate this authority by the bureaucratic protocols that presumably hold them 
‘accountable,’ but which, in fact, render them unable to teach” (Pinar, 2012, pp. 4-5). I 
suggest that the most extreme consequence of this dictatorial system, extending far 
deeper than the explicit restrictions imposed upon the teacher’s freedom to teach, is the 
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educator’s growing existential disconnection from herself, exacerbated by the 
disintegration of authentic relationship between her personal and pedagogical values,. 
Hence, my scholarly purpose for this study is to shine a brighter light on the situation of 
educator existential oppression, especially as it pertains to the contemporary, K-12 
educator whose personhood, I submit, has been and continues to be devalued, even 
ignored against neoliberal education’s ideology of standardization and objectification.  
 The following section, “Critical Perspectives on Neoliberal Education as a Force 
of Oppression,” addresses the neoliberal educational model as a dehumanizing construct, 
examined through the perspectives of a variety of philosophers, educational theorists, and 
public intellectuals, and included as theoretical support of my position on the problem of 
educator existential oppression. This section is also intended to orient the reader to a 
reckoning with how, within a so-called democratic society, a nationally sanctioned form 
of educational oppression can not only be tolerated, but accepted as the educational and 
cultural norm for our times.  
Critical Perspectives on Neoliberal Education 
Voices: Scholars and Philosophers of Education 
 Many contemporary educational philosophers and theorists are outspoken in their 
criticisms of neoliberal culture and of neoliberal education, specifically. However, at this 
point in time, critical voices opposing neoliberal ideology do not appear able to 
effectively penetrate its weighty sphere of political, economic, and educational 
dominance. Nonetheless, voices of critique continue to echo from the intellectual and 
philosophical margins, even from the depths of a subjective space belonging to the 
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individual educator whose visions of freedom are sometimes voiced, embodied, and 
enacted within her particular pedagogical situation.  
 In this section, I explore the work of a selected group of such critics, to include 
Antonia Darder (2012), Shaireen Rasheed (2007), Scott Ellison (2012), David Hursh 
(2007), Henry Giroux (2013, in Polychroniou), Maxine Greene (1978), Joe L. Kincheloe 
(2011), William Ayers (2011), Parker Palmer (1990), William F. Pinar (2012), Madeleine 
Grumet (1995), Diane Ravitch (2013), Nel Noddings (2007), Martha Nussbaum (2010), 
Allan Feldman (2002), Christopher Uhl and Dana L Stuchul (2011), and Frank Smith 
(2011). Spanning the latter 20th and 21st centuries, these individuals express a common 
concern regarding the objectivist, corporate mentality that has been reproduced in public 
education, a mentality stoked by ideological frameworks extolling a nationally 
standardized curriculum of technological expertise and a view of the educational process, 
itself, as a training ground for future workers prepared to advance the nation’s interests in 
the global marketplace. On this common ground of critical opinion, a general consensus 
as to the anti-human nature of neoliberal education emerges. At the same time, many of 
these same philosophers, scholars, and cultural critics offer recommendations for 
resistance to the neoliberal agenda, consistently based in advocacy for the subjective 
stance in teaching and learning, intellectual freedom, and reinvigoration of the arts and 
humanities in education.  
 On the emergence of neoliberal ideology in education. In their respective 
articles on the topic of neoliberal education, Ellison (2012) and Hursh (2007) each 
provide historical background grounded in the political/economic contexts from which 
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neoliberalism has emerged as the normative cultural ideology and educational paradigm 
of the 21st century. In his article, “From Within the Belly of the Beast: Rethinking the 
Concept of the ‘Educational Marketplace’ in the Popular Discourse of Education 
Reform,” Ellison (2012) correlates the neoliberal infiltration of American schooling to 
the era of President Ronald Reagan’s administration and, more specifically, to the 
commission of a national report on the state of education titled A Nation at Risk: The 
Imperative for Educational Reform (1983). 
 
The rise to prominence of the concept of globalization in the discourse of 
education reform can be traced to the rightward shift in American politics over the 
past thirty years and the publication of A Nation at Risk in 1983 (National 
Commission on Excellence in Education 1983). Framing education policy within 
the context of crisis and global economic competition, Risk set the stage for policy 
debates over the past 25 + years and introduced the concept of globalization into 
the lexicon of education discourse, and it did so by constructing an image of 
public schooling as a failing institution. (pp. 119–120) 
  
 The overall implication of the report was that American education was failing to 
produce competent students, prepared to compete and achieve success as members of the 
future workforce in an increasingly connected global marketplace. While, historically, 
education and economics have always been linked in terms of job training and 
professional career opportunities for future employment, the trajectory of globalization 
forces and related power structures since the latter part of the 20th century has extended 
well beyond learning as preparation for the responsibilities of adulthood. Instead, the 
neoliberal turn in education has made learning a business project, and only those learners 
capable of “passing the test” will be recognized as capable achievers (i.e., future profit 
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makers) whose success, as contributors to the wealth of the nation, will ultimately be 
defined by neoliberal standards of performance and production.  
 Hursh (2007) specifically casts the nation’s NCLB (“No Child Left Behind”) 
program of educational assessment and testing as “part of a larger political process in 
which concerns about increasing global economic competition have been a pretext for 
neoliberal reforms that focus on increasing efficiency through privatization, markets, and 
competition” (p. 514). In his article, “Assessing No Child Left Behind and the Rise of 
Neoliberal Education Policies,” Hursh (2007) states, “NCLB, like other recent education 
policies promoting standardized testing, accountability, competition, school choice, and 
privatization, reflects the rise and dominance of neoliberal and neoconservative policy 
discourses over social democratic policy discourses” (Hursh, 2007, p. 494). 
 Writing from a socially analytical perspective, Hursh takes note of a seemingly 
collective public acceptance of NCLB, the by-product of which is an unquestioned 
discounting of what this educational model means for the marginalized students and 
educators who cannot or choose not to fit into the NCLB mold. Other than these 
exceptions, who constitute a generally powerless minority, the uncritical and compliant 
ways in which the majority of contemporary citizens understand the purposes and 
functions of our social institutions reflect the continuing success of neoliberal ideology as 
the normative cultural ideal. Pushing this point further toward the power brokers within 
the political arena, Hursh notes that a capitalistic orientation toward educational policies 
and practices dominates the nation’s legislative bodies across party lines, indicating that 
moral and philosophical notions concerning what it means to educate and to be educated 
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are swept under the bureaucratic rug as if inconsequential to the well-being of the 
individuals involved: everyday students, educators, and citizens/taxpayers who constitute 
the social fabric of the country. While the following reference is dated (2007), I include it 
here to illustrate the socio-political contexts behind which this aspect of Hursh’s 
argument stands: that neoliberal ideology had become (and continues to be) so 
entrenched in our cultural mindset that voices of critique and dissension have been 
virtually eliminated in our legislative bodies. 
 
Reforming NCLB begins with changing the way in which we conceptualize the 
purpose of education and of society itself. This helps explain why the recent shift 
from Republican to Democratic control of the federal legislature may have little 
effect on education legislation. Democratic leaders, including Representative 
Miller and Senator Kennedy, remain “steadfast supporters of the testing and 
accountability requirements” of NCLB (Hoff, 2006, p. 27). (Hursh, 2007, p. 494) 
  
 Successful ideological management, grounded in an objectified and standardized 
conception of education, work, and human existence itself, results in a state of socio-
cultural conformity that tramples notions of individual personhood as a valued state of 
being. A neoliberal 21st century crowd mentality does not support, much less recognize, 
alternative possibilities that a privileging of individual subjectivity and personhood might 
suggest as essential to human education. Worse, the cyclic nature of teacher education in 
this neoliberal climate, meaning that future teachers tend to repeat their own educational 
experiences, will continue to anesthetize or render futile imagined possibilities of 
pursuing a pedagogy of personhood for so many. Ultimately, for those of us committed to 
existential and academic freedom, deeper philosophical and, yet, action-oriented 
questions remain, begging to be answered: What is required to engender a collective, 
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social awakening to a more humanistic and democratic notion of the purpose and 
meaning of education? Or, for now, is individual resistance to neoliberal education 
(through voicing critique and re-humanizing one’s own teaching praxis, for example) our 
best hope for promoting and implementing small steps of change? 
 Neoliberalism as a threat to democracy. Darder (2012), Rasheed (2007), 
Giroux (2013), and Nussbaum (2010) frame many of their criticisms in a discourse that 
highlights neoliberal education’s threats to democracy as a way of life and to the 
development of thoughtful, independent-thinking, and responsible citizens. A 
compilation of their commentaries on this point follows. Darder (2012) characterizes 
“neoliberal policies of education” (p. 412) as intended to overthrow or, at least, supersede 
“any tacit notion that we in the United States may have once had about the importance of 
the common good and public education as a human right” (p. 412). She explains 
neoliberal policies in the context of conservative ideals that embrace privatization and 
deregulation; ideals and goals that promote economic entrepreneurship and a right-wing, 
socio-political view that shuns government involvement in social welfare initiatives. 
Pointing to a lack of social empathy or sense of responsibility to the public at large, 
Darder (2012) warns of the dangerous implications concerning public education and, 
specifically higher education, where “policies of deregulation, privatization, and lack of 
concern for the public good have rendered democratic education an endangered species” 
(p. 414). Rasheed (2007) writes, 
 
the present movement toward educational reform, with its rationalistic and 
technologically oriented curricular objectives and overtones of a national 
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curriculum, threatens to eliminate the broad citizenship function of schools in 
favor of a restrictive, market-and-workplace-skills perspective. (p. 1) 
 
Likewise, Giroux (2013) argues, “As an ideology, [neoliberalism] construes profit-
making as the essence of democracy, consuming as the only operable form of citizenship, 
and an irrational belief in the market to solve all problems and serve as a model for 
structuring all social relations” (Giroux, as cited in Polychroniou, 2013, para. 6). Adding 
her voice to those advocating for a return to genuinely democratic ideals in education, 
Nussbaum (2010) states, “Distracted by the pursuit of wealth, we increasingly ask our 
schools to turn out useful profit-makers rather than thoughtful citizens” (Nussbaum, 
2010, pp. 141–142).  
 This consensus of viewpoints, from a diverse group of thinkers, all point 
specifically to an alternative, democratic view of human education in which ideals of 
individual freedom, community investment, and social justice constitute the goals of 
teaching and learning. Democratic education, therefore, requires an emphasis on 
citizenship founded upon values of freedom, shared dialogue, and personal and social 
responsibility. Ultimately, what these critics are saying is that neoliberal education is 
more concerned with churning out competent workers and businessmen/women, as 
opposed to encouraging the development of independently thinking, responsible citizens. 
How is the situation of the contemporary educator, existentially and professionally, 
implied in this assessment of neoliberalism’s de-democratization of education? In my 
view, the answer is implicitly obvious; that where there is no freedom for students, there 
is little to no freedom for their teachers. In this mandated world of educational standards 
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and objectives, the teacher’s freedom to be an individual who chooses to teach, as 
someone subjectively invested and dedicated to education as the foundation of human 
development and as the repository of democratic social ideals, is inconsequential, 
actually inessential, to the neoliberal worldview and its profit-making project. Once 
again, lack of freedom speaks to a situation of oppression. Concerning the individual 
teacher, oppression in the educational realm functions as the denial of her subjective 
stance, her personhood. This is dehumanization, or educator existential oppression. 
 Neoliberal education’s agenda of power and conformity. Kincheloe (2011) 
wrote a great deal about the hegemonic forces that governments in democratic societies 
employ to anesthetize their citizens for compliance, particularly through the use of 
technology and the media in contemporary culture. The 21st century public is constantly 
and consistently bombarded with news and popular information intended for their mass 
consumption, rendering independent thinking and choosing unnecessary in day-to-day 
affairs. That which is understood and internalized by the public as socially, politically, 
and economically desirable constitutes the standard to which the crowd will aspire and, 
therefore, justify their goals and actions. “What this means in everyday life, of course, is 
the ability of power to produce meaning in ways that move people to adopt particular 
behaviors that are in the interests of the power wielders” (Kincheloe, 2011, pp. 239–240). 
In this way, two goals are accomplished: (a) maintenance of power for the controlling 
governmental body, and (b) the indoctrination of conformist behaviors across the mass of 
society. For the purpose of this discussion, we are considering the hegemonic power of 
the neoliberal educational regime and its effective indoctrination of conformist behaviors 
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across the American institution of education, most evident in the conformist behaviors 
demanded of students and school personnel at all levels. In existentialist terms, we are 
talking about the successful indoctrination of the herd mentality, referred to as the 
mentality of the “crowd” by Kierkegaard (as cited in Solomon, 2005, p. 32) and as the 
“Herd-Instinct” by Nietzsche (as cited in Solomon, 2005, p. 68). In effect, the herd 
mentality renders notions of individual subjectivity and personhood unnecessary and, in 
fact, undesirable in the eyes of those in power. 
 Under the conditions of hegemonic power described by Kincheloe, a pedagogy of 
personhood is made obsolete, posing a clear threat to the existential development of the 
individual educator now and into the future. Underscoring the problem of educator 
existential oppression, Kincheloe’s argument asserts that the success of hegemonic power 
rests in its purposeful and systematic demeaning and objectification of people, thereby 
promoting within us (as compliant members of the herd or crowd) a sense of alienation 
“from our own selves, our erotic, passionate, loving, interactive selfhood” (Kincheloe, 
2011, p. 241). Whether we use the language of ideological management or hegemony, the 
effects are the same: submerged or eroding connections to one’s subjective self as a 
consequence of institutionalized existential oppression which, in the end, amounts to a 
process of dehumanization. Finally, the following quote by Ayers (2011) illustratively 
contributes to a picture of the educator’s situation of existential deprivation, providing a 
concise and astute analysis of the oppressed teacher’s daily experiences in this 
educational environment. 
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Schools and school systems turn teachers into clerks. Curriculum is the product of 
someone else’s thought, knowledge, experience, and imagination. It becomes the 
package developed somewhere out there. The teacher takes the package and hands 
it on to the students. Everyone is passive, everyone a consumer, everyone 
deficient and dependent. (Ayers, 2011, pp. 99–100) 
  
 Opposing neoliberal education with advocacy for the arts and humanities. 
Ravitch lends both scholarly and political weight to arguments opposing NCLB, 
privatization of American education, and the charter school movement in that she was 
initially an advocate of neoliberal legislation and worked on its behalf before changing 
course. As “assistant secretary of education under President George H.W. Bush and 
[later] appointed to the National Assessment Governing Board under President Bill 
Clinton” (Russom, 2010, para. 11), Ravitch was well positioned to observe and assess the 
design, implementation, and outcomes of NCLB legislation. Over time, her thinking 
evolved in an opposite direction, an event which Ravitch chronicled in her book, The 
Death and Life of the Great American School System: How Testing and Choice Are 
Undermining Education. 
 
The book critiques the NCLB mindset, in which schools function as businesses 
and competition is valued over collaboration [and] chronicles how school districts 
. . . are undergoing the “shocks” of heavy-handed market reformers using 
corporate models to “discipline” their teachers. (Russom, 2010, para. 12) 
  
 Ravitch’s current stance on 21st century curriculum, as outlined in a Huffington 
Post article, calls for a curriculum that holds the arts and humanities in equal measure 
with the hard disciplines (math, science, and technology). She urges reconsideration of 
budget cuts in the interest of what “real” education is and should be. “Because of budget 
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cuts, many schools have less time and resources for the arts, physical education, foreign 
languages, and other subjects crucial for a real [my emphasis, with real inferring 
“human”] education” (Ravitch, 2013, para 29). Ravitch’s conversion from neoliberal 
apologist to educational humanist suggests an implicitly existential concern for the 
integrity of educational workers caught in the politics of the neoliberal model. 
Furthermore, I would suggest that from a philosophical perspective, having chosen to 
take an alternative stance upon which she, in fact, acted, Ravitch stands out as an 
example of existential awakening in confrontation with an unacceptable obstacle 
(neoliberal educational policies), changing course in the direction of “real” education and 
“real” education workers. 
 Among the various educational philosophers and scholars of the mid-20th century 
on into the 21st century, Maxine Greene’s work has been uniquely and focally pointed 
toward advocacy of the arts and humanities as the bedrock of education and as the well-
spring of personal and intellectual freedom. From Greene’s perspective, the arts and 
humanities function as the pedagogical foundations from which personhood, for both the 
teacher and the student, is continually developed and affirmed because confrontations 
with the arts and intellectual engagement with the humanities require and stimulate the 
subjective stance of the individual. In other words, the individual’s sense of situation and 
subjective awareness are required for perceiving and making meaning of works of art 
(visual, literary, musical, dance, theatrical, etc.), as well as for interpreting the past and its 
implications for the present and the future through the study of history and the social 
sciences. 
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I would want to see one or another art form taught in all pedagogical contexts, 
because of the way in which aesthetic experiences provide a ground for the 
questioning that launches sense making and the understanding of what it is to 
exist in a world. If the arts are given such a central place, and if the disciplines 
that comprise the humanities are at the core of the curriculum, all kinds of 
reaching out are likely. (Greene, 1978, p. 166) 
 
Within these same contexts, Greene has consistently written about education from 
an existential perspective of possibility that correlates to her philosophy of individual 
“wide-awakeness” (Greene, 1978, p. 162), understood as the condition of becoming 
referenced in an earlier discussion of Freire. As previously stated, the existential process 
of becoming is nourished by humanizing educational experiences through which the 
individual’s attentiveness to her project of self-creation in the world,is validated and 
encouraged. “Wide-awakeness has a concreteness; it is related, as the philosopher Alfred 
Schutz suggests, to being in the world” (Greene, 1978, p. 163). Adapting her existential 
rendering of wide-awakeness from her study of Alfred Schutz’s work, Greene specifically 
addresses how wide-awakeness might be understood within an existential philosophy of 
education. For her, it is indelibly connected to notions of personhood, grounded in an 
essential understanding of education as a uniquely human undertaking; an undertaking 
through which the individual defines and expresses her awareness of being (my 
emphasis) in the world, as well as her way of teaching (the teacher) and/or learning (the 
student). To reiterate this point as it relates to Schutz’s theory of wide-awakeness, Greene 
states, “He [Schutz] is also pointing out that human beings define themselves by means 
of their projects and that wide-awakeness contributes to the creation of the self” (Greene, 
1978, p. 163); further, that these projects require the individual’s “heightened 
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consciousness and reflectiveness” (p. 163) as subjects interacting with others, “not in a 
withdrawal from the intersubjective world” (p. 163). Thus, with the condition of wide-
awakeness available and engaged on both sides of the teaching/learning process, the roles 
of teacher and learner become adaptable and interchangeable amidst the dynamics of 
authentic educational experiences.  
 In sum, Greene’s educational contexts for wide-awakeness and the possibilities of 
ever-evolving personhood situate individual subjectivity at the center of the educational 
endeavor, with the arts and humanities positioned at the core of curriculum. However, 
within her philosophy of education, Greene maintains interdisciplinary connections in 
which the arts and humanities, having situated the student as a person capable of 
independent thinking and meaning making, is better prepared to engage the harder 
disciplines (i.e., math, science, and technology). 
 
The situated person, conscious of his or her freedom, can move outwards to 
empirical study, analytic study, or quantitative study of all kinds. Being grounded, 
he or she will be far less likely to confuse abstraction with concreteness, 
formalized and schematized reality with what is “real.” Made aware of the 
multiplicity of possible perspectives, made aware of incompleteness and of a 
human reality to be pursued, the individual may reach “a plane of consciousness 
of highest tension.” Difficulties will be created everywhere, and the arts and 
humanities will come into their own. (Greene, 1978, p. 166) 
 
 
 Subjectivity, personhood, and curriculum as conversation. Ayers, (2011) 
Pinar (2012), Grumet (1995), and Palmer (1990) also emphasize student and educator 
subjectivity in much of their collective works, especially as subjectivity is exercised 
through personal reflection and the dialogue that emerges from engagement with 
curriculum content; in other words, with the conversations of meaning production that 
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arise within oneself and with one another as curriculum content is confronted and 
considered from multiple points of view. Ayers’s (2011) vision of educator personhood 
holds that individual empowerment flourishes through a synthesis of personal 
introspection coupled with the engagement of social responsibility, concepts that rest in 
critical, philosophical, democratic, and dialogical methods of teaching and learning. Pinar 
(2012) and Grumet (1995) subscribe to the conception of curriculum as conversation, 
encompassing the conversations that take place with the self (personal introspection) and 
those that take place with others (social responsibility), again reinforcing a view of 
education as a personal and social process grounded in the interplay of subjective 
engagement in confrontation with external content. Moreover, Pinar (2012) characterizes 
curriculum as an existential dialogue of philosophical import, specifically embodied in 
“that complicated conversation between teachers and students over the past and its 
meaning for the present as well as what both portend for the future [because] curriculum 
theory is focused on educational experience” (p. 2). On this view, education serves as 
“our key conveyance into the world” (Pinar, 2012, p. 2). In a collection of essays edited 
by Kincheloe and Steinberg, Grumet (1995) writes that “curriculum is never the text, or 
the topic, never the method, or the syllabus,” but curriculum is “the conversation that 
makes sense of . . . things” (p. 19). Whether the internal conversation with self, 
conversations conducted with others, or the conversation that breathes life into 
curriculum, I contend that all these modes of conversation require the educator’s 
consciousness of self as a unique subject in the classroom, as well as in the world; that 
the substance of subjectivity is necessary to engage in any and all academic 
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conversations, including conversations about potential resistance to institutionalized 
oppression. On this last point, Pinar (2012) emphasizes, “self-knowledge and collective 
witnessing are complementary projects of subjective and social reconstruction” (p. 47).  
 Palmer (1990) expands upon a vision of curriculum as conversation, 
characterizing the exploration and sharing of knowledge as a dialogue of subjectively 
understood truths (with a lower case “t”), proposed and dissected by individuals invested 
in the dialogic moment. Underscoring a vision of pedagogy as personhood, Palmer 
(1990) argues, “truth is not in the conclusions so much as in the process of conversation 
itself, that if you want to be ‘in truth’ you [emphasis added] must be in the conversation” 
(p. 12). Finally, Noddings’s (2007) philosophy of care manifests in the mutuality of 
engaged and caring conversation between the teacher and learner. “[D]ialogue 
contributes to the growth of cared-fors. . . . care theorists agree with Socrates (and Adler) 
that an education worthy of the name must help students to examine their own lives and 
explore the great questions human beings have always asked” (Noddings, 2007, p. 228). 
 Ultimately, in the most simple of statements on educator personhood, Feldman 
(2002) reminds us, “the teacher is a person who is being a teacher” (p. 235), that the 
educator’s choice of work is but one expression of her being, her selfhood. Uhl and 
Stuchul (2011) emphasize the relational dimension of teacher personhood as essential to 
“teaching as if life matters” (p. xvi). According to Uhl and Stuchul, the teacher’s 
relationship with herself, as a consciously situated and responsible subject, is pivotal to 
constructive relationship-building with others. Building on Feldman’s rendering of 
person as teacher and Uhl and Stuchul’s relationship focus, Smith (2011) portrays 
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learning as a natural and evolutionary human endeavor that takes place in both informal 
and formal settings because human development is a fundamentally existential process in 
which intellectual, emotional, and physical growth can flourish within the individual and 
across relationships. 
 
Learning is like physical growth in that it usually occurs without our being aware 
of it, it is long-lasting, and it requires a nurturing environment. It takes places as a 
result of social relationships . . . and it pivots on personal identification. (Smith, 
2011, p. 385) 
  
Voices: Public Intellectuals, Cultural Critics, and Technology Theorists 
Numerous other scholars, cultural commentators, and technology theorists offer 
diverse perspectives on 21st century values and lifestyles that, directly and indirectly, 
reflect concerns with the direction in which 21st century education is aimed. In this 
section, I explore the views of Noam Chomsky, a world-renowned scholar and public 
intellectual. I follow with discussions of three other individuals, Nicholas Carr, Sherry 
Turkle, and Jaron Lanier, whose areas of interests and expertise encompass scholarly 
research and writing, cultural criticism, and a collective concern with the questionable, 
negative effects of 21st century technological reliance on the culture at large; further, 
how this technological reliance reinforces the standardization and objectification 
measures that undergird the neoliberal educational mission. I aim to show how the 
individuals selected for this section problematize a culture of technocracy that supports 
neoliberal educational goals and practices that, in turn, degrade and oppress the 
existential integrity of the individual who chooses to be a teacher. 
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 Noam Chomsky: On intellectual freedom and humanism in the university. 
Noam Chomsky is a highly regarded scholar in linguistics and human cognition, as well 
as an intellect of impeccable reputation. He has written extensively about a variety of 
topics, from the realm of academia to the political sphere, with common threads of 
humanism and social justice weaving through his broad range of work and intellectual 
interests. In his article, “Paths Taken, Tasks Ahead,” Chomsky (2000) writes about the 
trajectory of university education from the late 1960’s to the year 2000, illustrating how 
the academic institution, traditionally considered the hallmark of intellectual freedom and 
defender of social justice, has been infiltrated by the oppressive hand of neoliberalism. In 
the passage that follows, Chomsky not only addresses this situation, but also deconstructs 
the term “neoliberal” as a misrepresentation. 
 
The problems are heightened with the expansion of private power in every 
domain, in the course of the state-corporate social engineering projects of the past 
several decades. Those projects, designed to shift decision-making authority even 
further from the public sphere, with all of that sphere's serious deficiencies, to 
private power, which is unaccountable in principle, are often called neoliberal—a 
highly misleading term: they are not new, and would have scandalized classical 
liberals. (Chomsky, 2000, p. 35) 
 
Chomsky (2000) alludes to the responsibility of the university to foster 
personhood and independent thinking among all its constituents. Incorporating a view of 
“intellectual history” (Chomsky, 2000, p. 34) as a two-pronged function of inquiry, he 
explains that intellectual inquiry revolves around “a distinction between inquiry into what 
the world is and how it works and into how a decent life should be lived” (p. 34). In this 
statement, we can see both the distinctions and interdependence of the scientific and the 
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philosophical. This dual approach to inquiry is necessary and, I suggest, predicated on 
understandings of personhood as the basis of intellectual inquiry. Whether inquiry is 
scientific in design or philosophical in nature, there can be no inquiry without an inquirer. 
Moreover, I posit that any kind of inquiry implies the condition of human wonderment, 
that philosophical orientation to thinking about the physical world as we can know it and 
our respective places in it, the kind of thinking of which only the human individual, as 
viable subject, is capable. 
 Amidst the 21st century emphasis on information access and technological 
knowledge production, Chomsky (2000) reminds us that humanism is and should be the 
driving force behind all intellectual, scientific, and worldly endeavors. On this view, he 
holds the university responsible for retaining its academic and humanistic integrity as a 
pedagogical space in which intellectual and personal freedom are extended to all who 
inhabit this space, so that inquiry of all kinds and from all corners are valued and 
respected. 
 
Universities should seek to develop the thinking, the ideas, the insights into 
science and human life, the knowledge and the broad understanding that are 
needed to help us find our way to a more human future. Pursuit of such goals 
requires substantial freedom from external pressures. Furthermore, that freedom 
must be distributed: it is not only for administrators and professors but for all 
those who take part in the life of the university: students, faculty, staff. That goal 
may be hard to reach, but it should remain as an ideal to be actively sought. 
(Chomsky, 2000, pp. 34–35) 
  
 From Chomsky’s theme of freedom leading to a more equitable and “a more 
human future,” I turn to the controversial issue of technology in terms of its impact on the 
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human condition as we know it today and, certainly, as it relates to technology’s 
ubiquitous presence in neoliberal education. 
 Nicholas Carr: On what the Internet is doing to our brains. Nicholas Carr 
targets the negative effects of technology, specifically Internet use, on human reading 
capacities and habits of learning in his book, The Shallows: What the Internet is Doing to 
Our Brains. Tracing the history of technological innovation, Carr (2010) illustrates how a 
particular technological medium, overwhelmingly present in terms of availability and 
application across the public landscape, profoundly influences the culture in which it 
predominates. He further explains that the human brain changes and adapts to the 
dominant medium based on the scientific study of neuroplasticity. “The brain’s plasticity 
is . . . universal. Virtually all of our neural circuits whether they’re involved in feeling, 
seeing, hearing, moving, thinking, learning, perceiving, or remembering are subject to 
change” (Carr, 2010, p. 26). In essence, the human brain molds to the intellectual 
challenges presented, or to the lack thereof. According to Carr, as the predominant 
medium of the 21st century, the Internet is a cause for concern regarding a number of 
perceived deficiencies in certain areas of brain function that hold severe consequences for 
educators and the work of teaching and learning. 
 Carr is especially concerned about the Internet’s impact on contemporary reading 
habits, highlighting a decreasing ability and desire to read deeply and with retention. Due 
to 21st century habits of multi-tasking, simultaneous browsing/reading of Internet web 
sites, and the interruptions imposed by email and Facebook checking, Carr points to the 
emergence of human brain adaptations that reduce reading to a skimming process across 
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the computer screen, resulting in a streamlined, fragmented, and superficial experience of 
reading; one that is very different from the kind of brain processes required for reading a 
book with sustained attention and retention.  
 The negative implications for education and for educator personhood, in terms of 
pedagogical and existential values, run deeply as computers have become the favored 
teaching tool of the 21st century. The end effect is the technicization of intellectual 
development and the dehumanization of teacher personhood, along with a kind of 
mechanized objectification of student personhood. Students adapt to the 
depersonalization of their roles as learners and to the depersonalization of the 
pedagogical relationship very early on in their schooling experiences. Even more 
problematic, as a result of being schooled or domesticated in this way, students become 
detached from the deeper existential questions of lived experience as they become more 
attached to virtual experiences, educational and otherwise, predicated on Internet 
connections that replace face-to-face interactions with others and the natural world. I 
suggest, it could be said that existential oppression, as a concept and as lived experience, 
is foreign to most students today because they have known nothing else. The freedoms 
they do understand and cherish are those related to connection, to Internet access, to 
being (my emphasis) as a technological experience of living. As the medium of our times, 
computer and Internet use “mold(s) what we see and how we see it—and eventually, if 
we use it enough, it changes who we are, as individuals and as a society” (Carr, 2010, p. 
3). 
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 Finally, reliance on instructional and testing software programs relegates the 
educator’s role to that of facilitator or manager of technology-driven instruction and 
testing procedures. In my former role as a school library media specialist who prioritized 
reading for pleasure as one of my program objectives, I was very clearly impacted by a 
computer driven reading program, Accelerated Reader, that removed free choice and an 
intrinsic sense of pleasure from the reading experience for many students. With 
Accelerated Reader frequently mandated by school administrations, visiting the school 
library to check out a book became a systematic exercise of book selection based on pre-
determined reading levels and point values (as opposed to real interest). This reading 
experience would then be followed by the students taking a computer answering rote 
(non-critical) questions on required, follow-up computerized tests. Following is a 
reflection on my experience with the Accelerated Reader program.   
 Reflection on a technology-based reading program in the elementary school. 
As a former media specialist, I witnessed the take-over of technology in both the library 
and in classrooms. On the elementary level, in particular, computer-based reading 
programs like Accelerated Reader (required by the majority of school principals at the 
time) required that students read books from a specific list of so-called “AR” titles and 
then take computer-generated tests to assess what they “got” from the reading experience. 
Tests were composed of multiple choice questions based on concrete knowledge of the 
book (i.e., characters, setting, the story “problem,” and ending); no critical or 
philosophical thinking involved here. Furthermore, students could only choose those AR 
books that were coded according to their so-called prescribed reading levels and abilities. 
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As media specialist, I (sometimes with volunteer help) had to label every AR book with 
its proper code pertaining to its designated reading level, with additional coding 
information written on the inside of the book cover and color-coded dots affixed to the 
book spine for identification purposes. In turn, book titles designated for the AR program 
also had to be identified as Accelerated Reader books in the library’s automation system. 
Adherence to the AR concept of reading skills development meant that a student could 
not choose to read a book in which she was interested if it was not coded specifically 
according to her diagnosed reading level. Because the student was limited to book 
selections in this way, I always felt that her freedom to choose alternative and more 
challenging titles was denied. As the leader of the school library, I felt that my freedom to 
resist this kind of manipulated reading design was compromised, as well—by the school 
administration who mandated the program and by the classroom teachers who relied upon 
it for their students’ reading habits in class. Nonetheless, I resisted the Accelerated 
Reader program in the two elementary schools in which I worked by not adhering to its 
strict guidelines. Going further, I de-emphasized and interfiled the AR books with the rest 
of the library collection in my first school (PES) soon after I arrived there. Prior to my 
taking over that library’s leadership, AR books were shelved in a large section of the 
library dedicated specifically to those titles. Apparently, my predecessor had no problem 
running an AR-focused school library and, consequently, that was its most popular 
section until I came along. That oppressive culture of reading was palpable at first, but 
with the free rein initially given to me by Mr. H, I made it my goal to encourage students 
to browse all the library books. I encouraged them to choose at least one other book (in 
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addition to the required AR title) that was not an AR book; in other words, to choose a 
book for an experience of freedom in reading and not linked to test-taking. One final note 
on my resistance to the Accelerated Reader program: When I took over the middle school 
library, the principal asked me to consider implementing the program there. By 
presenting factual information about the AR program (including the associated expenses 
and labor that would be involved in purchasing and implementing the program with its 
required software, tests, lists, coding procedures, etc.) to the school administrators, along 
with my strong reasons for opposing the program, I successfully resisted what I 
considered the tyranny of neoliberal technicism upon the student’s freedom to read. In 
turn, I affirmed my own freedom, as a pro-active educator, to encourage a wide range of 
reading experiences without reducing reading to a testing experience. 
 While the issue of technology may not loom as overtly central to the problem of 
educator existential oppression for some, I maintain that it reinforces the neoliberal focus 
on standardization, testing, and objectification—objectification of subject matter and 
objectification of the teacher and learner. This point has already been made and will 
continue to be reinforced throughout this project. I also want to emphasize the idea that 
standardized curriculum and standardized tests are made possible and manageable, on a 
national scale, through the use of technology as contemporary education’s primary 
teaching tool and assessment device. Furthermore, and as will be evidenced by the voices 
referenced in the following sections, controversial discussions abound regarding the 
negative impact wrought by technology on a variety of intellectual and social skills that 
manifest in the educational environment, including deficiencies in students’ reading and 
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writing skills; teachers’ reliance on rote instructional practices, deferring to Power Point 
and other technology-driven teaching tools; and obsessive habits involving multitasking 
and the use of social media. To reiterate, on these and other related points, I submit that 
the neoliberal educational agenda is well served by a technicist approach that promotes a 
generally passive, screen-based orientation to teaching and learning. Thus, I submit that a 
case can be made for the strong connection between technology-based schooling 
practices and dehumanization of the educator who is compelled to teach and test 
according to the neoliberal paradigm. With her subjective stance on the line, the 
educator’s particular pedagogical expertise and personal values and ideals are neither 
welcomed nor affirmed. 
 Sherry Turkle: Lived versus virtual experience. Sherry Turkle has an extensive 
background in technology research and innovation. With additional credentials as a 
licensed clinical psychologist, her work integrates technological concerns with existential 
concerns. As such, “Professor Turkle writes on the ‘subjective side’ of people’s 
relationships with technology, especially computers. She is an expert on mobile 
technology, social networking, and sociable robotics” (“Sherry Turkle,” n.d., para. 4). In 
her most recent book, Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less 
from Each Other (2011), Turkle calls into question the values and lifestyle habits 
associated with our culture’s obsession with technology, at times singling out the 
deleterious effects that technology dependence exacts on young people. She sounds a 
distinctive alarm about the changing nature of human relationships in the technological 
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universe; changes that, by extension, echo with alarming implications for education as a 
lived and embodied human project. 
  
[This book] is about how we are changed as technology offers us substitutes for 
connecting with each other face-to-face. We are offered robots and a whole world 
of machine-mediated relationships on networked devices. As we instant-message, 
e-mail, text, and Twitter, technology redraws the boundaries between intimacy 
and solitude. Teenagers avoid making telephone calls, fearful that they reveal too 
much. They would rather text than talk. Adults, too, choose keyboards over the 
human voice. In all of this, there is a nagging question: Does virtual intimacy 
degrade our experience of the other kind and, indeed, of all encounters, of any 
kind? (Turkle, 2011, pp. 11–12) 
 
From an existential perspective, a fundamental aspect of Turkle’s message is that 
the actual desire (my emphasis) to be conscious to one’s subjective self, as well as to the 
messy challenges of real-world personhood, fades against the backdrop of virtually 
generated modes of existence and relationship that can be easily, quickly, and 
anonymously accessed and experienced mechanistically. In a cultural climate such as 
this, I suggest that 21st century identity consciousness might be better understood as an 
externally generated state of being, displacing the inwardly sourced self-consciousness of 
personal introspection. I further suggest that this situation represents an insidious form of 
existential oppression, beyond this project’s main topic of educator existential 
oppression. Nevertheless, the 21st century educator is not immune from this lifestyle. In 
fact, she must engage in it in order to comply with the neoliberal educational agenda. 
Therefore, for many people, including the properly indoctrinated educator, technology 
dependence is addictive, taking hold of the mind and the body, and threatens the human 
capacity to choose and act independently. Based on this context of technologically 
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induced existential oppression, it is not a big stretch to imagine its power to intensify 
practices of standardization and objectification as forces of existential oppression in 
education. 
 Jaron Lanier: A technology pioneer’s concern for the waning self. Along with 
Turkle, Jaron Lanier is recognized as an established expert in the field of technology. 
Having worked in the computer industry since the 1980s, Lanier’s attitudes toward the 
use and direction of 21st century technology, in both personal and public life (including 
the realm of education), have changed course in ways that express deep concern for the 
human condition. In an article published on the website Smithsonian.com (January 2013), 
titled “What Turned Jaron Lanier against the Web,” Ron Rosenbaum aptly describes 
Lanier’s change of course. 
 
Lanier was one of the creators of our current digital reality and now he wants to 
subvert the “hive mind,” as the web world’s been called, before it engulfs us all, 
destroys political discourse, economic stability, the dignity of personhood and 
leads to “social catastrophe. (Rosenbaum, 2013, para. 2) 
  
 In particular, Lanier (2010) targets the proliferation of social networking sites as 
agents of depersonalization and dehumanization, supported by a “culture of 
technologists” (p. 1). In an article written for The Chronicle, “The End of Human 
Specialness,” Lanier (2010) directly criticizes Facebook. 
 
Decay in the belief in self is driven not by technology, but by the culture of 
technologists, especially the recent designs of antihuman software like Facebook, 
which almost everyone is living their lives through. Such designs suggest that 
information is a freestanding substance, independent of human experience or 
perspective. As a result, the role of each human shifts from being a special entity 
to being a component of an emerging global computer. (p. 1) 
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Lanier’s warnings about the waning self-speak directly to my concerns about 
existential oppression in the institution of education. As teachers and professors, if we 
continue to do the work of education as “waning selves,” we are complicit in our own 
dehumanization and, with that, the dehumanization of our students. 
Voices: The Classic Existentialists 
 Undergirding this study are the voices of classic existential philosophers, 
including Søren Kierkegaard (passionate commitment), Friedrich Nietzsche (individual 
empowerment, becoming oneself), and Jean-Paul Sartre (individual freedom, subjectivity, 
choice, action, and responsibility). While individually their philosophical theorizing was 
not directed at education per se, it is clear to me that Kierkegaard’s notion of passionate 
commitment translates well to a humanizing vision of education that requires investment 
of the subjective self, representing a commitment to personhood. Nietzsche’s emphasis 
on individual empowerment and individual becoming inspires notions of authentic 
personhood that would flourish within a humanistic educational model. Moreover, 
Nietzsche’s emphasis on self-empowerment speaks to the existentially oppressed 
educator’s developing awareness of an existential attitude from which she might choose 
to resist neoliberal domination, as well as potentially seek new possibilities for achieving 
personal and pedagogical freedom. Sartre’s existential conceptions of freedom and being 
(my emphasis) in the world, constituting the individual’s fundamental project, are 
implicit to realizing the educational endeavor as an existential undertaking. Throughout 
these pages, it will be Sartre’s voice that I channel most frequently when discussing 
existentialism as a philosophical theory of existence that holds real possibilities for the 
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educator who wishes to resist and/or move beyond her situation of oppression under the 
neoliberal educational regime. 
Methodology 
 Blending philosophical inquiry, textual analysis, and scholarly personal narrative 
(SPN) writing, I intend to unite philosophy, personal narrative, and pedagogy specifically 
through the lens of existentialism. Underscoring my choice of methodology is my 
commitment  to “doing” the kind of existential, philosophical research with which I can 
unite both my scholarly interests and my personal values; in other words, a methodology 
that upholds the integrity of my commitment to scholarship with my own existential 
project of being. The same kind of commitment applies to my evolving teaching practice 
in that I am consciously and intentionally in (my emphasis) my way of teaching 
existentially, critically, philosophically, and of prime importance, relationally with my 
students and among my peers. In essence,  existential subjectivity is the ground from 
which my processes of researching, writing, and teaching intersect and reach outward 
into the world of others. 
 
Understanding incorporates comprehension but the expertise and the erudition 
upon which it depends require the cultivation of subjectively situated, historically 
attuned intellectual judgment. Such judgment is informed by academic knowledge 
and professional ethics, by technical know-how coupled with a passionate sense 
of public service, all threaded through the subjectivity of the socially engaged 
individual. (Pinar, 2012, p. 43) 
 
The nucleus of subjectivity around which existential philosophy revolves is not to 
be construed as an isolated, self-serving, enclosed space that excludes others, or worldly 
concerns, or moral considerations of the human condition, especially as subjectivity 
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impacts educational spaces. In Pinar’s (2012) discussion of “subjectivity’s significance to 
the complicated conversation that is the school curriculum” (p. xv), he elaborates on the 
importance of 
 
threading one’s subjectivity—simultaneously socially structured and historically 
informed—through academic knowledge to communicate with others . . . Indeed, 
it is through academic knowledge, I [Pinar] am suggesting, that we find our way 
into the world. (p. xv) 
 
On this understanding, I suggest that it is through my subjectivity, as it informs my study 
purpose and my methodology, that I can authentically illustrate my pursuit of a pedagogy 
of personhood, also looking to possibilities for connecting with others—be they students, 
teachers, administrators, scholars—or some other person who experiences a sense of 
resonance with this individual’s pursuit of her fundamental project. 
Scholarly Personal Narrative Writing 
 Scholarly personal narrative writing (SPN) is a research/writing methodology 
originated by Dr. Robert J. Nash (University of Vermont). Aligning in many ways to “the 
narrative tradition of such scholars as Ruth Behar, Jerome Bruner, Kieran Egan, 
Madeleine Grumet, Richard Rorty, and Jane Tompkins” (Witherell, as cited in Nash 
2004, p. vii), SPN retains its own unique characteristics as a narrative genre. Distinct 
from narrative research methods that interrogate the stories of other individuals in which 
the researcher looks for common themes, SPN positions the researcher as subject. Nash is 
very direct about the necessity of researcher subjectivity as it serves the researcher’s 
project and underscores the potential of the project’s broader applications. 
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What I am advocating, however, takes qualitative research one major step further. 
SPN puts the self of the scholar front and center. The best SPN interview is the 
scholar’s self-interrogation. The best analysis and prescription come out of the 
scholar’s efforts to make narrative sense out of personal experience. (Nash, 2004, 
p. 18) 
  
 At the same time, SPN is distinct from a strict autobiographical account in which 
the chronology of a life is examined for the purpose of exploring the meanings associated 
with that particular life. Instead, SPN “writers use their personae in order to explore 
subject matter other than themselves” (Nash, 2004, p. 28). With SPN, the researcher’s 
narrative is central to the research process (my emphasis), thus capturing the process as a 
personally oriented endeavor, while the larger purpose—specifically, the specified 
problem—and the larger scope of the study problem remain intact.  
 
The ultimate intellectual responsibility of the SPN scholar is to find a way to use 
the personal insights gained in order to draw larger conclusions for readers; 
possibly even to challenge and reconstruct older political or educational 
narratives, if this is an important goal for the researcher. (Nash, 2004, p. 18) 
 
Note: See Appendix A: “Ten Guidelines for the SPN.” Here, I explain each of Nash’s 
guidelines and address my approach to each guideline relative to the planning, 
implementation, and writing of this project.  
Responsibility and Authenticity as Scholar/Researcher 
 My intellectual responsibility is to conduct myself as an ethical and diligent 
researcher and scholar, such responsibility preceded only by my responsibility to be 
authentic to my study purpose and to the meanings that I make as they emerge in this 
work. As consistently stated, my purpose is to illuminate the philosophical problem of 
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existential oppression in the realm of 21st century education, specifically targeting the 
situation of the educator. In order to meet my ultimate intellectual responsibility, I intend 
that the insights achieved through my work, and the ways in which I write about them, 
will highlight the problem of educator existential oppression in such a way as to “draw 
larger conclusions for readers; possibly even to challenge and reconstruct older political 
or educational narratives” (Nash, 2004, p. 18). Nash qualifies this last statement with “if 
this is an important goal for the researcher” (p. 18). In my multiple roles as scholar, 
researcher, educator, and philosophical advocate, my intended goal is to create a 
dissertation worthy of challenging the dominant, neoliberal narrative from the perspective 
of the existentially oppressed educator; that is, to challenge the neoliberal educational 
agenda by shining a light on a problem (institutionalized oppression) that is all too 
frequently suffered in silent compliance and in the darkness of submerged identities. To 
this end, I position myself as a potential change agent, intent on radically humanizing the 
situated space of my undergraduate classroom. Philosophically speaking, I choose to 
leave the darkness of the neoliberal cave and move into the sunlight of self-awareness 
and social responsibility, a kind of reclamation of my teaching self and a commitment to 
a certain kind of pedagogical philosophy that has its roots in existentialism.  
 Finally, the authenticity of my purpose, along with the scholarly work to be 
produced, rests on my authenticity and integrity as an individual who has experienced 
existential oppression in the realm of K-12 public education. As one among a multitude 
of education workers who have experienced or who continue to experience institutional 
dehumanization on a daily basis, I hope that my voice will resonate beyond the pages on 
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which I write and will resound with personal validity for others. Ideally, I would hope to 
awaken existential attitudes of resistance among a few current and future teachers should 
they read my work. Expanding the cave metaphor further, I offer a quote from Greene 
(1973) whose words, although written decades ago, echo with particular relevance to my 
concerns at this present time: “If ever there was a desire to be released from ‘sunless 
caves,’ the desire is apparent now. If ever there was a need for sunlit mountaintops, the 
need exists today” (p. 37). I submit that the sunless caves of neoliberal educational 
ideology can be excavated—with great challenge and difficulty, and over time, by 
chipping away at dehumanizing pedagogical practices piece by piece. Through the 
conscientious efforts of individual teachers who, newly awakened to existential attitudes 
of resistance grounded in possibility, projects of self-reclamation can be enacted through 
their commitment to teaching as a pedagogy of personhood. In fact, according to Pinar 
(2012), “Teachers can express intransigence to this fascist regime by expressing loyalty 
to the profession, by refusing to teach to the test, by insisting that students engage with 
ideas and facts critically and with passion through solitary study and classroom 
deliberation” (p. 10). While I agree wholeheartedly with Pinar, I would also suggest that 
each individual teacher can choose to create her own authentic path of resistance as it 
best serves her situation, hopefully within the school building. However, for some, as was 
the case for me, the choice to leave a particular educational environment in order to 
advance a pedagogy of personhood might prove to be a necessary response. Regardless of 
the choices made, from an existential perspective of personal freedom and responsibility 
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linked to academic freedom and social responsibility, I submit that small steps taken 
toward possibilities of educator liberation are better than no steps. 
Design and Scope of Study 
While the academic scope of this work encompasses the theories of classical 
existential thinkers such as Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, along with 20th century 
philosophers and educational theorists—highlighting Beauvoir, Fanon, and Freire - I 
primarily rely on Sartre’s theories to serve as the philosophical basis from which to 
advance a conception of existentialism, via the existential attitude, as a viable response to 
educator existential oppression. In line with this focus, I apply my understandings and 
interpretations of Sartrean existential tenets (individual freedom, subjectivity, choice, 
action, and responsibility) to my way of being an educator, researcher, and scholar. 
Overall, I integrate philosophical inquiry and analysis of existential conceptions of 
oppression and personhood, along with an exploration of existential philosophical theory, 
with personal narrative. My purpose behind this integrated design is to make my 
scholarly process more personally and existentially relevant and accessible to the 
potential reader. As for the narrative portions in general, personal reflections and 
commentaries are interspersed throughout the chapters. However, in Chapter IV, 
“Turning to Existentialism, I specifically use “existential” data, excerpts culled from 
post-class, reflective field notes that I wrote after each class session taught throughout the 
spring of 2013, to illustrate the existential tenets or principles addressed in this chapter. 
To be clear, all narrative portions, and especially the focused inclusion of real-world field 
74 
	  
	  
notes in Chapter IV, are intended to illustrate and support the philosophical foundations 
of this study from both personally subjective and pedagogical perspectives.  
Study Dynamics 
 Interestingly relevant to my personal experience of educator existential 
oppression and my subsequent move to higher education and the undergraduate 
classroom, is the fact that the majority of students I currently teach are teacher education 
majors, required to take the particular foundations of education course that served as my 
self-study laboratory during spring 2013. Then, and now as instructor of an 
undergraduate philosophy of education course, I teach my students about education from 
historical, cultural, philosophical, and social justice perspectives, also bringing the 
subjectivity of my own lived experiences as a former K-12 educator to our discussions. 
While I am sensitive to the fact that these future teachers are currently being trained 
according to the neoliberal educational model (since mainstream teacher education 
programs are aligned with the standards, goals, and objectives of public education), I 
embrace the freedom to purposefully position my pedagogical stance in philosophical 
advocacy and a critical orientation toward the contemporary educational scene.  
 From the very start of the semester, I explain my teaching philosophy, connecting 
existential principals to classroom practices that include open and interactive dialogue 
(seminar-style), emphasis on the student as individual, classroom community-building, 
and a focus on democratic concepts of social justice, prioritizing respect for both 
individual voice and multiple perspectives. In this regard, and as a person who has 
purposefully chosen the work of education, I intentionally project my humanity to my 
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students through personal story and through consciously extended invitations for 
meaningful, dialogical interactions—in this way, being for myself while also being for 
and with (my emphases) my students, individually and communally. The purpose is to 
“walk my talk,” so to speak—an exercise of personal and pedagogical authenticity based 
on enacting my philosophical pursuit of personhood (for my self and for my students) in 
the classroom. On this point, I hold close a particular comment made by a student during 
one of our class meetings, “You actually teach according to what you say you believe!” 
Finally, I continually explore my own subjectivity within an ongoing process of 
reflection and analysis of my effectiveness as an educator, along with my personal 
development as a human being, a process very much reflected across my field notes.  
While students are not interviewed or identified in this self-study (as such, not 
involving other human research subjects nor specific IRB approval), my perceptions of 
their reactions to me greatly inform my understandings of myself as an educator; as 
someone intent on teaching and learning who I am in the present, and who I am 
continuing to become, as a person/scholar/educator. At the same time, I am also intent on 
awakening students to their own understandings of themselves and their evolving 
educational philosophies. Are these future teachers concerned, even aware, of existential 
oppression as a threat to their assumptions or projected ways of being teachers? Or, do 
these undergraduates disagree with the image of the educator as a marginalized, 
dehumanized figure within the institution of education? Do they seek empowerment and 
possibilities for change in education as it is practiced today, or do these future teachers 
align, unreservedly, with 21st century educational policies and practices? In other words, 
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the ways in which students respond to me are strong indicators of how neoliberal 
schooling has impacted them over their previous years of K-12 schooling (along with 
family and other socio-cultural dynamics that influence childhood and teenage 
development); as such, implicating a potential disconnect between their understandings 
of education and mine, their notions of personhood versus mine, their comfort level 
regarding self-expression versus mine, and their understandings of the human condition 
versus mine. 
As a final note regarding the purpose and dynamics of this study, I want to 
reiterate that while the focal problem under exploration is what I term educator existential 
oppression (assumed to be perpetrated from above, within the educational hierarchy of 
school districts and administrators), students are, obviously, fundamental to the teacher’s 
situation. So, while the educator, as opposed to her students, stands at the center of this 
study, the interplay between them is crucial since, existentially speaking, the teacher 
cannot exist as an educator without her students. The phenomenon of educator existential 
oppression complicates the natural interplay between teachers and students. As will be 
illustrated in Chapter IV, such complications take on a paradoxical turn when students, 
themselves, function as both the products and the inadvertent transmitters of the 
messages of oppression. 
Study Recommendations: Limitations and Ongoing Research 
 An existential study of pedagogy that positions the educator as subject holds 
important implications for herself and her students. Teaching strategies that emphasize 
subjective contemplation, personal voice, interactive dialogue, and relationship privilege 
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a conception of personhood as essential for teachers and students alike. In my view then, 
teaching from a space of creative and responsible personhood represents a pedagogy of 
individual freedom, politically expressed through the educator’s intended acts of  
resistance to institutionalized policies that dehumanize the educational experience for 
both her and her students. I envision such acts of resistance taking place in the teaching 
environment, first and foremost, through humanistic teaching/learning strategies that will 
be addressed later in this study. In turn, the student who engages this liberatory space of 
learning might awaken to her own personhood and potentially choose to resist a culture 
of oppression that results in conformist attitudes and compliant surrender to peer pressure 
and other forms of dehumanization in the schooling environment. Note that my use of the 
term “liberatory space” does not imply or condone a situation of anarchy, disrespect, or 
violence. Resistance, as I use the term, means staying authentic to one’s self, to one’s 
values and beliefs, while navigating the educational situations in which each of us find 
ourselves. 
 The limitations of this study revolve around this scholar’s particular experience of 
existential oppression, efforts aimed at reclamation of selfhood, and commitment to a 
teaching practice based in principles of existentialism. Nonetheless, I continue to assert 
that my particular experience is not exclusive in conception or in its real-world 
consequences. From an existential perspective, I understand myself as a unique subject 
whose lived experiences are mine while, at the same time, suggesting that the revelation 
of one person’s story has the capacity to project existential “truths” recognizable across 
the greater human story. As such, I suggest that ongoing research is wholly recommended 
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and applicable to the problem of educator existential oppression in the 21st century. Each 
educator can choose to question her assumptions about the purpose of education—past 
and present—along with the role she plays in the educative process. Further, if she is to 
continue this kind of research, she must examine her own understandings of personhood, 
identity creation, and empowerment as these concepts inform her life as a private person 
and a public educator. Finally, I suggest that individual research can expand into 
collective projects that might challenge the neoliberal status quo beyond the individual 
classroom, possibly stretching upwards into the school building and the university.  
Organization of the Dissertation 
 This study, In Pursuit of a Pedagogy of Personhood: Existentialism and 
Possibilities for Educator Liberation, is comprised of five chapters. As a personally 
conceived and designed research study, I aim for both academic rigor and personal 
subjectivity as essential components of my scholarly efforts; components that, I suggest, 
would also serve the reader’s propensity to interpret and potentially create personal 
meaning from the information and insights that might emerge from these pages. 
Following is a brief summation of each chapter. 
 Chapter I, “Self-Portrait: An Illustration of Educator Existential Oppression” 
brings into focus, through personal narrative, my story of educator existential oppression, 
providing necessary background context regarding the 13 years I spent in the realm of  
K-12 public education, while also laying the groundwork for the philosophical analyses 
and narrative reflections and field note excerpts to follow in the remaining chapters. 
Specifically, I describe my experiences across the schools in which I worked, experiences 
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that speak to a progression of dehumanizing public school policies and practices that 
culminated in my decision to leave the K-12 setting, to then pursue doctoral studies and a 
future career in higher education.  
 Chapter II, “Framing the Study” orients the reader more directly, and with more 
detail, to the purpose, frameworks, methodology, and contexts of this work. The chapter 
begins with a restatement of the study problem, followed by a review of selected 
philosophers, scholars, and cultural and technological theorists who write critically about 
neoliberal education, directly and indirectly pointing to the attendant problem of educator 
existential oppression. This critical review is intended to highlight the voices of 
individuals whose theories support my contention that the neoliberal educational model 
functions as an oppressive force in the lives of teachers, personally and professionally. I 
conclude this chapter with an explanation of my selection of an unconventional 
dissertation methodology that blends philosophical inquiry and analysis with scholarly 
personal narrative writing (SPN).  
 In Chapter III, “Existentialist Perspectives on Oppression and Personhood,” I  
present existentialist conceptions of oppression, specifically highlighting the theories of 
Simone de Beauvoir, Frantz Fanon, and Paulo Freire, followed by separate and specific 
discussions of internalized oppression and existential oppression, the latter crystallizing 
as the focal point of this study. I end the chapter with an existentialist analysis of 
personhood based on Sartrean theory. The purpose of this chapter is: (a) to convey an 
understanding of oppression as the process and outcome of dehumanization or negated 
personhood, typically perpetrated upon the individual or upon groups of individuals by 
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one or more entities motivated by power and profit; and (b) to solidify an existential 
understanding of personhood as the state of being in which affirmation of one’s humanity 
is based on awareness of one’s subjective stance as an individual, also recognizing the 
subjective stance of other individuals, as the foundation of human existence. On this 
view, the individual (i.e. the individual educator) must first become conscious to her own 
existential freedom in order to self-affirm and, then, subsequently affirm her existence in 
the social world as a free and viable subject in order to advance her fundamental life 
project.  
 In Chapter IV, “Turning to Existentialism,” I explore existentialism as a 
humanizing philosophical school of thought that serves as the antithesis of the 
dehumanization associated with the policies and practices of neoliberal education. I 
demonstrate existentialism’s contemporary relevance to the situation of today’s educator 
and the notion of a pedagogy of personhood by correlating the theories of Kierkegaard, 
Nietzsche, Beauvoir, and Sartre, in particular, to excerpts from selected class field notes 
intended to illustrate primary existential tenets of individual freedom, subjectivity, 
choice, action, and responsibility. Further, I intend the selected field notes to provide 
relevant, real-world, pedagogical substance to the theories behind these existential 
principles, the idea being to show how theory and practice inform one another in this 
instance. Where pertinent, I interject concepts espoused by Fanon and Freire (stemming 
from Chapter III’s focus on conceptions of oppression and personhood) where they 
impart particular meaning and coherence to the scenarios presented.  My intention is to 
synthesize the previous chapter’s discussions of oppression and personhood with this 
81 
	  
	  
chapter’s illustrative discussion of existential principles, expanded through personal 
narrative, so as to position existentialism as the antithesis of neoliberal dehumanization 
and, therefore, a viable response to it. As such, I argue that existentialism serves as a 
foundation of resistance to oppression by emphasizing the awakening of the “existential 
attitude” as the essential state of self-consciousness necessary to confront the lived 
experience of oppression in order to potentially move beyond it.  
 Chapter V, “Conclusion,” is structured around four existential questions that 
suggest possibilities of self-liberation for the individual educator who chooses to awaken 
to her existential attitude and pursue a pedagogy of personhood. I respond to these 
questions with both theoretical and practical considerations using Beauvoir, Kierkegaard, 
Nietzsche, and Sartre as my primary guides, also including the voice of Van Cleve Morris 
whose scholarly work provides added insights to the value of existentialism as a 
philosophy for living and educating. I also advance my own theories of possibility for 
embracing existential philosophy as a pedagogical philosophy, especially for K-12 
educators, but certainly for any educator who conceives of teaching and learning as an 
undeniably existential process. Finally, in questioning what is at stake for the future of 
education, the individual, and the human community, I target the concept of integrity as a 
condition of personal, relational, and worldly wholeness, a condition of being that can 
only be supported by an existential attitude that understands the necessity of affirming 
individual personhood for self and others in a state of freedom.  
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Closing Commentary 
 
We but mirror the world. All the tendencies present in the outer world are to be 
found in the world of our body. If we could change ourselves, the tendencies in 
the world would also change. As a man changes his own nature, so does the 
attitude of the world change towards him. This is the divine mystery supreme. A 
wonderful thing it is and the source of our happiness. We need not wait to see 
what others do. (Gandhi, in GandhiTopia, post 2, para. 3) 
  
 As will regularly be addressed in this study, I posit that individual acts of 
pedagogical intervention, as exercised by the existentialist educator in the pedagogical 
space of the classroom or in another teaching/learning setting, can emerge as catalysts for 
creating increasingly humanistic pedagogical possibilities and realities. While the 
individual educator cannot overturn a corrupt and ineffectual system of education alone, 
she can start a movement of change by remaining authentic to her purpose and 
philosophy of teaching, as evidenced by the humanistic teaching strategies she employs 
in her daily practice. In this way, she can retain her personal and educational integrity by 
being responsible and authentic to her pedagogic values. As such, I believe that 
existentialist ideals emphasizing the centrality of the human individual as self-creator and 
meaning-maker have much to offer the 21st century educator who has suffered or who 
continues to suffer from existential oppression, but who has awakened to her own sense 
of personal subjectivity, responsibility, and potential for self-empowerment. Who better 
than Sartre to reinforce the notion of possibility emerging from self-empowerment in 
confrontation with an oppressive situation? 
  
For it is necessary here to reverse common opinion and on the basis of what it is 
not, to acknowledge the harshness of a situation or the suffering which it imposes, 
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both of which are motives for conceiving of another state of affairs in which 
things would be better for everybody. It is on the day that we can conceive of a 
different state of affairs that a new light falls on our troubles and our suffering and 
that we decide that these are unbearable. (Sartre, 1984, p. 561) 
 
Finally, I want to be explicitly and unpretentiously clear that my work is not 
grounded in narcissism or self-indulgence. I genuinely believe that my story of lost and 
reclaimed personhood, as an education worker, is all too familiar to a majority of 
contemporary educators. As such, my narrative does not infer my situation as particularly 
unique. Rather, the purpose behind my personal narrative—as a particular situation, as an  
accounting of personal experience interwoven with philosophical analysis—is to impart a 
real-world, first-person, textual construction of a philosophical/existential problem 
experienced by many in the field today. Clearly, I claim the veracity of this last statement 
as a former public school educator, as an observer/witness to other educators’ 
experiences of personhood denied, and as a conversational conspirator in too many 
dialogues about the present reality of educator existential oppression.  Because, or 
perhaps in spite of all this, I retain an idealistic glimmer of hope that a singular reader 
might discover relevance, meaning, and the realization that she is not alone in her 
existential isolation as a teacher in the neoliberal world of education.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
EXISTENTIALIST PERSPECTIVES ON OPPRESSION AND PERSONHOOD 
 
Chapter Overview 
 This chapter is dedicated to an existential analysis of oppression and personhood; 
that is, an existential analysis of how oppression, understood here as a process of 
dehumanization, the goal of which is objectification of the individual or group, represents 
the intended negation of the very qualities and freedoms associated with existential 
conceptions of personhood, more specifically individual subjectivity and the human will 
to freedom. Highlighting the theories of Simone de Beauvoir, Franz Fanon, and Paulo 
Freire in the section titled “Existentialist Conceptions of Oppression,” followed by a 
related discussion of the phenomenon of internalized oppression, I intend my analyses of 
their theories to serve as the ground from which to then more explicitly define existential 
oppression. It is from this vantage point that I intend to justify my claim of educator 
existential oppression as a real phenomenon of grave import and consequences not only 
for the educator, but for the very future of public education,  
A Composite View of Beauvoir, Fanon, and Freire  
 This introduction serves as an overview of the more individually focused analyses 
of existentialist conceptions of oppression soon to follow. Simone de Beauvoir (1976, 
2011) addresses oppression from the perspective of a 20th century existentialist in The 
Ethics of Ambiguity, and as a feminist in The Second Sex. Specifically, in The Ethics of 
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Ambiguity, she isolates freedom as that which makes the individual a viable and moral 
human being; that it is up to the individual “to will freedom” (Beauvoir, 1976, p. 78) for 
the purpose of advancing her project of living, intentionally aiming toward the future in 
the existential process of becoming. On this point, I suggest that Beauvoir’s focus on 
existential freedom presumes a rational frame of mind from which the individual chooses 
and acts. This is to say that Beauvoir’s moral dimension of freedom presumes that the 
individual is a rational being who consciously chooses and accepts responsibility for the 
outcomes of her choices should they, in the end, do harm or good to herself or to anyone 
else. As such, Beauvoir’s free individual is only truly moral when she recognizes and 
validates not only her own freedom, but also the existential freedom of other individuals 
in the world. Thus, we can make a case for the notion that choosing and acting to resist 
oppression is a rational and moral act of freedom. Lastly, while an existentialist notion of 
morality does not legitimate any prescribed or pre-determined moral code as an essential, 
given component of human existence, for thinkers like Beauvoir, even Sartre (2007) in 
his Existentialism is a Humanism, it is the individual’s freedom to choose (my emphasis) 
her moral stance that counts. It is in this sense that I address Beauvoir’s theory of 
freedom as a moral concept, precluding any discussion of what freedom means, morally 
or otherwise, in the mind of the irrational individual (i.e., the oppressor). 
 Fanon and Freire use their own unique vocabularies to theorize about oppression, 
but their individual sensibilities and their ideas about resisting oppression intersect in 
many instances. Fanon (1963) uses the vocabulary of colonization in his politically 
charged, descriptive analysis of dehumanization and oppression in The Wretched of the 
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Earth. In this book, he depicts the decimation of a people, its culture, and its national 
identity as perpetrated by the colonizer over “the other.” Fanon advocates the use of 
violence as the only response to oppression and the only hope for individual and national 
liberation. Freire’s (2012) Pedagogy of the Oppressed emphasizes the language signified 
in the book’s title as he advocates for a pedagogy of liberation, very much framed around 
critical and liberatory education as the ground of humanization and recovery from the 
dehumanizing effects of oppression. In terms of national and international situations of 
oppression in which whole cultures are at stake, Freire also uses the language of 
colonization. In such contexts, and similar to Fanon, Freire’s calls for critical and 
liberatory educational practices are also infused with calls for revolution. Whether framed 
in the binary of oppressor versus oppressed (Freire) or colonizer versus colonized 
(Fanon), or whether framed as the individual’s existential submersion within a situation 
personally experienced as a negation of her personhood (de Beauvoir), the common 
denominator among all three is oppression’s anti-human practice of objectification, 
exercised in the interest of the oppressor’s desire for power and control over any 
individual, group, or nation identified as the unworthy other. 
Internalized Oppression 
 As an aspect and potential outcome of oppression’s dehumanizing effects upon 
the individual, I add to the mix a discussion of internalized oppression, a psychological 
term frequently used in contemporary, socio-cultural contexts. Internalized oppression is 
important to the overall discussion of oppression because the experience or reality of 
internalized oppression is evidence, in itself, of the effectiveness of oppression’s anti-
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human objectives. Therefore, the successful inculcation of internalized oppression in the 
individual or in marginalized groups of individuals reinforces the power of the oppressor 
group to control others targeted for domination, and it is this reach for power and 
influence that continues to drive the oppressor group’s agenda of dehumanization. 
 As a psychologically categorized phenomenon, internalized oppression can be 
understood as the targeted individual’s (or targeted group’s) acceptance of an identity or 
role assigned to her by the dominant social order. “When people are targeted, 
discriminated against, or oppressed over a period of time, they often internalize (believe 
and make part of their self-image—their internal view of themselves) the myths and 
misinformation that society communicates to them about their group” (Axner, 2014, para 
13). Note that here I am focusing on the individual as opposed to a particular group as a 
whole. For example, when socially prescribed identities or roles related to race, ethnicity, 
and gender assign the targeted individual to a minority status within the dominant culture 
(in essence, discriminating against the individual by denying her full membership status 
within the dominant community, and thereby denying her value as a complete human 
being), the individual can experience this situation as a form of self-negating 
dehumanization; in essence, a self-internalized negation of personhood. In such a 
situation, the individual acquiesces, possibly even believes, the mythology of her lesser 
status in the social pecking order, consequently losing connection to any sense of 
affirmed selfhood and individual identification beyond the externally imposed labels and 
superficial characteristics to which she has attached. Thus, the mainstream opinion of her 
marginalized identification becomes her internalized view of herself. The individual then 
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owns the negative status that has been assigned to her. She has internalized the 
oppressor’s message and, in a way, perpetuates the external ravages of dehumanization 
internally, within what remains of herself. 
Personhood  
 Any discussion of oppression must entail a discussion of personhood. Oppression 
cannot emerge, much less succeed, without a subject, a person, to target for 
dehumanization. Nor can oppression emerge without a person or persons willing to take 
on the role of oppressor, someone willing to exert his power over others by denying their 
physical and existential freedoms. In their own ways, the oppressor and the victim each 
become objectified through this uneven balance of power. The victim of oppression is 
dehumanized and objectified by the oppressor, while the oppressor, consciously or not, 
dehumanizes and objectifies himself as he becomes increasingly anesthetized to his anti-
human behavior.  
 Now, I suggest that it is worthwhile to think about who or what a person is in 
everyday terms, with concepts such as “human being” or “individual” coming to mind. 
How we automatically use and regard these terms signifies our common use of language, 
reflecting our taken-for-granted assumptions about human existence without according 
any philosophical depth to the more ubiquitous meanings applied to such terms. But what 
does (my emphasis) it mean to be or exist in a way that symbolizes the full humanity of 
subjectively internalized personhood? What does it mean to live as this complex entity, 
this human being, such that human existence supersedes any possible understanding of 
what it means to exist as a thing, or an object, or a creature? From the existentialist 
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perspective, it is this subjective nature of being human, the individual’s ability to be 
conscious of and make decisions about her uniquely embodied existence in the world, 
that constitutes personhood as the definitive expression of one’s humanity.  
 All of the topics briefly addressed in this overview will be more fully addressed in 
the remaining sections of this chapter. I now turn to Beauvoir, Fanon, and Freire in order 
to consider the phenomenon of oppression in more depth, including its characteristics, 
goals, and outcomes as they impact the individual and the human condition itself. To be 
clearer, we must consider the phenomenon of oppression as it relates to a lack of 
humanity within those who choose/agree to oppress others and the threat to humanity for 
those who experience themselves as victims of oppression. 
Existentialist Conceptions of Oppression 
Simone de Beauvoir 
 
Freedom is the source from which all significations and all values spring. It is the 
original condition of all justification of existence. The man who seeks to justify 
his life must want freedom itself absolutely and above everything else. At the 
same time that it requires the realization of concrete ends, of particular projects, it 
requires itself universally. . . . To will oneself moral and to will oneself free are 
one and the same decision. (de Beauvoir, 1976, p. 24) 
 
 As a member of the post-World War II, French existentialist group of 
philosophers and intellectuals led by Sartre, Beauvoir interpreted existential theory across 
the opposing contexts of freedom and oppression, most famously in The Second Sex and 
in The Ethics of Ambiguity. As a female intellectual of the 20th century, she stands out in 
the highly masculine terrain of male philosophers and theorists linked to existentialism 
both directly and indirectly, from Kierkegaard to Sartre himself. And like Sartre, 
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Beauvoir’s writings incorporate a complexity and depth of philosophical analysis that 
require lengthy contemplation and inquiry. Within this discussion, I purposefully 
structure Beauvoir’s conception of oppression within existentialist frameworks meant to 
be inclusive of all human beings; frameworks that should not (my emphasis) be gendered 
(although, in the real world of everyday life, gender distinctions are consistently made 
present) because existentialism is concerned with being, in its most fundamental 
inception, as pure existence, not essentialized or dichotomized in any way prior to its 
connection to the world of objects, others, and the social constructions that emerge.  
 At the same time, the significance of Beauvoir’s feminist work contributes greatly 
to the general discourse around oppression. In particular, her analysis of woman as the 
“Other” (Beauvoir, 2011, p. 7), intended in her otherness for man as the “One” (p. 7), is 
illuminating and thought-provoking, inferring dependence and submission by the Other 
as a conditioned state of existence, almost as if this is a “natural” or “good” kind of 
oppression intended for the continuation of the species. Questions are asked, questions 
that complicate the oppression of women as something more fundamental, something 
secretly and insidiously attached to the idea of being as woman; as such, something more 
profoundly embodied than a socially constructed, externally imposed label of 
identification.  
 
Why do women not contest male sovereignty? No subject posits itself 
spontaneously and at once as the inessential from the outset; it is not the Other 
who, defining itself as Other, defines the One; the Other is posited as Other by the 
One positing itself as One. But in order for the Other not to turn into the One, the 
Other has to submit to this foreign point of view. Where does this submission in 
woman come from? (Beauvoir, 2011, p. 7) 
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 Beauvoir (2011) structures her analysis of women’s oppression in The Second Sex 
around her overarching concern with existential freedom and the “existentialist morality” 
(p. 16) that emerges from this freedom. In this context, she speaks of the individual as 
subject, positing “. . . itself as a transcendence concretely, through projects; 
[accomplishing] its freedom only by perpetual surpassing toward other freedoms” 
(Beauvoir, 2011, p. 16). When the individual is prevented from moving forward with her 
projects of living (or possibly chooses not to assert her freedom in this way), she reverts 
back to a state of “immanence” (Beauvoir, 2011, p. 16), a state of non-movement in 
which she is no longer a consciousness “for-itself” (Sartre, 1984, p. 119), instead 
regressing into being an object “in-itself” (Beauvoir, 2011, p. 16). This fall from freedom, 
from transcendence into immanence, becomes a moral issue whether the fall is chosen or 
perpetrated by another. According to Beauvoir (2011), “this fall is a moral fault if the 
subject consents to it; if the fall is inflicted on the subject, it takes the form of frustration 
and oppression; in both cases it is an absolute evil” (p. 16). 
 Beauvoir continues to speak of the morality of existential freedom in The Ethics 
of Ambiguity, reiterating her view that the individual’s choice to will her life as a freedom 
is a moral undertaking, complicated by the unavoidable ambiguity of existence itself. As 
both interacting and contesting subjects in the world, each of us contributes to the 
ambiguity of human existence, our unique subjectivities colliding as we attempt to move 
forward with our projects. Then there is the uncertain and contingent nature of the world 
itself over which the individual has no control, rendering existence that much more 
indiscernible and ambiguous. Freedom, however, is not ambiguous. It is not an elusive or 
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slippery proposition that metamorphoses into something else. Freedom is existence, life 
being lived as a choice, without artificially imposed constraints put upon one by another, 
even within such an ambiguous world. Herein lies the paradoxical connection between 
existential freedom and worldly existence: the clarity and spaciousness of freedom is 
borne from “this ambiguous reality which is called existence . . . To will oneself free is to 
effect the transition from nature to morality by establishing a genuine freedom on the 
original upsurge of our existence” (Beauvoir, 1976, p. 25). Here, Beauvoir presents us 
with a theory of freedom as the individual’s chosen moral stance, providing an ethical 
foundation of existence. On this view, it is the practice of freedom that advances a 
conception of personhood as a reaching for human affirmation—for self and, by 
extension, for others, keeping in mind Sartre’s (2007) assertion that when we choose for 
ourselves, we are also choosing for the other (p. 24) because we recognize, on some 
level, our mutual stance as subjects ensnared in the ambiguous web of existence. 
Moreover, it is the practice of freedom as the affirmation of humanity—individually, 
socially, and politically—that might then humanize an institution, a culture, or a nation. 
Ultimately then, existential freedom is a concept that is wholly attached to the being (my 
emphasis) that is human in that it must be chosen, expressed, and acted upon in order to 
be lived. 
 For Beauvoir, and as will be seen with Fanon and Freire, the dehumanizing 
structures of oppression represent a human contradiction: humanity denying humanity. 
On this view, both the oppressor and the oppressed are dehumanized. Yet, it is the person 
who is oppressed that we naturally label the victim because the active denial of freedom 
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for that individual is more concretely experienced and witnessed. Moreover, the sacrifice 
of freedom on the part of the oppressed individual implicates a state of victimhood 
because she has given up her freedom not simply in an abstract sense, but she has, in fact, 
lost her right to choose and act as a free and independent person. How the oppressor 
experiences dehumanization is a more subtle proposition because power over the other 
appears (my emphasis) as a freedom in terms of external control, but actually diminishes 
the oppressor’s capacity to experience empathy for another as a fellow human being, 
ultimately becoming dehumanized or anesthetized to his own more humane impulses. 
Whether the oppressed or the oppressor, personhood is negated for both the victim of 
oppression and the perpetrator of oppression as they share the common denominator of 
dehumanization. “Only man can be an enemy for man; only he can rob him of the 
meaning of his acts and his life because it also belongs to him alone to confirm it in its 
existence” (Beauvoir, 1976, p. 82). 
 Beauvoir’s frame of reference regarding oppression is particularly individual, 
personal, and existentially situational, commonly representing scenarios in which one’s 
personal will to freedom is transgressed by an oppressor. In effect, “they [the oppressors] 
are cutting me off from the future, they are changing me into a thing” (Beauvoir, 1976, p. 
82).  Here, the language of freedom and future resonates with highly personal overtones 
regarding the individual’s ability to imagine and go forward toward a future of her own 
creation, while the image of oneself as a thing (my emphasis) bespeaks the language of 
objectification and oppression. Finally, as will be seen with Fanon and Freire,  Beauvoir 
clearly advocates resistance to oppression, resistance conceived as either a personal 
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action or as the response of a group in outright revolt against the oppressor. In her 
following commentary on revolt, Beauvoir (1976) includes a most chilling statement 
concerning suicide as revolt’s ultimate act.  
 
It [revolt] is fulfilled as freedom only by returning to the positive, that is, by 
giving itself a content through action, escape, political struggle, revolution. 
Human transcendence then seeks, with the destruction of the given situation, the 
whole future which will flow from its victory. It resumes its indefinite rapport 
with itself. There are limited situations where this return to the positive is 
impossible, where the future is radically blocked off. Revolt can then be achieved 
only in the definitive rejection of the imposed situation, in suicide. (Beauvoir, 
1976, pp. 31–32) 
  
 When revolt results in liberation, I envision creative disruption, the future opening 
up once again with new possibilities. The significance of being a subject, being a person, 
is restored. Projects continue, albeit always in confrontation with the uncertainties and 
contingencies of life, while the human will to freedom redirects its propelling force in 
forward movement. It is a movement of meaning making, exerted through choice and 
action, imbuing the ambiguity of existence with significance for the individual whose 
humanity is recovered and whose personhood is reaffirmed, most significantly by herself.  
 But what of Beauvoir’s recommendation of suicide as “the definitive rejection of 
the imposed situation?” What kinds of resistance, acts of revolt can the oppressed 
educator take up in her quest for personal and pedagogical liberation? What would 
constitute the educator’s “definitive rejection” of oppressive neoliberal educational 
policies and practices? If acts of resistance should result in certain positive changes in  
K-12 schooling, offering some degree of liberation, what existential signification might 
be restored to the pedagogical pursuit of personhood? If human existence is ambiguous, 
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does it follow that human education is also ambiguous? Or, is education like freedom, a 
moral good in and of itself?  
Frantz Fanon 
 
The sweeping, leveling nature of colonial domination was quick to dislocate in 
spectacular fashion the cultural life of a conquered people. The denial of a 
national reality, the new legal system imposed by the occupying power, the 
marginalization of the indigenous population and their customs by colonial 
society, expropriation, and the systematic enslavement of men and women, all 
contributed to this cultural obliteration. (Fanon, 1963, p. 170) 
  
 In The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon exposes the horrific reality of oppression as 
a systematic process of dehumanization in which people and their culture are existentially 
(the people) and physically (the culture and the nation) decimated under the weight of 
colonization. From Fanon’s studied perspective as a psychiatrist and philosopher, as well 
as from his experience of working in support of Algeria’s struggle for independence from 
France during the 1950s, he characterizes colonization as a phenomenon marked by 
extreme violence that is typically forced upon less developed Third World nations by 
more economically powerful and technologically sophisticated Western nations.  His 
first-hand experiences with the dehumanizing effects of colonization upon oppressed 
individuals, their communities, and their entire way of life propelled his radical stance 
advocating violence to overthrow the oppressor. Fanon justifies his advocacy of violent 
revolution as the only means by which the people and the nation can recover from 
oppression’s enslavement; a paradoxical proposition in that, on this view, the people must 
liberate themselves through violence so that they might then recover their own humanity 
and, with it, their own moral compass. According to Fanon, because the oppressor mind 
96 
	  
	  
is irrational and inhuman itself “colonialism is not a machine capable of thinking, a body 
endowed with reason. It is naked violence and only gives in when confronted with greater 
violence” (Fanon, 1963, p. 23). Once again, in terms of the use of violence, we have the 
contradiction of humanity denying humanity, noted earlier in the discussion of 
Beauvoir’s theories on oppression. Is it possible to say, then, that irrational behavior (i.e., 
violence) is justified on the part of the oppressed because it is enacted in the name of 
freedom? How does Fanon’s point of view on the use of violence against the oppressor 
complicate Beauvoir’s contention that acting on and for freedom is a moral proposition 
grounded in the belief that, as rational individuals who cherish freedom, we would 
choose for others that which we would choose for ourselves?  If our notions of rational 
thinking and behavior are based on the higher qualities of human empathy and 
commitment to social justice, and our notions of irrational thinking and behavior are seen 
as encompassing qualities that are anti-human, we are left with the perplexing dilemma of 
deciding under what conditions violence can be justified.  
 Fanon prioritizes human freedom and personhood above all else. Therefore, with 
Beauvoir’s existential freedom poised as the moral ground of human existence, and with 
Fanon’s estimation of the oppressor as inhuman and irrational, the pursuit of freedom 
becomes the justification for acts of violence on the part of the oppressed population. In 
fact, I submit that Fanon would claim that this kind of violence, purposed toward the 
reclamation of personhood and freedom, is a moral act, not to be compared with the 
violent and dehumanizing tactics perpetrated by the oppressor across the human 
landscape and the cultural fabric of a victimized society. According to Fanon, oppressor 
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violence destroys homes and businesses; it rapes the land as well as its people, literally 
and figuratively; it dehumanizes the colonized individual, peeling away personhood, 
layer by layer, through its disregard of independent thought and choice, as well as its 
denial of independent expression of critical points of view, until there is nothing left but a 
shell of a human being. Oppression is violent in that it obliterates a culture and tears apart  
the social fabric and familiar “normalcy” of everyday life; that is, life lived as freedom 
before colonization.  
 One might ask how the violence of colonization is successfully transmitted into 
the everyday? How is a system predicated on dehumanizing practices of manipulation 
and control implemented so that it successfully permeates a way of life to the point that it 
is able to conquer and take control of it? Are there systematic phases of dehumanization 
that prepare the ground of negated personhood for docility and domestication? What is 
the first phase of colonization’s dehumanization process? What gets eradicated first, 
personhood or the representations of personhood that constitute a culture? In a way, it 
makes sense to imagine that the symbols, customs, and familiar trappings of a culture 
would be decimated at the start, so that the colonized individual would initially undergo a 
separation between herself and her familiar way of life. From here, one could imagine, 
with the regularity of enforced limitations on personal freedom, the separation of self 
from one’s own consciousness of being a subject in her own right, as dehumanization of 
the mind and soul set in more deeply. This dual experience of separation—from a way of 
life and from oneself—speaks to the experience of alienation. As explained by Fromm 
(1961), “Alienation (or “estrangement”) means, for Marx, that man does not experience 
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himself as the acting agent in his grasp of the world, but that the world (nature, others, 
and he himself) remain alien to him” (para. 2). Certainly, the oppressor represents an 
unwelcome, alien force that that seeks to degrade the security, confidence, and the 
integrity of wholeness upon which freedom and personhood depend. 
 On the other hand, it is also possible to imagine that a specific ordering of events 
in the process of oppression can be somewhat arbitrary in that the individual, as a 
uniquely subjective being, will internalize dehumanization in ways that are especially 
particular to her way of making meaning of the assaults on her freedom. Thus, on the 
surface of things, while it makes sense that physical oppression—for instance, the taking 
away of one’s land, one’s home and possessions, and one’s ability to move around 
freely—serves as an initial, concrete step in the dehumanization process, it does not 
necessarily result in the immediate stripping away of the colonized individual’s unique 
inwardness, her self-possession and self-understandings as a particular person. If such be 
the case for a few or many newly colonized individuals, the process of dehumanization 
must continue in order to effectively negate those qualities or characteristics that we 
associate with intact personhood; again, self-awareness, independent thinking, choice, 
agency, freedom of movement, and freedom to self-express. The colonized individual 
must be rendered a thing through the removal of all aspects of life that contribute to the 
shaping of identity and the affirmation of personhood. Thus, to obliterate a culture is to 
destroy and replace its norms, practices, customs, symbols, art, and daily way of life with 
something alien. To obliterate personhood is to negate the human qualities and 
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characteristics that flourish in a state of freedom. In both scenarios, oppression is to be 
understood as anti-human.  
 Fanon (1963) describes the colonized world as a “Manichaean world” (p. 6) of 
concrete duality; that is, a “compartmentalized world” (p. 5), “divided in two [and] 
inhabited by different species” (p. 5). Here, Fanon is not talking about humans versus 
animals; rather, he is talking about race. “Looking at the immediacies of the colonial 
context, it is clear that what divides this world is first and foremost what species, what 
race one belongs to” (p. 5). Fanon’s use of language, equating species with race, 
magnifies a colonial attitude of white superiority over people of color, a long-standing 
construct of dehumanization. Using these terms, if race is now to be regarded as a 
species, and the species of the colonizer is supreme, then the colonized person is 
categorized as a species that is “less than,” lower than human so as to be regarded a 
creature, if not quite yet a thing. On this view, the colonization process can also be 
understood as a taming process in which the oppressed are trained, like animals to obey, 
conform, and take on the outsider culture over time.  
 Nonetheless, while the colonizer’s taming process is intended to exert control and 
to effectively domesticate the oppressed, Fanon claims that full conversion to sub-human 
status is not typically internalized in the mind and soul of his (Fanon’s) colonized 
individual. This is because, despite appearances of successful domination, Fanon 
maintains that the colonized person continues to perceive the colonizer as outsider, the 
foreigner, the interloper, the ultimate representation of an anti-human species. Thus, it is 
very important to understand that, on Fanon’s rendering of the colonized mind, the 
100 
	  
	  
oppressor or colonizer comes to represent that which is inhuman, and not the other way 
around.   
 
In the colonies the foreigner imposed himself using his cannons and machines. 
Despite the success of his pacification, in spite of his appropriation, the colonist 
always remains a foreigner. It is not the factories, the estates, or the bank account 
which primarily characterize the “ruling class.” The ruling species is first and 
foremost the outsider from elsewhere, different from the indigenous population, 
“the others.” (Fanon, 1963, p. 5) 
  
 So it is on this view of the colonized as “dominated but not domesticated” (Fanon, 
1963, p. 16) that Fanon places his hopes for liberation and his belief in violent resistance 
as the only viable means by which the colonized masses can recover themselves and their 
nation status. Although marginalized and dehumanized, Fanon holds to the idea that 
within the colonized individual, there lurks a spark of violently human inspiration waiting 
to be ignited. “The muscles of the colonized are always tensed. . . . he is always ready to 
change his role as game for that of hunter. The colonized subject is a persecuted man who 
is forever dreaming of becoming the persecutor” (Fanon, 1963, p. 16). Finally, for Fanon, 
the fundamental understanding that dehumanization is the ultimate reality of everyday 
life under an oppressive, colonial regime signifies his ultimate justification for the taking 
up of arms by the oppressed. Once again, we have the ironic situation of justifying 
violence for a humanitarian cause, that cause being the reclamation of individual 
personhood and the restoration of a human community committed to social justice and 
freedom. Again, this reasoning rests not simply in Fanon’s advocacy of violence as the 
only possible response to oppression, but in an even more profound and incredulous way, 
in his belief that the colonized people of the Third World somehow continue to retain a 
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glimmer of their own inner humanness amidst dehumanizing conditions. Perhaps it is this 
mixture of the colonized individual’s unextinguished glimmer of humanity confronted 
with the darkness of dehumanization that makes it possible for him to resist oppression 
with isolated, chosen acts of violence for the sake of a more permanent vision of 
freedom. 
 
After years of unreality, after wallowing in the most extraordinary phantasms, the 
colonized subject, machine gun at the ready, finally confronts the only force 
which challenges his very being: colonialism. . . . The colonized subject discovers 
reality and transforms it through his praxis, his deployment of violence and his 
agenda for liberation. (Fanon, 1963, pp. 20–21) 
  
 Still, self-recovery and national liberation do not assure a return to the way things 
were before colonization.  The formerly oppressed/newly liberated individual (and 
nation) most likely cannot return to what was. Fanon addresses this when he talks about 
the potential of revitalizing a culture that has been severely damaged, if not decimated, 
through the experience of colonization and the struggle toward liberation. In other words, 
and from the existentialist perspective, an alternative project must be chosen in the 
movement of going forward. This is to be done in the name of a new day, a new way of 
being in the world. No longer colonized, but not who they were before colonization, the 
people must recreate themselves. Having experienced what it is to live as a creature or a 
thing, the newly liberated must become who they will be anew, in tandem with their new 
project of freedom. Likewise, a colonized cultural landscape cannot duplicate its prior 
essence, what it was before the ravaging of its very way of life. Instead, a new culture 
must be forged. “The liberation struggle does not restore to national culture its former 
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values and configurations. This struggle, which aims at a fundamental redistribution of 
relations between men, cannot leave intact either the form or substance of the people’s 
culture” (Fanon, 1963, p. 178). 
 With liberation at hand, Fanon focuses on the importance of forging a national 
consciousness with which a new culture of humanity can be born and nourished. Because 
a genuine struggle for liberation enlists the hearts, souls, minds, and bodies of those 
fighting for their humanity and their freedom, this new culture of humanity can take on 
greater significance as a creative force for bonding people together not only during their 
initial time of triumph, but also throughout their efforts to symbolize and manifest their 
cultural ideals in congruence with their national identity as a freedom-loving people. “We 
believe that the future of culture and the richness of a national culture are also based on 
the same values that inspired the struggle for freedom” (Fanon, 1963, p. 179). 
 How might this discussion of colonization translate to the world of American 
education in the 21st century? Does the neoliberal educational system fit the role of 
colonizer with its imposition of standardizing “laws” that compromise teachers’ freedom 
to be individuals who choose to teach? As domesticated, colonized workers, are teachers 
simply trained to perform for the advancement of the colonizer’s goals and, yet, still held 
personally accountable for their production levels? Is the realm of education 
compartmentalized in such a way that the masses who occupy the school buildings are 
maintained as a separate species, looked upon as inferior by the colonizer species of 
neoliberal legislators in their positions of power? Has school culture been co-opted by 
colonization’s mandated rules of compliance and conformity to such an extent that 
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“individual creativity,” “independent thinking,” and “academic freedom” are slogans of a 
bygone school culture? Finally, what kind of liberatory praxis can teachers undertake to 
liberate themselves and to re-humanize school culture? I ask these questions because I 
think teacher liberation is possible, whether it be the liberation of one teacher at a time or 
a collective of teachers advancing a liberatory praxis focused on a broader scale. 
Certainly, I am not suggesting that we can or should overthrow an entire school system. I 
am not in favor of violent revolution. However, I am suggesting an existential revolution 
that starts with the individual teacher, exploring possibilities regarding how she might 
choose to advance her project of personal and academic freedom in the classroom. I 
suggest that she can choose to start with a declaration of freedom that validates the 
individual interests and learning styles of each student; that she can choose to declare the 
centrality of classroom dialogue as the basis of relationship-building; and that, on all 
these points, she must assert her commitment to a pedagogy of personhood through 
which she chooses to teach humanistically and creatively, discarding whenever possible 
the standardizing pedagogical practices of neoliberal education. 
 In essence, if we are to liberate education, we must liberate ourselves first. I do 
not wish to be read as simplistic here, for I am only talking about possibilities that might 
speak to, first and foremost, liberation of self as an inward reclamation of personhood. 
This inwardly focused liberation speaks to the existential attitude of self-consciousness 
from which a newly found sense of agency can emerge. This is a liberatory attitude that 
seeks to move beyond the futility and despair of powerlessness and hopelessness; to be 
able to envision some kind of future, to be able to grasp onto an image of something 
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better than life as the experience of endless alienation; that is, alienation from the 
oppressive system at hand and from the self. When I left the public school system, I was 
not suddenly liberated in terms of conquering the oppressor. Rather, I released myself 
from an inwardly experienced situation of personal enslavement over which I felt I had 
no control, and from which I could envision no positive resolution. While I freed myself 
from that situation of existential angst, I was still living in close partnership with stress 
and anxiety, not assured of any next step that I could take to solve the problems 
associated with my experience of existential oppression in the world of K-12 education. 
 In fact, I was taking on new problems surrounding my jobless status, financial 
obligations, and the challenges of a doctoral program. I was alone, self-supporting, and 
uncertain of the future. But I felt a freedom to be (my emphasis) that sustained me as a 
person, acting on the decision to leave one system of education and committing myself to 
another, the university, where I hoped that existential and academic freedom might 
prevail. I could feel like myself again; that is, I felt like a viable human being who could 
choose and act on my own accord, as opposed to an automaton carrying out a mandate or 
fulfilling an educational prescription. I believed that I could advance my project of 
becoming myself as an educator, a prospect inaccessible to me in my state of existential 
oppression. 
Paulo Freire 
 
 
Dehumanization, which marks not only those whose humanity has been stolen, 
but also (though in a different way) those who have stolen it, is a distortion of the 
vocation of becoming more fully human. This distortion occurs within history; but 
it is not an historical vocation. . . . This struggle [for humanization] is possible 
only because dehumanization, although a concrete historical fact, is not a given 
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destiny but the result of an unjust order that engenders violence in the oppressors, 
which in turn dehumanizes the oppressed. (Freire, 2000, p. 44) 
 
 For Freire, oppression—whether evidenced in strident nationalism, twisted 
notions of racial superiority, gender inequality, cultural decimation, economic disparity, 
or educational despotism—is a process of dehumanization that serves to negate, as 
opposed to affirm, personhood. “For the oppressors, ‘human beings’ refers only to 
themselves; other people are ‘things.’ . . . the existence of the oppressed is necessary to 
their own existence” (Freire, 2000, pp. 57–58). At the same time, Freire declares that the 
singular “vocation” of the individual is to become more human, calling to mind  
Beauvoir’s talk of forward movement being the individual’s project of freedom. If 
becoming more human is our primary existential task as free individuals, then re-
humanization is the primary task for those who are or have been oppressed. Furthermore, 
Freire places the responsibility of rehumanization, for those who are oppressed and for 
their oppressors, in the hands of the former because, “Only power that springs from the 
weakness of the oppressed will be sufficiently strong to free both” (Freire, 2000, p. 44). 
In essence, the oppressed must liberate themselves first and, with that, achieve a kind of 
liberation for their former oppressors. In a way, this stance resonates with Fanon’s call 
for the colonized to take up arms against the colonizer in terms of taking responsibility 
for their own liberation. However, Fanon does not put responsibility for the oppressor’s 
liberation in the hands of the oppressed, as Freire symbolically implies in the prior 
quotation. Therefore, we must ask, “How would Freire have the oppressed liberate 
themselves, rehumanize their way of life, and potentially free the oppressor?  
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 Freire (2000) emphasizes “praxis” (p. 45) as the path to liberation: “reflection and 
action upon the world in order to transform it” (p. 51). Such praxis requires the 
development of what Freire (2000) terms “conscientization” (p. 74), the critical 
awareness of one’s social reality so that the individual is able to use her reflective 
capacities to choose and act for the cause of freedom and positive social transformation. 
Thus, the notion of acting upon the world in order to transform it can encompass a 
multitude of possibilities: from going on strike, to verbal resistance, to physical 
resistance, to actual revolution. It can entail concern for others, for the environment, and 
for a variety of social justice issues. 
 More specifically, however, Freire’s pedagogy of the oppressed demands that 
those who are, themselves, oppressed wake up to a critical understanding of their 
particular situations of dehumanization, hearkening closely to the notion of awakening to 
one’s existential attitude of self-awareness, resistance, and possibility in confrontation 
with an oppressive situation. For Freire, such an existentially critical self-awakening can 
best be accomplished through dialogical and reflective strategies that ultimately inspire, 
and dictate the individual’s choice to be responsible for her own liberation. “This 
pedagogy makes oppression and its causes objects of reflection by the oppressed, and 
from that reflection will come their necessary engagement in the struggle for their 
liberation. And in the struggle this pedagogy will be made and remade” (Freire, 2000, p. 
48). In other words, the oppressed must learn (my emphasis) why and how to pursue 
freedom, humanization, and the recovery of personhood. Real liberation does not stop at 
physical freedom, but is based in the deeper knowing of existential liberation as freedom 
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of mind and spirit. As such, resistance must be a reflective act that speaks to the body, 
mind, and spirit. 
 The significance of a critical educational process cannot be overstated here. It 
must also be understood that critical education is political education; so, whether working 
with adult peasants in the fields of Brazil or with grade school students in an inner city 
American school, education is the key to cultivating humanity and executing a praxis of 
freedom. What does a critical educational process look like? Regardless of the physical 
setting, critical education is what Freire (2000) calls “problem posing” (p. 84) education, 
whereby critical and creative dialogue between teachers and students inspire heightened 
consciousness of one’s reality in the world, provoking ongoing questions that often 
challenge old assumptions and the consideration of new possibilities. Independent 
thinking is stimulated in problem posing education because each participant in this 
process is aroused to reflect upon the given reality and consider alternatives that might 
advance the cause of humanization for herself and for her community. 
 Further, problem posing education is Freire’s antidote to the traditional banking 
concept of education in which students are regarded as empty containers needing/waiting 
to be filled. The dehumanizing nature of the banking model positions students as objects, 
while the teacher is positioned as the so-called subject or lone authority figure in the 
classroom. Yet, as Freire consistently points out, the teacher is also dehumanized in the 
banking model conception of education because she is required to submerge her 
personhood in order to play the role of information giver and test administrator, herself 
controlled by a system that mandates how, what, and when she will teach. This is the 
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typical scenario of unfreedom in the contemporary, neoliberal classroom, and it begs the 
intervention of problem posing education as liberatory practice. “Problem-posing 
education bases itself on creativity and stimulates true reflection and action upon reality, 
thereby responding to the vocation of persons as beings who are authentic only when 
engaged in inquiry and creative transformation” (Freire, 2000, p. 84). In line with 
privileging human creativity and authenticity as essential to the teaching/learning 
process, problem-posing education speaks to Freire’s (2000) existentialist orientation, 
particularly apparent when he discusses the human process of “becoming” (p. 84), a 
concept historically embraced by existentialist thinkers.. As a critically reflective and 
active educational process, problem posing “affirms men and women as beings” (p. 84), 
as free and moral persons who “. . . know themselves to be unfinished” (p. 84). Thus, for 
Freire, becoming and unfinishedness are two sides of the same coin, symbolizing the 
ongoing possibilities available to the individual who affirms her existence as a choosing 
and acting subject in the world. As such, becoming is not only a hallmark of an 
existentialist conception of personhood, it is also a hallmark of a humanizing educational 
process that has no end in itself. “Education is thus constantly remade in the praxis” 
(Freire, 2000, p. 84). 
 Essentially, Freire’s conception of oppression, as a process of dehumanization or 
negation of personhood, correlates to the ideas expressed by Beauvoir and Fanon. Based 
on my interpretations, I suggest all three would agree that, in the eyes of the 
oppressor/colonizer, the oppressed individual or group is regarded as sub-human and 
treated accordingly, relegated to the status of an animal or a thing as opposed to being 
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affirmed as an equal human being. All three advocate acts of resistance, even revolution, 
for the cause of liberation. Fanon’s call for collective violence resonates as the most 
extreme, but Beauvoir recommends revolt against oppressive forces, as well, and goes so 
far as to recommend suicide for the oppressed individual when all best efforts fail to 
achieve liberation. Freire also calls for revolution as an ultimate necessity in particular 
situations, but he saves his strongest arguments for his advocacy of critical pedagogy as 
the highest and best liberatory tool available to humankind. Finally, whether inferred or 
explicitly expressed (as in the case of Beauvoir), existential freedom is a moral freedom 
that affirms personhood. Oppression, as the negation of personhood, is thus deemed 
immoral.  
Internalized Oppression 
Historical and Social Constructs 
 Internalized oppression speaks to an inwardly experienced adaptation to an 
oppressive situation in which the targeted individual either identifies with the oppressor 
and the oppressor culture, or she believes the oppressor’s narrative about her inferior 
status. In the latter scenario, the oppressed individual does not necessarily identify with 
the oppressor, but she accepts and owns the oppressor’s evaluation of her being as other, 
as less than, as differently deficient, as someone who does not quite belong to the 
community of acceptable persons. Across both scenarios, internalized oppression can 
clearly be associated with large-scale, historical projects of dehumanization such as the 
institution of slavery in the southern United States prior to the Civil War or the Holocaust 
of the 20th century, two formidable examples among a plethora of historical moments of 
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oppression and domination. These same scenarios also pertain to more narrow, 
contemporized contexts in which internalized oppression is often associated with the 
individual’s marginalized social status, often based on personal qualities (physical, 
intellectual, psychological, socio-economic, heritage, etc.) that do not measure up to the 
socio-cultural norms equated with mainstream society’s definitions and standards.  
 The more current literature about internalized oppression (Osajima, 1989; 
Rosenwasser, 2002; Wendell, 1990) typically focuses on groups routinely accorded 
minority status within the greater society according to race, ethnicity, gender, religious 
affiliations, etc. In his article, “Internalized Oppression and the Culture of Silence: 
Rethinking the Stereotype of the Quiet Asian-American Student,” Osajima (1989) argues 
that the quiet and non-assertive behavior typically associated with Asian-American 
students is actually the silent manifestation of internalized oppression linked “to the 
dynamics of oppression they face as students and as members of a racial minority group” 
(p. 153). Rosenwasser (2002) studies Jewish women’s internalized anti-Semitism as a 
form of internalized oppression in her article, “Exploring Internalized Oppression and 
Healing Strategies,” posing the following focal question, “How does internalized Jewish 
oppression manifest in us, and what are strategies for resisting and healing from this 
oppression?” (Rosenwasser, 2002, p. 53). In her article, “Oppression and Victimization; 
Choice and Responsibility,” Wendell (1990) addresses internalized oppression as it 
correlates to “a cluster of problems for feminist theory and practice which concern 
responsibility and choice under conditions of oppression” (p. 16). As represented by these 
three articles, socially marginalized individuals or groups feel themselves to be 
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disassociated, in varying degrees, from mainstream culture, from the master narrative of a 
socially “correct” way of life. While the external realities may not overtly testify to a 
picture of oppression, the individual suffering from internalized oppression yet 
experiences a kind of psychic dehumanization and a distinct sense of alienation as other, 
separated and isolated from the dominant culture in her situation of difference.  
Philosophical Constructs: Fanon, Freire, and Beauvoir  
 In their own ways and within their more heightened discussions of oppression 
across historical, national, and international contexts, I want to suggest that Fanon and 
Freire speak to the phenomenon of internalized oppression as an alternative self-
identification process resulting from the overt infliction of oppression upon the 
individual’s physical, intellectual, psychological, and emotional being. Following are 
illustrations of how each of these philosophers incorporates a rendering of internalized 
oppression—the psychological effect of dehumanization—as being an issue, or not, 
within certain oppressed individuals or groups. 
 Fanon presents two pictures of the colonized in his discussion of the affective 
nature of oppression. First, he illustrates the case of people who are physically and 
culturally oppressed, but who are yet self-possessed within the situation of oppression. 
They are not physically free. They are victims of dehumanization, but they have not lost 
themselves to an alternative self-identification. Therefore, they have not internalized 
oppression in terms of identifying with the oppressor. Ironically, and in contrast to this 
picture of the self-possessed colonized individual, the colonizer’s common tactic of 
reducing (in his own eyes) the colonized person to the status of an animal or thing blurs 
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his vision of what being human means, in a sense enabling and strengthening his  
capacity to further dehumanize others as he becomes less human himself. Nonetheless, 
Fanon emphasizes that among the colonized masses, there are many who retain past 
memory, present knowledge, and clear vision as persons of value and moral purpose. 
According to Fanon, these colonized people know that they are seen as animals in the 
narrowness of the colonizers’ eyes, but they see themselves with the truth of who they 
are, remaining aware of what they must do to regain their freedom.  
 
The colonized know all that and roar with laughter every time they hear 
themselves called an animal by the other. For they know they are not animals. 
And at the very moment when they discover their humanity, they begin to sharpen 
their weapons to secure its victory. (Fanon, 1963, p. 8) 
  
 In a different kind of portrait of the colonized individual, Fanon (1963) illustrates 
the case of the “colonized intellectual” (p. 13) whose skewed personal identification, I 
propose, symbolizes a state of internalized oppression. This colonized subject chooses to 
identify with the oppressor even though he retains ties with the common people who 
remain physically oppressed. “In order to assimilate the culture of the oppressor and 
venture into his fold, the colonized subject has had to pawn some of his own intellectual 
possessions” (Fanon, 1963, p. 13). In a sense, the colonized intellectual is a split identity 
because he internalizes much of the oppressor’s way of behaving and thinking while he 
still retains a sense of membership among the people. In this way, he is “constantly at risk 
of becoming a demagogue” (Fanon, 1963, p. 13) because he lives in existential 
compromise in terms of moral purpose and values. In this sense, the colonized 
intellectual might even be considered less free than the others because he does not know 
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who he is or to whom his allegiance belongs. He is still oppressed by the oppressors, even 
if it is, ostensibly, to a lesser degree than his countrymen. At the same time, he remains 
internally oppressed by his own complicit actions. 
 Freire very directly addresses what I understand as the two sides of internalized 
oppression, although he does not use this term specifically. First, with regard to the 
tendency of the oppressed to identify with the oppressor, Freire connects this tendency to 
the state of alienation that envelops the oppressed individual so that, once again, with the 
integrity of personhood torn to existential shreds, the individual reaches for an alternative 
self with which to connect. At this vulnerable stage of dehumanization, the privilege of 
the oppressor and the oppressor’s way of life looms as far more appealing than the status 
quo. 
 
Sharing this way of life becomes an overpowering aspiration. In their alienation, 
the oppressed want at any cost to resemble the oppressors, to imitate them, to 
follow them. This phenomenon is especially prevalent in the middle-class 
oppressed, who yearn to be equal to the “eminent” men and women of the upper 
class. (Freire, 2000, p. 62) 
  
 Freire (2000) characterizes the other side of internalized oppression, having to do 
with owning (my emphasis) the negative qualities attributed to the oppressed by the 
oppressor, as “self-depreciation” (p. 63); what we more commonly refer to as self-
deprecation. On this point, I suggest that continuous assaults upon the individual’s sense 
of self, self here representing that integrated inner knowing of one’s value and purpose as 
a particular subject in the world, can be more damaging, in a permanent sense, than 
physical assaults upon the body. In essence, to be repeatedly told and treated as if you 
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have no value speaks to a strategy of dehumanization in which an ongoing process of 
psychic wounding occurs, not allowing for healing on its own. This kind of internalized 
oppression is a wound inflicted on the soul, and the kind of intervention needed for soul 
healing would likely require much time and personal work. 
 Finally, and to give Beauvoir her due, I suggest that identification with the 
oppressor would be explained not only as the result of dehumanization, but also as an act 
(whether consciously chosen or passively committed) of “bad faith” (Sartre, 2007, p. 25) 
because the oppressed individual has contributed to the negation of her own personhood 
by accepting the words and opinions of the other. This existentialist perspective sounds 
harsh, and I think that it is. However, the fundamental premise behind it is that, at some 
point along the path of oppression, some individuals awaken to a critical consciousness of 
their situations. For these individuals, there is no other option but to choose freedom, 
even if that freedom can only be experienced, initially, as an inward affirmation of 
personhood that also resonates as an existential attitude of potential resistance. Even if 
there is not a clear solution at hand, a choice has been made to know oneself, anew, as a 
viable, moral, and choosing person. Beauvoir would likely state that the intentional act of 
choosing oneself is an act of existential freedom, but that true revolt must follow in 
whatever form necessary and doable, although I would like to exclude her option of 
suicide as one of the options here. Nevertheless, I suggest that Fanon, Freire, and 
Beauvoir would agree that the very idea of freedom consciously chosen is the necessary 
initial step toward reviving the individual’s inward affirmation of personhood, an 
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affirmation that can ultimately serve to demystify internalized oppression, defy 
dehumanization, and restore to the individual her existential integrity. 
Family Constructs 
 I have considered internalized oppression in historical and contemporary social 
contexts, and I have explored the philosophical constructs of internalized oppression via 
the theories of Fanon, Freire, and Beauvoir. What about the possibility of internalized 
oppression as a psychological phenomenon related to family dynamics, dynamics that can 
range from benign ignorance to the dysfunctional effects of childhood grooming with its 
strategies of objectification and labeling, even to the extremes of various forms of abuse 
perpetrated within families? I submit that children, adolescents, and teenagers all too 
often become victims of oppressive family cultures and, thus, internalize the damaging 
labels and characteristics that brand them before they have even had a chance to create 
themselves in a space of freedom. How can the child or young person understand the 
possibilities of existential freedom and choice when she is wholly dependent on the 
adults in her life to supply her basic needs, as well as familial love and security as she can 
know such ideals? Moreover, how does the experience of internalized oppression within 
the structure of the family unit predispose the individual to potential victimization within 
the oppressive environment of neoliberal education, whether that individual be a student 
or an adult educator? 
 Based on my own experiences within a dysfunctional family environment in 
which the children were externally identified and labeled (even so-called “good” or 
“positive” labels can wreak damaging effects on a child who is told who she is, and how 
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she should present herself to the world), I can say that the child is an unwitting victim. 
With unusual exceptions, the child cannot avoid internalizing the oppressive labeling that 
attends to the lived experience of objectification and parental manipulation, typically 
resulting in the submergence of her more natural impulses and instincts. In my case, 
choosing freedom and recreating identity started much later in life, actually within the 
more open space of adulthood, and continues to be an ongoing personal project indelibly 
attached to my working project as a scholar and educator. 
 Reflections on childhood objectification and labeling. During the later years of 
childhood and more acutely throughout my adolescent and early adult years, I now 
understand that I existed like a thing, a performing thing that sought approval from those 
whom I both loved and feared. But I did not start out this way, Actually, from what I have 
been told and from what I can remember of my very early childhood, I was an 
independent child, demonstrating natural childhood curiosity and exploring the freedom 
of play while also manifesting a childhood version of an existential attitude towards life 
as I could comprehend it. In fact, as a child, I did not realize the extent to which my 
philosophical/existential attitude, reflected in my propensity to analyze and imagine 
alternative ways of being in the world, was beating in cadence with my human heart and 
my intuitive mindset. Nor did I realize how others, from childhood friends to parents and 
siblings, perceived my habits of inward thinking—relative to my particular interests, 
questions, conversations, and interactions—as different, perhaps out of sync with their 
ways of thinking and being, even possibly undesirable.  
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 “You think too much!” A familiar refrain directed at me—from childhood 
onward—followed by charges of being “intense,” “serious,” and, particularly worthy of 
ridicule in a materialistic and competitive culture, a “professional student.” These labels 
arose from scenarios that allude to the following questions: Why would I stay inside on a 
summer evening engrossed in a book while some neighborhood children were playing 
outside? Why did I find peace in hitting a tennis ball against a wall for extended periods 
of time by myself? Why did I recognize a need to have alone time? Why did I like to take 
long walks with a special friend and speculate about life? Why was I very consciously 
caught in a web mediating between my need to be true to a particular inner life and my 
need to be considered popular and in step with the prevailing, peer group mentality? 
Although I do not recall feeling outrightly insulted by the labeling that signified 
difference from the dominant group, I do remember always feeling different, set apart—
both within the family unit and in social groups. What I am certain of is that I ultimately 
internalized such labels as negative commentary over time.  
 To understand labeling as an actual form of dehumanization and oppression 
within the family structure is a very subtle, but intense proposition that, for some, might 
prove difficult to accept, For others, it is a reality that can prove to be a lifelong 
challenge. Regardless, the effects of childhood labeling, even after the passing of many 
years, can remain pressed upon our adult psyches as continuing reminders of long-held, 
negative self-concepts and behaviors that continue to manifest in the present (Hudak, 
2001). Typically, the experience of internalized oppression that results from the enduring 
effects of labeling, in order to be dismantled or at least disrupted from within one’s 
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psyche, requires formal professional therapy or possibly other, informal processes of 
therapeutic value. The point is that mere substitution of a preferred word for the original 
labeling word does not reduce or change the internalized stamp of identification 
associated with long-term labeling. This is because labeling, as a more subtle process of 
dehumanization within the family, serves to objectify the labeled individual by 
substituting externally imposed identification preferences upon the susceptible target, 
thereby negating or denying her the freedom of her own self-creation. Even seemingly 
positive or benign labels (such as feminine, dainty, tomboy, sensitive, quiet, brainy) 
stamped in childhood can exert powerful influences on individual development and 
subsequent behaviors well into adult life. Hudak (2001) states, “labels become a part of 
our lived experiences; they can become a part of one’s life, one’s identity and hence, 
difficult to replace. . . . Stigma is not removed by word substitutions, but is rather worked 
through in one’s lived experience” (pp. 9–10). On this note, I want to suggest that a  
person may become more aware, more conscious of how childhood labeling has impacted 
her development and still not fully realize the threat that internalized oppression poses to 
her understanding of herself as a subject who must consciously choose her freedom in 
order to reclaim her project of personhood. As such, the philosophical disposition that is 
the existential attitude is a necessary state of awareness from which to reclaim selfhood 
and pursue one’s project with a renewed understanding and commitment to existential 
freedom. 
 The damaging impact of earlier labeling experiences may not have been intended 
when first applied by my parents, other family members, and the label-makers of 
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schooling, but they became fodder for my own negative interpretations of myself as an 
impressionable young person seeking family approval and social acceptance. In essence, 
the effects of childhood labeling were such that I adapted to what I thought those labels 
meant. I internalized them and, by doing so, I participated in my own objectification, 
becoming more thing-like in my automated responses to the stimuli that impacted my 
existence on a daily basis.  
 As an adult, with greater consciousness of my freedom to be who I choose myself 
to be from one moment to the next, I am more aware of choosing, possibly creating, the 
features of identity that I wish to embrace, and only as they affirm my personhood. But 
this is a process of unfinished duration, an existential process of working through past 
dysfunctions, present situations, and future possibilities. I will always be working through 
the negativity of past labeling experiences that promoted a superficial and inhumane 
concept of myself as the “smart one,” “the achiever,” the good girl,” “the people-
pleaser,” “the emotional one,” “the weak one,” and “the selfless one,” because, in 
effect, it was through those labels that I became selfless. They substituted for the personal 
exploration and meaningful creation of a self existentially authentic to my way of being in 
the world. They did not confirm my personhood because they did not affirm my freedom 
and my humanity. Instead, I assumed a self that was a thing for others. 
Educational Constructs 
 Do we hear about internalized oppression in educational circles? Are teachers 
routinely labeled as incompetent, inept, ineffective, insignificant, even non-essential 
when students’ test scores do not meet the mandated standards? For that matter, do 
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teachers routinely internalize now familiar schooling labels of dehumanization that 
actually de-personalize their roles as educators, labels such as “tester,” “assessor,” 
“evaluator,” “classroom manager,” “facilitator,” etc.? Do today’s teachers accept their 
situations of existential oppression without question, discussion, or critique? If so, can we 
say that they have internalized the culture of the neoliberal oppressor, along with the 
oppressor’s message of objectification? Or, is it more accurate to say that being 
existentially oppressed means that the educator knowingly lives the experience of 
dehumanization as alienation from the oppressor and from the self, deploring her 
situation and, yet, feeling trapped within it? On this view, can we say that the chronic 
degradation of self that emerges from alienation, resignation, and professional isolation 
has become the norm for those educators who experience their days in the school 
building as both existential entrapment and disconnection from anything resembling the 
possibility of a humanizing dialogue among supposed educational partners, be they 
teaching peers or school administrators?  If teachers cannot be part of a humanizing 
educational dialogue, how can they be (my emphasis) at all in the neoliberal world of 
schooling? I will discuss my interpretation of existential oppression as a somewhat 
separate phenomenon from internalized oppression in the next section. 
 For now, to acknowledge internalized oppression, the teacher’s adaptation to the 
dehumanizing labels associated with neoliberal pedagogy, as a present and pervasive 
reality in the world of 21st schooling is to recognize the anti-human nature of an 
educational model in which competition, superficial standards, and technological systems 
and relationships rule the day. In turn, it is easy to see how this kind of educational 
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ideology and culture are but reflections of a larger socio-cultural dilemma in which the 
integrity of the human experience, in general, is not sufficiently valued in modern 
Western society. Thus, to fully realize that oppression is not a phenomenon exclusive to 
Third World nations or to peasants in the Brazilian countryside is to confront the 
existential realities of both human fallibility and possibility across the increasingly anti-
human, data-driven, technologically sourced terrain of the 21st century. With extremely 
detrimental consequences running under the radar of our external consciousnesses as 
workers, caregivers, teachers, parents, and citizens, how can we distinguish between the 
necessary “programming” of relatively benign socio-cultural practices that underscore the 
creation of civilized communities and cultures and those that speak to dehumanization 
and the denial of personhood? Understanding that internalized oppression can plant its 
roots in childhood, then fester and grow with the added influences of neoliberal 
schooling, how might it be possible for the labeled, externally identified child to recover 
herself—if not in the present moment—then as an older child, or even as an adult? As for 
the latter scenario, how might it be possible for the educated adult, the educator herself, 
to rupture the false images of internalized oppression so that she might eventually see 
herself anew, possibly for the first time, as her own self-creation in a chosen state of 
existential freedom, either within or outside the walls of neoliberal education?  
 In answer to such questions, I choose (my emphasis) to believe that reclamation 
of personhood, even before it can be translated into resistance to oppression, exists as a 
possibility; not as any kind of guarantee of ultimate triumph over the forces of oppression 
and dehumanization, but certainly as an inward existential possibility that, for many of 
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us, becomes an existential necessity. In fact, I have learned through my own experience 
of educator existential oppression that it is absolutely necessary that I choose freedom, 
personally and pedagogically, in order to be able to live with myself with any sense of 
integrity; in other words, so that my personal, philosophical, and professional values are 
in alignment; so  that my identity, as both a private individual and a public citizen is 
intact. To be more explicit, I am talking about striving for existential authenticity. 
Whether or not I can ever stake a claim to my own actualization of personal authenticity 
is highly questionable. However, what is most important is the awareness that I can 
choose and act with the goal of authenticity clearly and consciously in mind. In his book, 
Existentialism in Education, Van Cleve Morris (1966) asks, “And who is the authentic” 
(p. 48)? His insightful response sets the stage for more directly considering the effects of 
dehumanization and objectification, experienced as internalized oppression or possibly as 
a more nuanced rendering of existential oppression, on the health and integrity of 
individual personhood. 
 
And who is the authentic? The individual whose example is perhaps beyond the 
reach of most of us: the individual who is free and who knows it, who knows that 
every deed and word is a choice and hence an act of value creation, and, finally 
and perhaps decisively, who knows that he is the author of his own life and must 
be held personally responsible for the values on behalf of which he has chosen to 
live it, and that these values can never be justified by referring to something or 
somebody outside himself. (Morris, 1966, p. 48) 
 
Existential Oppression 
 From the outset of this study, I have specifically referred to educator existential 
oppression as the central topic/problem at hand. I have explained educator existential 
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oppression as the negation of the educator’s personhood in the neoliberal educational 
setting, meaning the denial or negation of her subjective stance as an independently 
thinking individual and, with that, her freedom to choose how and what she will teach. 
On this view, the educator’s freedom to pursue her project, personally and pedagogically, 
is compromised, if not outrightly denied, and as such, she is confronted with an 
oppressive situation. For many educators, the sense of dehumanization and objectification 
is palpable as they find themselves operating like mindless automatons on an assembly 
line of standardization, uniformity, conformity, and acquiescence to an external authority. 
For other educators, the situation may not feel so dire, possibly because they have been 
schooled this way themselves and do not presume to critically question the status quo. 
There yet could be others who support the neoliberal agenda because they actually 
believe in the testing/measurement model. Clearly, having experienced existential 
oppression myself, I am committed to the cause of educator liberation as an inward self-
reclamation and as an expression of resistance in the world. 
 Yet, how are we to understand this claim of existential oppression in a modern, 
democratic society such as ours, a society in which the individual has the option/right to 
choose her career, her life project? She is not forced to do this work, and she is not 
overtly oppressed in terms of her physical and material freedom. On all these points, I 
submit that it is necessary to consider existential oppression as a particularly 
philosophical phenomenon that is quite particular to the individual, corresponding to her 
present reality in relation to her perception of herself as a value creating and meaning 
making subject in the world. Once consciously aware that she cannot express herself fully 
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and authentically within the school setting, the teacher is then certainly aware of the 
limitations and constraints on her freedom. She knows inside herself that she is at odds 
with the ideological/pedagogical stance of the neoliberal regime, but she typically 
perseveres in her work, ultimately ending up at odds with herself, as well. This is how 
existential oppression begins to take over the soul and psyche of the teacher who knows 
who she should be (according to her more natural, humanistic instincts and values) as an 
educator, but who has become fragmented and torn between her philosophical and 
pedagogical values and the demands of the neoliberal agenda. 
  The denial of freedom from which educator existential oppression emerges is not 
an overtly visible or physical manifestation of power exerted by one party over another, 
such that it would be evidenced by physical constraints on one’s freedom or denial of 
shelter and necessary sustenance. Rather, and somewhat like internalized oppression, 
existential oppression is a condition experienced within the self, and it is the self that 
must consciously and actively choose freedom if it is to be released from this kind of 
bondage. In an article concerned with the role of social workers and their modes of 
practice in relation to clients’ situations of oppression, “Confronting Oppression not 
Enhancing Functioning: The Role of Social Workers within Postmodern Practice, Dybicz 
(2010) specifically addresses existential oppression in a way that resonates with my 
rationale that educator existential oppression is a particularly individual experience and 
condition of existence. He does so by grounding his argument in the work of Martin 
Heidegger, specifically as it relates to the latter’s concept of Da-sein.  
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Heidegger (1962/1927) employs the term “Da-sein” to capture the non- 
categorical particularity of this being [the individual]. It is through understanding 
Da-sein, the unique being of the person, that we are able to truly understand the 
individual. This is in contrast to understanding things in our world, for example, a 
cow. We can point to any cow, and through employing categorical understanding, 
come to know all cows. According to Heidegger (1962/1927), to treat persons in 
this way is to treat persons as things. (Dybicz, 2010, pp. 30–31) 
  
 Dybicz (2010) explains Heidegger’s Da-sein as individual being embracing the 
freedom that makes subjective identity-creation possible in a socially constructed world. 
On this account, oppression looms as a threat when the “master narratives” (Dybicz, 
2010, p. 37) of an authoritative social order limits or takes away the individual’s freedom. 
In the case of the educator, the standardizing discourse and authority of the neoliberal 
narrative limits and, in many cases, disempowers the educator’s access to both academic 
and personal freedom in the workplace, frequently and negatively impacting her claim to 
freedom as a private individual. In this way, the progression of the educator’s existential 
project is stunted, and she begins to live the experience of existential oppression, 
alienated from the system and progressively disconnected from the expression of her 
“true” self and her intrinsic values in her work environment, possibly even beyond over 
time.  
 
Da-sein refers to one’s uniqueness as an individual—one’s identity within the 
context of one’s constructed world. So oppression occurs when discursive 
elements of the dominant discourse—narratives, or master narratives as labeled 
by some (Brubaker & Wright, 2006; Sands & Krumer-Nevo, 2006)—begin to 
restrict the possibilities of Da-sein. In plainer language, master narratives begin to 
define the individual in such a way that one’s essence, or worth, is lessened. 
(Dybicz, 2010, p. 37) 
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   At this juncture, I want to invoke a clear correlation between Heidegger’s Da-sein 
and Sartre’s (1984) “being-for-itself” (p. 117), the latter to be explained in more detail, 
along with other existential terms, in Chapter IV and in Appendix B, “Tenets of 
Existentialism.” Using different philosophical terminology, both terms speak to the 
individual’s uniquely subjective existence in the world, a state of existence for which the 
individual is responsible because she is essentially and existentially free. It is this very 
property of the individual’s particularity as a subject that renders existential oppression 
both real and so very individual in affect because it is not based on a socially constructed 
category (think of the prior cow example) or on a common disposition that encompasses 
all individuals in exactly the same way. As Dybicz (2010) states, existential oppression 
“does not rest upon a categorical understanding of the individual, but rather upon a 
particular understanding of the individual as a unique entity: Da-sein” (p. 37) or, in 
Sartre’s lexicon, as a being-for-itself. Therefore, it is important to understand that 
whether we are talking about the arena of social work or the institution of education, it is 
the individual, within in her uniquely experienced situation of existential oppression, 
about whom we are speaking. This does not mean that others are not living through 
similar experiences of oppression, but the subjectively embodied individual can only 
truly be conscious to her own particular circumstances and, in turn, in control of her 
response to them.  
 Both Heidegger and Sartre point to the possibilities that are inherent to one’s 
consciousness of existential freedom. The caveat is that these possibilities must be chosen 
by the individual, within her particular situation of oppression in order to counteract it or 
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move beyond it. Thus, in terms of Dybicz’s rendering of an oppressive master narrative 
in the world of social work, the possibility of freedom as Da-sein cannot be realized 
under “the current horizon of understanding ” (Dybicz, 2010, p. 37), meaning the status 
quo. However, as Da-sein, or as a being-for-itself, the individual can access her freedom, 
“in terms of one’s free will, [having] the ability to construct counter narratives to the 
oppressive master narratives, and thus move Da-sein beyond one’s current horizon of 
understanding by constructing a new social reality or world” (p. 37). Sartre (1984) 
expresses the same idea in Being and Nothingness, noting that the individual who finally 
decides that her situation is intolerable will then choose to take action to resist or change 
it. Still, phrases like “new social reality or world” implicate a broad-scale disruption of 
the status quo that is not a likely accomplishment for the individual educator in view of 
the present realities of neoliberal culture. Nonetheless, according to existentialism’s 
emphasis on possibility and personal transcendence, the individual educator can create a 
new existential reality for herself by choosing her freedom, inwardly, and potentially by 
constructing a new social reality within her present classroom or in an alternative 
educational setting. 
 A final matter to consider: Is there a significant difference between internalized 
oppression and existential oppression, having earlier alluded to distinctions between the 
two? Based on my own experience of existential oppression, I believe that there is a 
qualitative difference between these states of oppression. Internalized oppression 
connotes the oppressed individual’s inclination to believe and adhere to the oppressor’s 
externally imposed story about herself. As an existentially oppressed educator, I 
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experienced a very conscious conflict between my own pedagogical values and ideals in 
contrast to the neoliberal oppressor’s story about the officially sanctioned role and values 
of the contemporary educator. I never believed, never owned the neoliberal version. 
Nonetheless, the damaging effects of existential oppression—understood as both an act of 
dehumanization perpetrated upon my being by the neoliberal institution of education and 
as my own alienated state of existence within that institution—resulted in my functioning 
as a fragmented person, knowing my pedagogical values, but simultaneously trapped 
within them and cut off from any meaningful and sustained expression of them in my 
daily practice. In essence, I did not take on the oppressor identity, but I was increasingly 
disconnected from my “true” or authentic way of being myself as an educator. Deep 
within my being, I maintained my self-constructed values, but I was existentially and 
pedagogically isolated in my workplace and, consequently, out of sync with any clear 
sense of existential wholeness in terms of living and expressing my personal and 
professional integrity in the world.  
 Now, with conceptions of oppression having been explored in some depth, I end 
this chapter with an abbreviated of discussion of personhood based on Sartrean existential 
theory. As such, “An Existentialist Conception of Personhood” is not an exhaustive 
treatment of Sartre’s notions of personhood and existentialist ontology. Rather, it is 
intended to provide additional context to this chapter’s prior emphasis on oppression, 
thus rounding the circle of what I consider an exploration of the oppression-personhood 
dynamic. Lastly, this last section of Chapter III also serves as a transition into Chapter 
IV, “Turning to Existentialism” where, going forward, I focus my attention on presenting 
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existentialism as a humanizing philosophical theory of personhood and existence, 
particularly in pedagogical contexts that address my current use of existential theory as 
the pedagogical foundation of my teaching practice in the undergraduate classroom; as 
such, my choice of response to the dehumanization of neoliberal education. 
An Existentialist Conception of Personhood 
 As a philosophical school of thought, existentialism is concerned with individual 
personhood as constituted by the lived world of subjective, human experiences. In 
Sartre’s (2007) words, “‘existentialism’ is a doctrine that makes human life possible and 
also affirms that every truth and every action imply an environment and a human 
subjectivity” (p. 18) that manifest once the individual has been “cast into the world” 
(Sartre, 2007, p. 29) of mortal existence. Accordingly, Sartre’s (2007) famous maxim, 
“existence precedes essence” (p. 20), asserts that the individual first exists (my emphasis) 
and then creates herself as a particular person, continually informed and impacted by the 
experiences and relationships that emerge during the course of her life. In this way, the 
individual shapes and comes to know herself as a particular individual, physically 
embodied and consciously separate from the other things and subjects of the world. In 
Sartrean (1984) terms, she is a being “for-itself and projected toward its own possibles” 
(p. 147) within the world of earthly existence. In turn, the subjective nature of individual 
existence orients our understanding of human consciousness as something quite unique 
and apart from other living creatures in that human consciousness can think about its own 
thinking. This capacity renders the individual capable of considering herself, in situation, 
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as an embodied self-consciousness, as a being who can choose to be self-aware and self-
activating.  
 Moreover, existentialism adds a nuanced rendering of self-consciousness that 
gives a deeper complexity to commonly held assumptions about the average individual’s 
experience of self-awareness; in particular, as it relates to the development of 
personhood. Following Sartre’s premise that human existence in the world is the 
precursor to any notion of selfhood, we might say that the human individual becomes 
aware of the physical reality of her being in the world, first, and then embarks on her task 
of self-creation.as she develops increasing consciousness of self as a choosing/acting 
person. Thus, personhood is neither a predetermined condition nor a one-time static 
creation. Solomon (2005) explains the self-consciousness that underscores an existential 
notion of personhood as an attitude that engages the world by virtue of the individual’s 
perceived place or situation within it, demonstrating both awareness and responsibility 
for how she will choose to act in a given situation. Existential self-consciousness is 
indelibly linked to the notion of choosing one’s path, one’s way of creating an embodied 
self with which to navigate this uncertain and challenging world. Looking at self-creation 
as an outgrowth of consciousness in action, Solomon (2005) states, “The self is an ideal, 
a chosen course of action and values, something one creates in the world” (p. xvii).  
 Sartre’s (2007) claim that “subjectivity must be our point of departure” (p. 20) 
represents the individual’s “project” (p. 23) of personhood, underscored by the applied 
consciousness of her freedom to choose, act, and involve herself—always as a particular 
and unique individual—in the world of others; continually shaping identity and  
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becoming more herself throughout her project of living. Thus, to be a person, a subject, is 
to be an agentic being, as opposed to existing as an object or thing incapable of deciding, 
choosing, and acting. To illustrate this point, Sartre (2007) explains, “Man [Woman] is 
indeed a project that has a subjective existence, rather unlike that of a patch of moss, a 
spreading fungus, or a cauliflower” (p. 23).  
 What about the existence of other subjects, individuals, in the world with whom 
we necessarily interact and form relationships? Sartre (1984) tells us that, upon 
encountering the “look” (p. 352) of the other, the individual subject becomes a kind of 
object for the other’s attention, just as she—the individual in question—encounters or 
engages other subjects as objects of her attention.  
 
If there is an Other, whatever or whoever he may be, whatever may be his 
relations with me, and without his acting upon me in any way except by the pure 
upsurge of his being—then I have an outside, I have a nature. My original fall is 
the existence of the Other. Shame—like pride—is the apprehension of myself as a 
nature although that very nature escapes me and is unknowable as such. Strictly 
speaking, it is not that I perceive myself losing my freedom in order to become a 
thing, but my nature is—over there, outside my lived freedom—as a given 
attribute of this being which I am for the Other. (Sartre, 1984, p. 352) 
  
 Regardless of the subject/other dynamic that fuels and sometimes undermines, 
even corrupts, human relationships, existentialism’s primacy of individual freedom and 
subjectivity is the bedrock of its conception of personhood. In particular, and alluding to 
Beauvoir’s view of freedom as the moral ground of human existence, existential freedom 
symbolizes personhood as the antithesis of victimhood associated with objectification and 
dehumanization. From this vantage point, freedom is understood as the condition of 
existence that nourishes positive qualities of human development; positive qualities 
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meaning those qualities that affirm humanity in its fullest possible expression as opposed 
to habits of self-denial and socially unjust practices that dehumanize and demean the 
human condition. Furthermore, while history reminds us of the existential truth that 
human freedom has been and likely will continue to be threatened by those seeking 
power over others (through irrational, evil-minded motivations and goals), the existential 
need (my emphasis) to live in freedom will continue to motivate and function as the 
rational individual’s impetus for choosing self-consciousness and personhood over self-
negation and victimhood, thereby also valuing human cooperation as opposed to human 
conflict. 
 To expand on the affirming aspects of existential personhood, and incorporating 
the subject/other dynamic, existentialism’s primacy of individual subjectivity holds that 
the individual’s will to choose and act for freedom is not unilaterally self-serving. In 
choosing freedom for herself, the individual is responsible for the consequences of her 
choosing as it affects her life and, potentially, the lives of others with whom she interacts. 
Simultaneously, others hold the same responsibility for their choices and actions. As 
such, there is an implicit, existential reciprocity at work for those individuals who value 
freedom as a moral value and as the fundamental condition for living in a shared world. 
Sartre’s (2007) own words, expressed in Existentialism is a Humanism, reinforce this 
point (presuming a rational state of mind as the default condition of Sartre’s individual) 
while also deflecting stereotypical accusations of existential solipsism, the idea that the 
individual can only be certain of the existence of her own mind and no other  
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Choosing to be this or that is to affirm at the same time the value of what we 
choose, because we can never choose evil. We always choose the good, and 
nothing can be good for any of us unless it is good for all. (Sartre, 2007, p. 24) 
 
Closing Commentary 
 To synthesize the themes that underscore this chapter’s discussion of 
philosophical theories of oppression, internalized oppression, existential oppression, and  
an existentialist conception of personhood, I wish to emphasize the distinction between 
the dehumanizing nature and function of oppression versus the humanizing nature and 
function of existentialism as a philosophy of humanistic possibilities, specifically in the 
contexts of this study of educator existential oppression. To be clear, existential 
possibility does not imply simplicity or ease of living. Quite the opposite, no matter the 
depth of the individual educator’s dedication or perseverance for the cause of personal 
and pedagogical freedom, none of us is guaranteed success or smooth sailing along our 
respective journeys. I suggest, then, that having nothing more concrete to hold onto, it is 
essential that each of us reclaim and preserve the integrity of personhood in the neoliberal 
world of education by forging relationships with our students and with one another in that 
world and elsewhere, acknowledging our ability to choose from a mutual commitment to 
the humanization of education via an existential approach to teaching and learning.  
 I now proceed to Chapter IV, “Turning to Existentialism” where I use excerpts 
from post-class, teaching field notes to serve as my existential data in support of a 
pedagogy of personhood and, therefore, as my strategy of resistance to neoliberal 
educational ideology in an undergraduate classroom composed primarily of teacher 
education students. I correlate these field notes with philosophical analyses of the 
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following, fundamental existential tenets—individual freedom, subjectivity, choice, 
action, and responsibility—referencing Sartre, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Beauvoir, Freire, 
and Fanon. In this way, I propose that we turn to existentialism as a humanizing response 
to neoliberal education and educator existential oppression. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
TURNING TO EXISTENTIALISM  
 
Overview 
 In this chapter, I turn to existentialism as a humanizing philosophy for living and 
educating. With this intent in mind, I present existentialism as a philosophical attitude 
(the existential attitude) of resistance and possibility, positioned as the antithesis of 
neoliberal education’s dehumanizing agenda of standardization and objectification that 
underscores the problem of educator existential oppression. Linking to Chapter III’s prior 
discussion of oppression and personhood via Beauvoir, Fanon, and Freire, I offer this 
chapter as existentialism’s critical response to neoliberal oppression by illuminating 
existential tenets that support a vision and practice of pedagogy as an existential 
enterprise that centers on individual freedom, affirmation of personhood and recognition 
of the subjective nature of the human individual. In other words, according to the 
existentialist vision of a humanizing pedagogy, the individual—embodied as teacher or 
student—is central. As such, the individual teacher “must himself [herself] be a free 
personality actively engaging in such relations and projects with individual students as to 
leave no doubt in their minds that they, too, are in fact free personalities and are being 
treated that way” (Kneller, 1958, p. 115). 
 The structure of the chapter incorporates philosophical analyses and explanations 
of existential tenets particularly associated with Sartre—individual freedom, subjectivity, 
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choice, action, and responsibility—that are organized around selected excerpts from post-
class, reflective field notes collected during the 2013 spring semester when I taught a 
foundations of education course to undergraduate students, most of whom were enrolled 
in the teacher education program at my university. With these field notes purposed as my 
“existential data,” I aim to illustrate, in real-world time and contexts, the contemporary 
applications of these existential concepts as I work to incorporate them in my teaching 
praxis and as they contribute to my personal and pedagogical development; furthermore, 
how this kind of humanistic pedagogy might contribute to the personal and intellectual 
development of my students. Turning to Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Beauvoir, Freire, Fanon, 
and especially Sartre, I interpret aspects of their theories as they inform not only each of 
the specified tenets, but also as these theories support my existential attitude of resistance 
and possibility against educator existential oppression and the anti-human agenda of 
neoliberal education.  
Existentialism: A Philosophy of Humanization 
 Historically, there has been a curious irony at play regarding two opposing 
perspectives on existentialism as a philosophical school of thought: (a) existentialism is a 
humanizing philosophy for living based on the individual’s consciousness of self as a 
particular subject, free to create her identity and to pursue her life project in the world, 
the possibilities of which include intentional choosing and acting against the 
contingencies and uncertainties of human existence and (b) existentialism is a philosophy 
of spiritual darkness, angst, alienation, and nihilism (the view that human existence has 
no meaning, value, or purpose) in response to life’s obstacles, challenges, and 
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uncertainties, a frequent theme in existentialist novels and plays. Looking to Sartre alone 
(other writers of dark existentialist literature are plentiful, but are not singularly relevant 
to this study), such works as Nausea (1938) and No Exit (1944) are stereotypically noted 
as representing the meaninglessness of human existence, along with the negative, often 
destructive ways in which people manifest their anxieties toward self and others in the 
world.   
 Between these two views, I choose to understand existentialism as a philosophy 
of humanization, a philosophy that validates the human experience despite (my emphasis) 
the darker realities of life. How is this so? Existentialism interprets individual existence 
as the initially unchosen (in terms of being born into the world), but unavoidably 
necessary space of freedom in which personal subjectivity, choice, action, and 
responsibility are the existential tools with which the individual can shape her identity 
and pursue her subjectively conceived project for living, thereby assigning a sense of 
purpose, meaning, and value to her life. In other words, the individual can simply resign 
herself to existence as a meaningless proposition by doing nothing, or she can choose to 
create meaning of her life by taking action to give it purpose and value. Thus, 
existentialism can be interpreted as a philosophical attitude of human possibility and 
purpose, but only if and when the individual chooses to act on her freedom. From the 
existentialist perspective, such choosing emanates from the individual’s awakening to her 
existential attitude. 
 The individual finds herself in that acute state of self-consciousness known as the 
“existential attitude,” identified early in Chapter I and continuing as a running theme 
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throughout this study, when she awakens to the seminal realization that she is 
simultaneously free and utterly responsible for her situation, now and into the unknown, 
contingent future. In fact, Solomon (2005) asserts, “the existential attitude is apparently 
not chosen. One finds oneself in it” (p. xiv). As an attitude reflecting a more profound 
experience of individual self-consciousness, the existential attitude becomes the 
foundation of the individual’s way of looking at the world and her place in it. However, 
according to Solomon (2005), “self-consciousness itself is not universal, although once 
one becomes self-conscious, he cannot go back, no matter how he denies himself, drugs 
himself, leaps or falls away from himself (the terms, from Kierkegaard and Heidegger 
respectively, carry their evaluations with them)” (p. xiv). Based on my own experience, I 
would also add that the individual finds herself in (my emphasis) the existential attitude 
when her quality of life and well-being are experienced as hanging in the balance; when 
her self-consciousness, in situation, renders choosing between existential impotence and 
existential agency necessary to her ability to function at all. In other words, the existential 
attitude becomes absolutely necessary to the individual’s survival as an intact, 
functioning self. Clearly, this is not simply a physical survival of which I am speaking, 
although it could be in specific cases. I am talking about the survival of one’s sense of 
viability, as a human being—a person—navigating her life journey. Clearly, the 
existential attitude does not constitute a head-in-the-sands approach to dealing with life’s 
thornier issues. It does not mean an inwardness that shies away from the world. To 
reiterate, it is just the opposite. Instead of yielding to the darkness and impotence of 
resignation and futility, the existential attitude is “an attitude of self-consciousness” 
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(Solomon, 2005, p. xiii) in confrontation with the world; on the one hand, illuminating 
the individual’s sense of aloneness and angst against life’s contingencies while, on the 
other hand, compelling her to respond to her situation in order to make meaning of it, to 
improve it, change it, or possibly move beyond it. In essence, the existential attitude 
becomes the ground from which the individual can, then, choose to act in the interest of 
her own liberation.  
 Finally, to more fully appreciate existentialism as a philosophy of humanization, 
it is essential that we understand the individual’s situation, while unique to her, as a 
reflection of what is commonly called the human condition or the human experience. In 
other words, as human beings, we are collectively confronted with the unavoidable 
tyrannies and anxieties of earthly existence. Therefore, as beings uniquely capable of 
exercising our imaginations and our capacities to empathize, we have the ability to relate 
to the joys and pains experienced by others due to the given commonalities of the human 
experience; yet, as uniquely and historically situated individuals, still not feel the 
experience specifically as one’s own. Therefore, if we are genuinely self-conscious and 
other-conscious, we can imagine the situations of others because we have our own 
experiences of life from which to draw. As individuals, we are alone, but as human 
beings, we share a collective experience of existence. On this view, I suggest that it is the 
consciousness of the existential attitude that compels the individual to think about what 
each of us can do to make our humanness more accessible, to ourselves and to the world, 
in order to imbue earthly existence with greater purpose and meaning. Where better to 
apply such a humanizing attitude than in the world of neoliberal education? 
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Note: See Appendix B, “Tenets of Existentialism” and Appendix C, “Historical 
Overview of Existentialism” for more specific and substantive information about the 
background and concepts associated with existentialism as a philosophical school of 
thought. 
The Contemporary Undergraduate Classroom:  
Tensions between an Existential Pedagogy of Personhood and Student Resistance 
 
First, freeing oneself from existential oppression is a necessary precondition for 
spawning a critical consciousness (Freire, 2000/1970), and hence, achieving 
empowerment. This critical consciousness is what enables one to act effectively 
towards seeking change in the issues and problems one confronts. (Dybicz, 2010, 
p. 38) 
  
 During the spring 2013 semester I taught a foundations of education course, ELC 
381 The Institution of Education, a course predicated on social justice issues as they 
impact teaching and learning, and critically examining the intersections between public 
education and the social, cultural, political, and economic structures that frame our 
society. Set up as a seminar-style classroom environment, the dynamics and activities that 
define the course involve assigned readings, follow-up seminar discussions, 
responsive/reflective writing activities, and students’ choices of creative projects. It goes 
without saying that having experienced and personally suffered through the standardized 
pedagogical practices of K-12 schooling, I genuinely embrace the relative freedom of my 
undergraduate classroom.  
 As an instructor of undergraduate students preparing to be future teachers, I 
continue to position myself as a resistor to the prevailing neoliberal model of 
standardization and objectification by exposing my students to critical and philosophical 
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forms of pedagogy that can be adapted to their own evolving teaching philosophies and 
future pedagogical practices. Of course, my pedagogy is embedded within the 
existentialist perspective that I bring to the classroom. Interestingly, a paradox has 
emerged with regard to the contrast between my existential view of education and the 
neoliberal view with which these students, as a whole, have been educated or trained. 
From my interactions and discussions with many of my former (and current) students, I 
have learned that existential freedom, as manifested and practiced in the classroom, can 
be a disconcerting, anxiety-producing experience for the unsuspecting student who has 
been conditioned to the standardizing climate of K-12 education. Based on direct 
discussions with the students, a large number of them reveal that they are more at home 
with a concrete notion of education because that is what they experienced throughout 
their years of K-12 schooling. In other words, the normative educational process for these 
students has typically and consistently encompassed a dependence on rubrics, 
assessments, tests, right/wrong answers, and concrete grading systems. As such, the 
security and precision of academic concreteness is frequently preferred over the open-
ended, abstract possibilities of academic freedom because the notion of possibility, in 
itself, speaks to uncertainty and requires an alternative, imaginative way of thinking. So, 
the ironic situation in which I find myself as university instructor is this: I am free (not 
absolutely, but relatively free) to pursue my personally conceived pedagogy of 
personhood in the higher education setting. Yet, a new tension sets in as I now experience 
my own freedom being resisted by others, my students, positioning me in confrontation 
with existential oppression once again. However, this time it is not my own oppression 
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about which I am speaking. Rather, I am speaking of my perception and interpretation of 
existential oppression as I understand it to be embodied in many of my students. (Note 
that when I speak of existential oppression pertaining to my students, my language will 
reflect a tone of generalization; certainly, there are students who do not fall into this 
category). I make this claim because students say that they know (my emphasis) they 
have been educationally indoctrinated according to neoliberal ideology, and they are 
quick to criticize many of their prior educational experiences throughout their years of K-
12 schooling. Nevertheless, while they know they have been/are existentially oppressed, 
many yet choose to continue down the neoliberal path because it is familiar, promises job 
security, and because the abstract nature of freedom looms as a kind of uncertain, 
sometimes frightening, stranger in their externally manipulated frames of reference.  
 Finally, my pedagogical challenge of humanization has been and continues to be 
aimed at my students. In terms of the semester under study, a number of students 
demonstrated their willingness to embrace the opportunities of intellectual and existential 
freedom provided in this classroom space, while many others did not. The tension that 
marks such a pedagogical situation clearly represents an ongoing challenge to the 
existential teacher. At the same time, it represents an often uncomfortable challenge to 
the individual student because opening oneself to a space of freedom requires the 
student’s willingness to engage herself and the world in more profound ways; to risk 
engaging multiple points of view that might cause her to question the familiarity and 
security of her own, long-held assumptions about education, society, and life itself. 
Consequently, opening students’ minds to their own possibilities of existential freedom, 
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as unique individuals and as future teachers, has proven to be a formidable challenge, one 
that actually reinforces my pedagogy of resistance against oppressive neoliberal reforms 
and for the existential and academic freedom of both teachers and students.  
Field Notes as Pedagogical Portraits of Existential Tenets 
 Each of the following sections is headed by a fundamental tenet or principle of 
existential theory that I emphasize as essential to a pedagogy of personhood that affirms 
the humanity of both teachers and students. Immediately following each heading is one or 
more excerpts from my class field notes, serving as existential data and a textual 
“portrait” of the pedagogical dynamics of a particular classroom experience and my 
reflective response to the situation at hand. In both obvious and subtle ways, each of the 
excerpts is intended to convey pedagogical and existential substance to the tenet to which 
it is linked. The idea is for the reader to see more deeply into the thoughts and concerns 
of one educator attempting to pursue a pedagogy of personhood in a particular 
undergraduate classroom, as well as to better understand the existential tenets upon which 
she chooses to base her pedagogy. As such, I intend this pedagogy of freedom and 
humanization as an ongoing statement of personhood affirmed for my students and 
myself, representing a definitive rejection of existential oppression. 
Individual Freedom  
 Excerpt from class field notes—class 3, January 23, 2013, on experiencing my 
own freedom. So, getting divorced, living on my own again, my girls away at college, 
quitting the public school system, embracing the PhD program, the death of my father, 
the death of my beloved dog, Max, and confrontations with acute anxiety have brought 
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me to this place in which I am more in touch with myself, as I understand myself to be in 
terms of my own conscious creation.. This creation includes the innocent truth of my 
childhood independence, my curiosity, my outspokenness, and love of learning. That 
never went away, really, but rather became submerged under the cover of avoidance of 
pain from the dysfunctional events of my adolescence—when I stopped being myself. I 
submerged that formerly free child under a blanket of responsibility for the wrongs 
perpetrated by the adults in my life. Now, no longer submerged, I discover how much I 
like teaching. I like students responding to me, as well as seeking me out. I feel like a real 
individual who matters for something in this world. Yes, it’s human connection, but it is 
also reconnection with the me that I consider authentic—that girl who shone in school 
just by being there, the girl who made the classroom her psychic home, the girl and 
woman who feels the greatest excitement walking around college campuses, absorbing 
the feeling of humming minds within glorious buildings that hold stores of life stories and 
human information. I like ideas. I like to discover ideas and explore them with others who 
come alive with ideas. So, how do I make my students come alive with ideas? I am trying 
to build a community so that they will open up and talk. I cajole and I perform. I put my 
gregarious side forward, tell them personal anecdotes, and try to bring warmth to the 
setting. I forget that I am actually being me, and not performing falsely. Perhaps this is 
the underlying message of today: I am not performing—I am being me. I am a born 
student/educator—I love this kind of human interaction. I feel a sense of excitement swell 
my insides when I make a connection with the students; when they respond as if I have 
something valuable to share with them. I trust that we will build this community, and that 
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they will open up. They are just so trained, like seals on stools, waiting for the next 
command and a fish treat to reinforce their expected responses. I don’t want trained 
seals that I have to feed a certain way to get a response. I want them to feel, to relate to 
the topics we address in 381. I want them to emerge from their own blankets of 
smothering and their own swimming pools of submersion and find that part of them that 
says, “I can resist, I can speak up, and I can be an individual in the classroom, in society, 
in the world.” That’s what’s wrong with education today. Kids are so trained. They admit 
it. They don’t know how else to be. They just want to know the “right” answers and move 
along to the next event. This is crazy and inhuman. I want my classroom to be the one in 
which they wake up to themselves. Not simply awakening from sleep, but to experience an 
awakening from submersion of selfhood so that they might each become conscious to the 
possibilities of individual freedom. 
 Excerpt from class 5 field notes—Wednesday, January 30, 2013, on the 
tension between individual freedom and students as objects of neoliberal 
indoctrination. I enter the doorway of my classroom. Our “seminar square” has been 
set up. I announce my friendly hello and chatter about the last batch of student papers 
recently graded and what we’re going to do in class today. Utilizing the flat surface of a 
table upon which to organize my papers and notes—essentially my classroom existence 
for the next hour and 15 minutes—I continue to speak, seeking connection with my 
students. Why do I always feel that I have to fill the empty spaces with my voice? Seeking 
their approval? Trying to be engaging? Trying to initiate dialogue? All of the above.  I 
look at my notes, like a mini script, to prompt myself on what needs to be said: comments 
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about another batch of papers written on an assigned reading, “The Banality of Evil.” I 
offer, “Your papers are quite good—actually full of conviction, so why don’t you speak 
your thoughts aloud in class?” No response. 
 I recall a philosophy of listening course in which doctoral students explored 
philosophical interpretations and dimensions of human listening. To whom or what am I 
listening in this situation? Students’ voices? More often, listening to their silences. 
Listening to my own voice, both the internal chatter and the external conversation. I 
purposefully invite my students to engage in meaningful classroom dialogue, to share 
opinions, and to be open to diverse points of view. I think to myself that an education 
course such as this—predicated on critical pedagogy, contemporary social justice issues, 
and philosophy of education—should naturally provoke passionate ideas and engaged 
discourse. With a touch of desperation and a large dose of humor, I announce to the 
group, “Liberate yourselves!” In other words, embrace your freedom to be who you are, 
who you are striving to become. They smile, laugh, and reinforce my hope of inspiring 
deeper efforts at personal reflection, open communication, and a realized sense of inner 
freedom, as well as connection to this educational community.  
 Still, I ask myself if this is too much, too controversial a practice of socio-cultural 
critique and self-examination? Might I crush the teaching aspirations of these future 
educators?  I openly voice this fear to my class, further explaining that while we intend to 
critique many aspects of the institution of education, hopes and possibilities for change 
are available. Hope and possibility can be their tools of choice as they consider why and 
how they will teach, as individuals who have chosen the teaching profession. I ask my 
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students if I make them uncomfortable with my forthrightness. They answer no. One 
young woman even pronounces to the class that she is amazed that that I (as instructor) 
model the principles of which I speak. Grateful for the affirmation, I reiterate that the 
purpose of this class is to communicate freely and respectfully, to think critically and 
philosophically, to explore personal possibilities that speak to individual freedom and the 
ongoing becoming of evolving identity creation, and, certainly, personhood affirmed for 
both teacher and student. 
 Sartre’s (2007) conception of existential freedom emerges from his famous 
maxim, “existence precedes essence” (p. 22). He is saying that the individual is cast into 
the world through the incident of birth, having no choice in the matter and having no pre-
determined nature or identity to anchor her there. This view of existence speaks to an 
absolute kind of freedom that, on the one hand, looms as frighteningly overwhelming; or, 
on the other hand, looms as the open possibility of freedom with which the subjectively 
self-conscious individual can choose to create herself and her life path. On this 
understanding, Sartre (1984) claims that the individual “is condemned to be free” (p. 567) 
because each of us engages the world, initially, without a predetermined plan of what to 
do with our lives in this very space of freedom. In the following passage, Sartre more 
fully explains what is involved in coming to terms with oneself as a freedom. Note that 
he uses the masculine noun/pronoun to signify the individual, the literary convention of 
his era. While I am quoting according to his specific use of language, I intend that Sartre 
be understood as speaking of the individual with no gender identification intended. 
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We mean that man first exists: he materializes in the world, encounters himself, 
and only afterward defines himself. If man as existentialists conceive of him 
cannot be defined, it is because to begin with he is nothing. He will not be 
anything until later, and then he will be what he makes of himself. . . . Man is not 
only that which he conceives himself to be, but that  which he wills himself to be, 
and since he conceives of himself only after he exists, just as he wills himself to 
be after being thrown into existence, man is nothing other than what he makes of 
himself. This is the first principle of existentialism. (Sartre, 2007, p. 22) 
 
 From the existentialist perspective, identity creation has everything to do with the 
individual’s consciousness of self as a unique and free existent in the world; yet, one who 
is always situated in history and in experiences with others, all set against the 
uncertainties and contingencies presented in by existence itself. In existential terms, this 
means that the individual cannot escape the “facticity” (Sartre, 1984, p. 127) of existence, 
the “givens” of mortal existence in an uncontrollable universe. Cox (2009) explains the 
tension between individual freedom and facticity as “The resistance or adversity 
presented by the world that free action strives to overcome” (Cox, 2009, p. 77). 
Therefore, it is essential to emphasize an understanding of facticity as an unavoidable 
feature of human existence with which individual freedom is constantly entangled.  
 In the contexts of this study, the neoliberal institution of education represents the 
facticity against which the freedom of the individual educator is pitted. Theoretically 
speaking, and according to Sartre, the existentially oppressed educator must choose how 
she will confront the facticity of her situation in order to avoid the self-deception and 
rationalization of “bad faith” (Sartre, 2007, p. 25) that would have her submerge her will 
to freedom by complying and conforming to the givens of a dehumanizing educational 
model. “The technical and philosophical concept of freedom . . . means only the 
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autonomy of choice. . . . choice, being identical with acting, supposes a commencement 
of realization in order that the choice may be distinguished from the dream and the wish” 
(Sartre, 1984, p. 622). Therefore, on Sartre’s view, individual freedom moves from a 
seemingly unobtainable abstraction, a kind of nothingness, to become a present reality for 
the educator who consciously and intentionally chooses herself as a creator and maker of 
identity and, with that, her pedagogical project. 
 
Freedom is precisely the nothingness which is made-to-be at the heart of man and 
which forces human-reality to make itself instead of to be. As we have seen, for 
human reality, to be is to choose oneself; nothing comes to it either from the 
outside or from within which it can receive or accept. Without any help 
whatsoever, it is entirely abandoned to the intolerable necessity of making itself 
be—down to the slightest detail. Thus freedom is not a being; it is the being of 
man. (Sartre, 1984, pp. 568–569) 
 
 What about the students in my undergraduate classroom, most of whom are 
preparing to become teachers in K-12 public education? Do they approach their lives 
with a Sartrean conception of individual freedom that places responsibility on oneself for 
the creation of identity and for the pursuit one’s fundamental project in the reality of 
lived experience? I suggest that it is the exceptional individual, be she student or teacher, 
who has escaped contemporary K-12 schooling unscathed by its system of 
dehumanization. Consequently, as products of neoliberal K-12 schooling themselves and, 
now, as students preparing to work in that same arena, there is an ironic dynamic at play 
in which individual freedom expressed by the educator (me) is frequently met with the 
facticity of the student’s resistance to engage this pedagogical experience of freedom. 
Once again, I see myself faced with existential oppression, this time embodied within my 
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students whose educational indoctrination to the neoliberal standardization and 
objectification model appears to be well in place. In effect, evidenced by their ways of 
engaging (or not), expressing themselves (or not), completing their work (or not), and 
taking advantage of the freedom afforded in this classroom (or not), the majority of these 
students have internalized their prior training and habits of conformity to the neoliberal 
agenda, only to continue down this same path in their teacher training. 
 From the classic existentialist perspective, notions of conformity abound, 
evidenced by Kierkegaard’s “crowd” (in Solomon, 2005, p. 32) mentality and what 
Nietzsche (2001) refers to as the “herd instinct” (p. 114). First, Kierkegaard correlates 
truth with the integrity of the individual as an independent and free thinker who does not 
taint the personal purity of her values and beliefs with the less contemplative, externally 
imposed influences of the dominant social order or group. For Kierkegaard, truth is 
apprehended within the inwardness of the individual who affirms her own personhood; 
therefore, as one who refuses to submit to the power and influence of the group at large 
for the sake of belonging to something larger than oneself, or attaching to a false sense of 
security that comes from passive anonymity.  
 
There is another view of life which conceives that wherever there is a crowd there 
is untruth, so  that (to consider for a moment the extreme case), even if every 
individual, each for himself in private, were to be in possession of the truth, yet in 
case they were all to get together in a crowd—a crowd to which any sort of 
decisive significance is attributed, a voting, noisy, audible crowd—untruth would 
at once be evident. (Kierkegaard, as cited in Solomon, 2005, p. 32) 
 
For the existentially oppressed educator, the implication to be drawn from Kierkegaard’s 
existential view of individual freedom and personal truth is to be willing to go inward in 
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order to define her pedagogical truth and align it with her personal values. In this way, 
and with the consciousness of reflective intent, the educator can begin to reclaim the 
integrity of personhood and the truth of her existential project.  
 As previously noted, Nietzsche’s conception of the herd instinct links closely with 
Kierkegaard’s view of the crowd. He brings a nuanced understanding to the herd instinct 
by correlating it with his notion of socially constructed moral codes that induce the 
typical individual to follow the prevailing master narrative of her time and place willingly 
and uncritically. The best explanation of Nietzsche’s herd instinct is the one provided by 
Nietzsche himself. As such, I quote the following passage, from Book 3 of The Gay 
Science, in its entirety; no paraphrasing would do Nietzsche’s words justice in this 
instance. 
 
Herd instinct.—Wherever we encounter a morality, we find an evaluation and 
ranking of human drives and actions. These evaluations and rankings are always 
the expression of the  needs of a community and herd: that which benefits it the 
most—and second most, and third most—is also the highest standard of value for 
all individuals. With morality the individual is instructed to be a function of the 
herd and to ascribe value to himself only as a function. Since the conditions for 
preserving one community have been very different from those of another 
community, there have been very different moralities; and in view of essential 
changes in herds and communities, states and societies that are yet to come, one 
can prophesy that there will yet be very divergent moralities. Morality is the herd-
instinct in the individual. (Nietzsche, 2001, pp. 114–115) 
 
 Similar to Kierkegaard, if we are to correlate the herd instinct to the situation of 
existential oppression in either teachers or students, according to Nietzsche, we are 
talking about the submergence of individual freedom to a conception of human 
experience that is predicated on the safety and anonymity of belonging to an externally 
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created and imposed view of individual existence. On this view, with the ideology 
(morality) of neoliberalism successfully disseminated across the nation’s public school 
systems, and with job security a prime concern among most education workers regardless 
of their positions, the existentially oppressed educator is hard-pressed to take her own 
stand in the name of her own existential freedom. In fact, we might say that if the 
oppressed educator internalizes the oppressor’s ideological or moral stance, she has thus 
adapted or acceded to a situation of internalized oppression in which consciousness to her 
own subjective interpretations and understandings is effectively submerged. Thus, she 
joins the crowd or masses of teachers who toil daily at tasks dictated by the system to 
which she has contracted her time and efforts. Yet, to be an individual as Sartre, 
Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche would have us understand the individual, even within the 
context of a situation of existential oppression, means that the individual teacher 
ultimately knows that she must decide between her freedom and the neoliberal crowd. If 
she decides in favor or her freedom, it is because, in becoming conscious to herself, she 
finds it necessary to change her way of being because she can no longer tolerate herself 
as an existentially oppressed being. Again this self-awareness, this self-consciousness is 
the space from which the existential attitude of resistance to oppression emerges and 
translates into the educator’s commitment to freedom as the only possibility for living 
and working in the realm of education today. 
 Understanding Nietzsche’s link between a culture’s ideological notions of 
morality and the individual’s propensity to attach to those notions, we can look to the 
distinction he makes between what he calls the master morality and the slave morality. 
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These two terms represent a dichotomy of personal qualities and values as applied to the 
individual, inferring higher versus lower status—morally and socially—particularly as 
such values are set by specific cultural, societal, and religious standards. The “goodness” 
of one type of morality over the other lies in the cultural contexts of the society in which 
the individual exists. In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche (in Solomon, 2005) describes 
master morality as emerging from conditions in which “. . . the ruling group determines 
what is ‘good,’ [and] the exalted proud states of the soul are experienced as conferring 
distinction and determining the rank of order” (p. 76).  In the case of master morality, 
good connotes the higher ground of nobility and honor in thought and action—
particularly toward self. In contrast, Nietzsche associates slave morality with a character 
that adapts to suffering, such character desiring or believing that suffering can only be 
eased by others through “. . . pity, the complaisant and obliging hand, the warm heart, 
patience, industry, humility, and friendliness . . . these are the most useful qualities and 
almost the only means for enduring the pressure of existence. Slave morality is 
essentially a morality of utility” (Nietzsche, in Solomon, 2005, p. 78). Nietzsche’s 
interpretations of master and slave morality tend to overturn conventional conceptions of 
what comprises the “good” qualities ascribed to human existence versus those 
conceptions of slave morality that are considered “bad,” undesirable, and pitiful. 
Nietzsche’s master morality positions the independent and free individual as noble and 
honorable, self-determining and “value-creating” (Nietzsche, as cited in Solomon, 2005, 
p. 76), symbolizing a self-full (self-empowered) attitude of living in the world. The 
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negative or weak character of slave morality is to be understood as a self-less attitude of 
existence that, according to Nietzsche, borders on stupidity.  
 
. . . the good human being has to be undangerous in the slave’s way of thinking: 
he is good natured, easy to deceive, a little stupid perhaps, un bonhomme. 
Wherever slave morality becomes preponderant, language tends to bring the 
words ‘good’ and ‘stupid’ closer together. (Nietzsche, as cited in Solomon, 2005, 
p. 78) 
 
 In essence, Nietzsche’s master morality connotes the existentially free individual 
who chooses her fundamental project and her way of being in the world, not tied to 
externally imposed notions of what it means to be a good or bad person. On the other 
hand, Nietzsche’s slave morality connotes the follower, the sufferer, the one who attaches 
to the herd because this is what the dominant culture dictates that one must do in order to 
remain a member, in good standing, and to enjoy the security that it promises. Certainly, 
based on his condemnation of the herd instinct and his views on master/slave morality, 
Nietzsche (2001) would condemn the existentially oppressed educator for being a 
follower, for choosing the superficial security of acceptance and expedience associated 
with conformism over choosing the uncertain possibilities of one’s own freedom.   
 Finally, Nietzsche’s conception of the individual’s “will to power” (Solomon, 
2005, p. 65), the driving force behind all human needs and functions, lends itself to a 
notion of individual freedom that affirms personhood and negates the dehumanization of 
existential oppression. On this view, the individual educator’s will to empower herself by 
refusing to accept or accede to neoliberal objectification makes it possible for her to 
choose herself (as Sartre insists), representing an existential value of “good” and the 
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initial step toward affirming the existential reality of individual freedom and personhood. 
“What is good? Everything that heightens the feeling of power in man, the will to power, 
power itself. What is bad? Everything that is born of weakness. What is happiness? The 
feeling that power is growing, that resistance is overcome” (Nietzsche, as cited in 
Solomon, 2005, p. 99). 
 Taken at face value, Nietzschean concepts like master/slave morality and the will 
to power resonate with negative overtones because they invoke images of “power over” 
someone or some group. However, I suggest that this is not the existentialist perspective. 
Instead, I posit that the meaning behind the notion of a master versus slave morality 
resides within the individual’s own creation of identity as a manifestation of her choice to 
live in freedom or not. By assuming and acting upon the character traits with which she 
identifies herself, the individual reflects either the self-empowered stance of the master 
morality (personal freedom) or the passive stance of slave morality (victimhood). The 
issue of power, in this sense then, is a subjectively existential issue that has more to do 
with the individual’s ability to affirm herself, her choices, and actions as manifestations 
of freedom; not as an issue of power in the form of oppression of others. As such, the 
educator who would assert the power of her personhood in the arena of neoliberal 
education is not seeking or willing her personal power over students, other teachers, or 
administrators. Rather, she is willing the power of her personhood as her statement of 
existential freedom against dehumanization in the workplace.  
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Subjectivity 
 Excerpt from class 2 field notes—January 16, 2013, on teacher subjectivity 
reaching out to students’ subjectivities. I start the class with a 5-minute Gallagher 
video in which he spoofs schooling and the inconsistencies of the English language. I 
then show a clip from the animated movie “Waking Life,” the clip in which Dr. Robert 
Solomon talks about the actual exuberance fostered by existentialism to a young college 
student. I want this clip to somehow better define the key existential concepts to my 
students than just giving them rote definitions. I ask for feedback on the clips, and it is 
still silent. No one wants to speak up. So, of course, I fill in the space with my own 
chatter, trying to prompt responses from the students. This is a challenging job for the 
teacher—to get people to invest themselves and speak up for who they are, what they 
view, what they perceive, and how they feel about it. I sense my own prejudice, my 
personal belief that kids today don’t embrace the intellect; that they are so trained to get 
a job, any job, and in this case, to be teachers. What does that actually mean to them? 
Still, blank faces, although there were a few laughs during the Gallagher video. One 
student, a male, said he liked the sense of freedom to be who you are from the Waking 
Life clip, but no one really picked up on that, at least not verbally to extend the 
conversation. Blank faces, scared faces, unaware/unconscious underneath these blank 
stares; challenged faces who are not used to being provided a place of freedom to reveal 
themselves to me—to each other—to themselves. Polite, quiet, mannequin-like faces.   
 I sit down at the table and use my written prompts to get dialogue started. I feel 
the weight on my shoulders/on my spirit to make the room come alive, to wake up these 
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students’ minds with the light of an idea or an emotion that will open the floodgates of 
conversation. A few comments here, a few there, like slow, unpredictable drips of water 
from a leaky faucet. I am still talking a lot, but I am determined to motivate a dialogue. I 
ask more pointed questions—aiming arrows of thought at these students targets—arrows 
dipped in controversial topics like social class, racism, sexism, stereotypes, bullying, 
religion, and ethnicity, and so forth. I want to pierce them with these arrows to stun them 
into consciousness, to awaken thought and curiosity, to stimulate their imaginations, 
their anger, their memories, their pain, their hopes, and their dreams. I want to leave my 
mark with them so that this class will count for something in their lives. Why do I want to 
have this effect? It makes me feel. It makes me feel worthwhile—that I have some 
meaning to share. I want the intellectual interchange. I want them to open up to 
themselves, more than I want them to open up to me. I want to connect and be connected 
in a way that lets me know that my arrows not just pierced, but actually made meaning 
central to the targets, to the hearts of the students. This is not altruism. This is showing 
me that I am good at this teaching; that I’m good at connecting with people; that I can 
use the learning environment as my work and my passion. It’s as much about me as it is 
about them. And I’m not going to apologize for this statement.  
 When we talk about the reading on “School Wounds,” I point my targeted 
questions, my arrows, toward distinct prompts of school-based shame, prejudice, bullying 
experiences, dualities of smart vs. dumb, etc. to inspire or maybe prick at a personal 
memory or experience. An African-American student talks about being assumed as dumb 
in predominantly white schools. Another student talks about a teacher who killed her love 
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for learning by insisting that all assignments be completed as illustrations, a mode of 
expression with which she felt uncomfortable. Another student commented that a teacher 
had told her she was stupid. Similar stories came to light. But not everyone spoke, not 
just yet, not this second class of the semester. Regardless, I began to feel redemption in 
that that we broke the silence that I would have interpreted as disinterest, non-
engagement, boredom, intimidation. And that kind of silence, for me, would have meant a 
defeat, a sense of failure. This kind of silence is not the calm of reflective silence, but 
rather the silence of powerlessness, of disconnection, of futility. I am eager and 
persistent, if nothing else. And my thoughts fly across the cranial landscape—few do I 
catch, but then there are some that I grasp as new inventions with which to explore new 
possibilities in my 381 classroom. 
 Excerpt from class 8—February 11, 2013, on the unconscious student. I think 
about today’s 381 class, and I find writing about it difficult. Because it is repetitive, 
because my efforts at establishing an existential classroom of actively involved 
individuals are not bearing the kind of fruit I would like. It is not personal for me—I’m 
giving them all my educational energy and passion when I am there in that classroom. 
It’s personal for them, in my view.  
 It’s like there is a deficiency at hand; like a vitamin or mineral deficiency, but this 
deficiency is one of passion. I use it here because I used it with them, the students. So, 
now I’ll try to explore a description of deficiency. For example, when I envision a person 
deficient of nutrients, I see someone pale of complexion, with skin that might be mottled, 
broken out, or flaky. Hair is thin and dull. Eyes are glassy and vacant. The mind is 
159 
	  
	  
confused and nonsensical. Speech is not deliberate and focused. The mood may be 
depressed or anxious. I picture lack of muscle tone and a generally weak physical body.  
 I have just described how I see most of my students when I look at their bodily 
representations and what I imagine their minds to be like. Instead of pale complexions, I 
see those flat, one-dimensional faces. There is no texture to them—not even the redness of 
blotches and pimples, or the ridges of flakes on peeling, dry skin. Their hair is not even a 
noticeable feature of their being because their being is so flat and dull—yes, dull like 
deficient hair. Their eyes are definitely glassy and vacant, belying emptiness behind the 
physical landscape of flatness—like the flat plains of the Midwest that seem to go 
nowhere—they have nothing to say; which renders the question of how they think? Are 
their minds confused and nonsensical. I would say confused, and I would say, yes, 
nonsensical in that thinking of this depth of critique and organic quality does not make 
sense to them, as they are programmed; and 381 is not a component of their inner 
software. They are programmed with non-nutrient data input, and 381 is food for the 
soul. Certainly, speech is not deliberate or focused—speech is quantified and qualified—
there is no spontaneity—no passion. Are these students depressed or anxious? I cannot 
say what goes on in their personal lives and how they are affected in terms of classroom 
behaviors. But instead of depressed or anxious, as subjects in my classroom, they appear 
to me as incomprehensible, non-readable, non-feeling. So, it follows that there is a lack 
of muscle to the collective body of this class; and there is a weakness of individual spirit. 
 I repeated my new mantra for this semester, “Liberate yourselves!” Let yourself 
out to just be and say whatever comes to mind. I want them to experience freedom in this 
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classroom and to take a leap of faith by opening to this pedagogic environment that 
would welcome some rebellion and challenge to their taken-for-granted worlds. 
 How does the student’s lack of consciousness of her own freedom as a unique 
subject implicate a state of existential oppression that precludes possibilities for 
individual engagement and community-building in the existential classroom? What is my 
task as existential educator in this regard? I suggest that I must help the individual student 
realize herself, consciously and subjectively, so that she might have (my emphasis) 
herself to contribute to the pedagogical experience. To implement the task at hand, I must 
continue to respond to each student as a particular person—through our classroom 
dialogues and through the personalized commentary I provide to each student on each of 
her twice-weekly reflection papers. The latter is a time-consuming process with a class of 
twenty-four students, but one that I claim as wholly authentic and essential to facilitating 
a bond of communication between us as two subjects. By coming to realize herself, 
subjectively, as a unique participant in the educational relationships that emerge in the 
classroom, the student achieves presence not only to herself, but to the others who make 
up this world (my emphasis) that is our classroom community. “Without the world there 
is no selfness, no person; without selfness, without the person, there is no world” (Sartre, 
1984, p. 157).  
 Can an existential pedagogy of personhood, as enacted and encouraged by the 
individual teacher, break through the silences of existential oppression in a classroom full 
of students? Can an existential pedagogy of personhood ultimately stimulate students to 
awaken to their individual subjectivities so that they might break through these silences 
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(as opposed to other kinds of silences that emanate from subjective contemplation)? 
While Sartre did not theorize about education per se, Burstow (1983) provides an answer 
to these questions about oppression and student subjectivities by explaining Sartre’s view 
of education as anti-conventional in its negation of the student as “. . . an empty vessel to 
be filled” (p. 179), a statement that resonates with Freire’s description of the banking 
concept of education discussed in Chapter III. Based on Sartre’s privileging of individual 
subjectivity as the starting point of identity creation for the individual, his philosophy 
renders a view of “. . . education which is more individualistic, more dialogical, more 
libertarian, more socially aware, more respectful of the needs and emergence of the 
individual” (Burstow, 1983, p. 179). Envisioning the teacher as helper, Burstow (1983) 
makes the case that Sartre positions the teacher as one who helps “. . . the human being 
come to terms with his individual project, accept his freedom and facticity, and emerge as 
the unique human being that he is” (p. 180). On Burstow’s interpretation of a Sartrean 
educational philosophy, Sartre would be concerned with providing a pedagogical space of 
freedom in which student subjectivity is meant to grow and prosper.  
 Kierkegaard’s philosophical emphasis on individual subjectivity, along with his 
passionate commitment to personal truth, resonates in the following statement, “the thing 
is to find a truth which is true for me, to find the idea I can live and die for” 
(Kierkegaard, as cited in Solomon, 2005, pp. 7). For Kierkegaard, truth is derived from 
the individual’s subjective understanding of her needs, beliefs, and passions for living, 
and this personal truth must be lived with unflinching commitment against the objective 
162 
	  
	  
propositions that often stand for truth in the external world. In Truth is Subjectivity, from 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard (1846) writes: 
 
When subjectivity is truth, the definition of truth must also contain in itself an 
expression of the antithesis to objectivity, a memento of that fork in the road, and 
this expression will simultaneously indicate the resilience of the inwardness. Here 
is such a definition of truth: the objective uncertainty, seized in the most 
passionately inward appropriation, is truth, the highest truth there is for an 
existing person. (Kierkegaard, as cited in Solomon, 2005, p. 21) 
 
 What does it mean to be genuinely in touch with one’s own subjectivity so that 
the individual cannot help but be passionately committed to her self-created or self-
discovered truth and the project that emerges from it? How does one decide what she is to 
do in this world? How many teachers today can affirm that they have chosen to be 
educators because such a choice represents their individually held subjective truths and, 
thus, their passionate commitments to pedagogies of personhood? And if they still hold 
onto a shred of this passion while also living in a state of existential oppression, how can 
these teachers get in touch with themselves as whole persons choosing to live their 
subjective truths? On the other side of the equation, how many of my students see their 
projects of education as their subjectively true callings at this time in their lives?  
  Clearly, from the existentialist perspective, if personhood and academic freedom 
are essential to her personal project, it is incumbent upon today’s educator to break from 
the crowd mentality, to go inward and recover her subjective truth—whatever that may 
turn out to be—then choose and act accordingly and authentically. From the existentialist 
point of view, the obvious question would be: What other way is there to genuinely live 
and educate others if not as an expression of personhood and freedom in these neoliberal 
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times? On this view, my undergraduate seminar classroom is where I most directly aim 
my efforts at expressing educator personhood while encouraging students to reclaim their 
own as unique subjects. It has, and continues to be, a struggle to engage students in the 
exercise of their own self-liberation, having been so successfully and mechanically 
programmed to deny or ignore their own inner truths. Nonetheless, I pursue this 
pedagogy of personhood with a sense of Kierkegaard’s passionate commitment. 
Choice 
 Excerpt from class 15 field notes—March 6, 2013, on developing as a 
consciously independent thinker and chooser. What actually stands out to me is a 
comment made by a student last week when we were discussing issues of race and social 
class. I believe we were discussing how human beings are the most profoundly 
intellectually capable of all living creatures, but on the other hand, the most helpless of 
living creatures when first born. So, we talked about how babies and young children 
learn about their very being in the world through relationships with others; how, even the 
activity of nursing cannot be understood by the infant as involving another person; the 
infant only can understand—through sensation—that something physically and 
emotionally nurturing is happening to her or his body/being. Then, of course, kids learn 
through contact with others as separate selves and through actual lived experiences. 
Then we talked about kids learning from the cultural standards of family, school, etc. A 
point may have been made about independently motivated think, but this particular 
student was making the point that young people don’t know what to think on their own: 
“They need someone to tell them what to think.” (as in family, schooling, and culture). 
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This one simple comment speaks volumes about the way students are programmed in 
their thinking; how they bring this programmed mode of thinking to the university. Then 
we have to work to undo this mindset in order to wake up their minds so that they might 
develop the habit of thinking and choosing for themselves.  
 Independent thinking and choosing is a red flag of danger for those who prize 
sameness, stability, and unflinching order. For me, independent thinking and choosing 
conjure visions of complexity, sometimes emotional pain, but they also conjure visions of 
wonder and possibility as features of existential choosing for the self-conscious 
individual? How do we develop a culture and society of free-thinkers and choosers, not 
anarchists, but naturally free thinker and choosers. Most would feel at a loss, I think, 
relative to how to handle themselves in the world and with others. They would feel lost 
and unsteady—nothing to anchor them because they are not sufficiently anchored to their 
inner worlds. They don’t know who they are because they are not conscious to themselves 
and certainly not conscious to their freedom to choose themselves, to shape their 
identities. No personal agency needed in this technicized and mediated world, the 
paradigms and bars are set. So, rather than thinking, choosing, and responding from 
inner resources of contemplation, reflections and decision-making, the individual 
becomes a reflexive being who responds according to conditioned behaviors intended to 
keep everyone safe and fashionably numb to felt, lived experience. 
 
I can always choose, but I must also realize that, if I decide not to choose, that still 
constitutes a choice. . . . I am obliged to choose an attitude toward the situation, 
and in any case I bear the responsibility of a choice that, in committing myself, 
also commits humanity as a whole. (Sartre, 2007, p. 44) 
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 I am very conscious of myself as a person who chooses to educate, as a “being for 
itself” (Sartre, 1984, p. 117); that is, as a self-aware individual intent on pursuing her 
life/work project in a space of freedom. In philosophical terms, being-for-itself is human 
consciousness that is aware of itself; first, as a unique subject in the world and, by 
extension, as a self-consciousness that becomes aware of other objects and human 
subjects in this same world. My students are the primary others in my pedagogical world, 
and because of them, I become a “being-for-others” (Sartre, 1984, p. 299). 
 As such, my awareness, intentions, choices, and actions are extended toward my 
students, these other subjects, whose lives intersect with mine in the pedagogical space of 
the classroom. Yet, existentially speaking, I must be a being-for-itself, owning the 
integrity of my own personhood in order to be a being-for-them. In other words, self-
consciousness is necessary to other-consciousness. On this view, it is natural to ask, 
“How can the typical K-12 educator be a consciousness for her students if she cannot 
exist as a consciousness for herself in her present situation of existential oppression?”  
 From Beauvoir’s perspective, the educator who does not resist oppression cannot 
be genuinely conscious to herself (the existential attitude) as an agentic subject because, 
in not choosing freedom, she is, in fact, in denial of her own humanity. “The man 
[woman] who seeks to justify his life must want freedom itself absolutely and above 
everything else” (Beauvoir, 1976, p. 24). In other words, the contemporary educator must 
want her freedom, as her moral grounding and as her conscious choice, more than 
external approval and the security of a job. For Beauvoir (1976), to choose freedom is the 
only means by which to choose a viable life of purpose and meaning.  
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Now, I can evade this choice. We have said that it would be contradictory 
deliberately to will oneself not free. But one can choose not to will himself free. 
In laziness, heedlessness, capriciousness, cowardice, impatience, one contests the 
meaning of the project at the very moment that one defines it. The spontaneity of 
the subject is then merely a vain living palpitation, its movement toward the 
object is a flight, and itself is an absence. To convert the absence into presence, to 
convert my flight into will, I must assume my project positively. (Beauvoir, 1976, 
pp. 25–26) 
 
 Beauvoir seems to offer no excuses in terms of the individual’s commitment to 
her project as an ethical act of freedom. At the same time, she concedes, “But we also 
ought to ask ourselves whether one can will oneself free in any matter, whatsoever it may 
be” (Beauvoir, 1976, p. 26). She then responds by noting one cannot view her project as 
having a specific deadline, as if the project would lose its purpose and its moral 
significance. “It is in time that the goal is pursued and that freedom confirms itself . . . It 
is only when the moments of his [the individual] life begin to be organized into behaviour 
that he [the individual] can decide and choose” (Beauvoir, pp. 26–27). By consciously 
and conscientiously choosing and acting for the sake of one’s project of freedom, “The 
value of the chosen end is confirmed and, reciprocally, the genuineness of the choice is 
manifested concretely through patience, courage, and fidelity” (Beauvoir, p. 27). On this 
view, the educator who chooses to act toward the goal of pedagogical freedom, within or 
beyond the confines of the neoliberal classroom, may be still materially oppressed but is 
no longer existentially oppressed once she has chosen to reclaim her personhood and 
project of freedom. As long as she is pursuing her pedagogy of personhood, despite the 
obstacles, she is not complicit with neoliberal ideology; rather, she is embodying her 
project through her actions. Granted, this is not easy to sustain in light of the pressures 
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exerted upon the contemporary educator, but I submit that this is exactly what Beauvoir 
would recommend the teacher do if she wishes to continue her project of education in 
freedom.  
 
Man [woman, educator] is free; but he finds his law in his freedom. First he must 
assume his freedom and not flee it; he assumes it by a constructive movement: 
one does not exist without doing something; and also by a negative movement 
which rejects oppression for oneself and others. (Beauvoir, 1976, p. 156) 
 
 On numerous occasions, my students and I discuss what existential choosing 
means. I sense that this is a foreign concept to them because they have experienced little 
existential freedom for choosing and acting in the traditional realm of schooling. 
However, by offering them choices in my undergraduate classroom—choices about how 
they will engage in discussion, in reading and writing assignments, choice in discussion 
formats (large seminar group, small groups, and so on), choice about their creative styles 
for projects, and choices about overall participation—I aim to stimulate their capacities 
for choosing, offering possibilities for self-affirmation as the appropriate response to 
years of dehumanization under neoliberal policies and practices in K-12 schooling. Yet, I 
realize that I can only offer them this particular space of freedom in which to practice 
habits of self-affirmation and subjective choosing.  
Action 
 Excerpt from class 21 field notes—April 3, 2013, on dialogical engagement, 
problem-posing, and praxis as intellectual forms of action in the existential 
classroom. While the chapter reading has to do with using Art as a universal language 
with non-English speaking immigrant students, I found myself veering into efforts to 
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engage and re-connect with my own undergraduate students today. I did not split them up 
into small groups. We stayed in our seminar square, and I was hoping that we have 
progressed enough that we would have a stimulating, full-group conversation.  
 It felt forced for a while, but I kept probing at them with questions in an attempt to 
ignite sparks of interest, of personal responses to topics thrown into the air for their 
consumption. Much as I like them, I still find them impenetrable at times, their faces so 
blank that I think they are bored, and then reflexively perceive my assumption of their 
boredom as a reflection of my teaching abilities. The usual students volunteer to speak 
up. I like D a lot, but it bothers me when I see him looking down at his lap under the 
tabletop. Then I think he is texting someone on his phone, and since I like him and think 
he’s quite bright, I think that he should be intent on and wanting to engage with me and 
the others in this class experience. Why should he be distracted from the brilliance of the 
intellectual interchange?—said/written with a heavy dose of sarcasm. 
 So, I am back to the issue of student engagement—to the perplexing situation of 
offering a space of freedom to students in which they can actively self-express and 
participate in reciprocal exchanges about art, life, education, social justice, the world, 
etc. To me, this offer would be as tantalizing as a bowl of dark chocolate fudge, heated so 
as to melt in my mouth with the flavor and the promise of a serotonin boost. I would 
figuratively eat up the opportunity to engage in conversations about philosophy, the arts, 
human education and life—my engagement in such discourse is an unqualified given. But 
not so with a great many of the students thus far. Student A and Student D are the most 
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inclined to speak up and have insightful, less traditional/less conformist things to say. 
The rest, once again, appear expressionless—vacant. I wonder what they are thinking 
 I used my prepared prompts to solicit discussion about the chapter. I consistently 
had to regroup my thoughts, my prompts, seeking ways to reach these students viscerally. 
I directly asked them if they found the chapter interesting or not. No clear response—not 
yes, not no. Maybe neutrality, or maybe apathy? Who knows? I can make assumptions. I 
can guess. But I don’t really know. I ask how many of them experienced the arts in their 
schooling—just a few, not the majority. I asked how many have traveled outside the U.S. 
A few, but certainly not the majority. Most had been on some kind of vacation, staying at 
resorts and tourist spots. Some mentioned seeing the discrepancy between the 
appearances (implicating financial status) between tourists and local residents in typical 
family vacation spots. I asked how many of them have been to New York City? Just a 
handful. I tried to explain how NY is such a blend of diversity: ethnicity, culture and 
lifestyle, language, etc. I asked the students to imagine going to a foreign country in 
which they could not communicate nor share their cultural ways of life as a natural, 
accepted way of being in the new and strange environment. A few nods of heads 
indicating that this would be difficult, but the concept of a different kind of setting or 
situatedness does not appear to resonate—I witnessed no substantial change of 
sensibilities, of body movement, of facial expression, of visual recognition of an idea with 
meaning behind it, no connection—looking for the signs of activated intellects! 
 Toward the end of class, I desperately try to connect by asking each student to 
which of the arts, or other forms of creativity, do they relate?  I went a step further and 
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asked if sports or physical activities might be considered in the category of artistic 
engagement. The class generally agreed that sports/physical activities would fit in this 
niche. So, I went around the seminar square, one by one, and asked each student, as a 
particular individual, what is her or his favorite sport or physical activity—both as 
participant and spectator. It did not matter to me what answers were given—what 
matters is that each student was selected/pointed to/designated/asked to engage from a 
space of personal thought regarding personal preference. Some responded with more 
enthusiasm and energy than others. After listening to each student’s response, I shared 
that I have returned to Bikram Yoga, briefly explaining that it is a yoga sequence of 26 
poses, performed in a 105 degrees room, for 90 minutes. With purposeful earnestness, I 
intended to convey the message that my yoga practice represents an actively lived part of 
my life, contributing to who I am as an individual. It is an action and a practice that I 
consciously choose to pursue as it provides the substance and shaping of experience to 
my being. How might commitment to intellectual activity provide substance and shape to 
my students’ ways of being in the world of education and beyond? 
 I ended the class by trying to bring the final part of the discussion back to today’s 
assigned reading about validating and teaching immigrant students through art. I pointed 
out that these students had to be actively engaged in some way that would be meaningful 
to them, that would validate them as individuals, that would recognize their unique 
cultures and backgrounds, and that would reinforce their learning processes as 
intentionally lived experiences. I compared my attempts to engage them (my students) 
through a discussion of their personal interests in the arts, sports, or both, signaling each 
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student individually to indicate genuine interest in what she or he had to say; that what 
each student has to say matters because each of them matters. Clearly, the energy in the 
room can be so variable, like people, I realize. But there they are, and I want to reach 
these students intellectually, emotionally, pedagogically through the activity of 
meaningful dialogue.  
 So, this issue of active engagement in the classroom conversation is real, an 
ongoing challenge for me. Despite the fact that I receive positive feedback from my 
students on class surveys, I feel that the connections being made here are fleeting; that, 
with a few exceptions, these students will fall in line with the commands of the system’s 
generals and administrators. With a few exceptions, it seems to me that they are not 
really interested in resistance to the oppression of standardized teaching/learning 
methodologies and standardized habits of being; rather, they have internalized their own 
existential oppression to lesser or greater degrees. They say they hate testing. They claim 
that they have not truly learned anything of great consequence through the methods used 
in neoliberal schooling, but they are not inspired to change. If they won’t engage while 
they have the freedom to be students in a class that invites intellectual curiosity and 
energetic dialogues encompassing alternative perspectives to the status quo, how are 
they going to engage, critically and creatively, their future students in a system that 
provides their paychecks, their retirement, and their summer vacations? 
 I look at my students and wonder how they do not think more about life from a 
wondering, dreaming, possibility-driven perspective. Where is their hope? Where is the 
desire to know more, to act more? Where is the desire to be more? One student actually 
172 
	  
	  
wrote in a recent paper that humans do not create meaning nor their identities—I do not 
comprehend this point of view. She explains that she is a concrete thinker and likes 
structure. She is also the one who said today that she likes worksheets when I was 
explaining that worksheets constitute a passive kind of learning that seems to degenerate 
interest in learning as an actively lived experience. Someone else said that she likes 
worksheets, too. Maybe there is security in worksheets: that which is given, the known 
question waiting for its rightfully appointed answer. Maybe these particular students 
treasure the security of passivity and sameness over the possibilities of action and 
diversity. Do they know they are indoctrinated to an oppressive system of education? 
Does it matter to them? I do not know their deeper, inner thoughts. But for many who 
find comfort in the crowd, security, the known, and the easier exercises for the brain and 
the soul justify the absence of independent choosing and acting for freedom. To question 
assumptions and traditional patterns would definitely upset the apple cart, sending out 
signal flares of panic to an internalized system of compliance and conformity. So much 
easier this way . . . 
 Excerpt from class 24 field notes—April 15, 2013, on the passivity of virtual 
existence versus the active conversation of face-to-face existence. I positioned the 
lesson focus on Sherry Turkle and Jaron Lanier—both esteemed academics, technology 
experts, cultural critics, and critics of technology overuse as we experience it today in the 
21st century. This time, I had the students watch segments of selected videos: 1 longer 
video of Turkle doing a TED TALK and 3 brief videos of Lanier, talking about computers 
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and people, creativity, and maintaining creativity in education. Fortunately, discussion 
ensued from the viewings as well as from my prodding with related questions.  
 In essence, the students “get” that our humanity is being marginalized (my 
viewpoint) through our hyper-connectivity as a way of life. Turkle talked about the 
preference for texting as opposed to talking; the ease and safety of virtually mediated 
relationships as opposed to the hard, messy, face-to-face interactions of embodied 
relationships; the seductive (and somewhat addictive) appeal of the Internet and social 
networking; multitasking versus singular focus; the fear of solitude for personal 
regeneration and inward focus (claiming that those who cannot be alone with themselves 
will be the ones who are lonely); and so on. Lanier talked about the falsity of pitting 
people against computers in an orchestrated attempt to determine who is smarter. In fact, 
he claims that people are willing to make themselves be/act more stupid in order to make 
computers look smarter. He used the example of teachers teaching to a standardized test 
in such a way that the outcomes make the computer the master. 
  Lanier also talked about finding that special teacher who made you feel magic; 
who made you realize what you wanted to do in order to “make your heart sing.” I think 
this can also be stated as discovering and following your passion. All of this has to do 
with our human selves and the humanity we express in the world through the actions we 
take to be a part of that world, to craft lives of some meaning and purpose through our 
subjective choices and subsequent actions. These are the ideas that excite and resonate 
with me. And so I still cannot understand how educational policy, including the currently 
themed academic journals and conferences that seem to be embracing the pros of 
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technological, K-12  educational practices, are emphasizing journal themes surrounding 
technology in higher ed and STEM curriculum. Are they all jumping on this same 
bandwagon, just clamoring on to be up to date with the latest fashion or trend in a 
consumption-driven, technological culture? Is this all some kind of wag the dog thing in 
which everything is orchestrated without the average person realizing it, and so we go 
along and play the game, even though it is we who are being played?   
 One of the biggest points (for me) made by Turkle, in the video from 2009, is her 
view that the new frontier (of the coming decades of the 21st century) will be the 
reclamation of the human “conversation.” I love this idea. It’s not going backward—it’s 
going to a whole new place, but so far, it seems, only a few of us want to explore that 
frontier, especially in education. It’s very encouraging for me to hear this from a 
brilliant technology expert such as Turkle, also reiterated in his own way by Lanier. I see 
this frontier of conversation covering all strata of human existence; and perhaps, it could 
be this realization alone that makes conversation a new frontier. Not limited to the 
parlors of elite intellectuals; or the smoky back rooms of rebellious social activists; or to 
the muted, secret corners of the romantic idealists; the frontier of philosophical 
conversation should be the HUMAN CONVERSATION that needs to take place at the 
forefront of human education. So, in other words, technology should be used as a system 
of support to the human conversation—to advocate and disseminate information about it 
so that humans will know when/where to congregate in embodied spaces in order to 
implement frontiers of conversation. Computers can facilitate, but not implement; 
computers can carry the initial message, but not be the message; computers can be the 
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tools with which to compose messages from the brain to the fingertips to the keyboard, 
but they should not replace the human voices that need to enunciate those important 
messages and conversations between and among human beings.  
 The students claim to agree with the arguments presented by Turkle and Lanier, 
and they provide examples from their own experiences to back it all up. Student K says 
that sometimes when her mother picks her up in the car for a planned event, her mother 
will be busy talking or texting on the phone. Student S talked about running the other day 
with a couple of friends and purposefully leaving her cell phone at home. While it felt 
strange, she also realized that she felt free, although she did worry about missing a call 
or message. I reminded her that the messages would be on her phone, so that she would 
not, in actuality, miss anything. Student J said that she keeps her phone near her head 
when she goes to sleep, and that she tells herself the purpose is to make her more sleepy 
(??); yet, she ultimately admitted that she is keyed into wanting to be aware of anything 
of interest going on via Twitter, Facebook, etc. at all times of the day and night. We 
continued to communicate in this way. So, it is very puzzling to me that students can 
profess to see the pitfalls of virtual connection as a fundamental way of experiencing 
themselves and others in the world, yet continue to rely on this kind of passive existence. 
Perhaps it should not be so puzzling to me when I realize that outside of a class such as 
this, being plugged in is the norm of contemporary existence, inside and outside the walls 
of the university.  
 An existential pedagogy of personhood emphasizes Pinar’s (2012) curriculum as 
conversation, previously addressed in Chapter II. To facilitate this pedagogical structure, 
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we create a seminar-style arrangement of desks and chairs whereby all students can see 
and interact with one another. This physical set-up is purposeful as an act of resistance to 
the culture of separated desks, a culture that perpetuates facelessness, a sense of non-
identity pertaining to both self and others that contributes to a state of existential 
oppression. Disclosure is eroded when the view is of another student’s back and when the 
traditional, authoritarian framework of the classroom positions the teacher at the front of 
regimented rows of bodies. Because conversation or dialogue is the seminal form of 
action in this space, student engagement and intentional participation in the seminar 
process is pivotal. On this view, the student must choose to engage by consciously 
discarding the programmed, neoliberal attitude of compliance and conformity. In essence, 
she must choose to release herself from her own perpetuation of existential oppression 
within this classroom space of freedom.  
 With freedom understood as the underlying catalyst of human existence, Sartre 
(2007) claims that it is action, along with the experiences and relationships that result 
from actions, that defines the reality of our lives. He lays out his conception of action in 
the following passage from Existentialism is a Humanism. 
 
Quietism is the attitude of people who say: “Others can do what I cannot do.” The 
doctrine [existentialism] that I am presenting to you is precisely the opposite of 
quietism, since it declares that reality exists only in action. It ventures even 
further than that, since it adds: “Man  is nothing other than his own project. He 
exists only to the extent that he realizes himself, therefore he is nothing more than 
the sum of his actions, nothing more than his life.” (Sartre, 2007, pp. 36–37) 
  
 I suggest that Freire’s strongest response to the situation of educator (and student) 
existential oppression lies in his notion of action as praxis: critical reflection leading to 
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action that yet continues to reflect upon itself as a humanizing strategy for intervening in 
the oppressive world of neoliberal education. “The insistence that the oppressed engage 
in reflection on their concrete situation is not a call to armchair revolution. On the 
contrary, reflection—true reflection—leads to action” (Freire, 2000, p. 66). For praxis to 
be authentic and effectual, it must become part of the oppressed individual’s way of 
thinking and being in the world, “the new raison d’être of the oppressed” (Freire, p. 66). 
For me, this resonates with the self-consciousness of the existential attitude acting upon 
the world, or intervening in it, in order to change it. In the case of the existentially 
oppressed educator, Freire would specifically recommend intervening in the neoliberal 
world through his problem-posing pedagogy. Doing this, the oppressed educator (by way 
of her existential attitude) makes a conscious decision to disrupt the neoliberal 
instructional prescription with a humanizing pedagogy that is both an effective pedagogy 
of resistance as well as a pedagogy for effecting positive change. As discussed in Chapter 
III, problem-posing, with its dialogical and inclusive emphasis on human communication, 
is the antithesis of the dehumanizing strategies associated with the banking method of 
education. Again, Freire would not accept excuses, complacency, and resignation to 
neoliberal power structures as reasons for not moving forward with a humanizing 
pedagogy. Once she has become acutely conscious to herself and to her situation of 
oppression, the educator is compelled to choose a liberating pedagogy in order to effect 
her own liberation. In the following passage, the reader can easily substitute “neoliberal 
pedagogy of standardization and objectification” for banking concept as they both 
represent anti-human models of teaching and learning. 
178 
	  
	  
Those truly committed to liberation must reject the banking concept in its entirety, 
adopting instead a concept of women and men as conscious beings, and 
consciousness as consciousness intent upon the world. They must abandon the 
educational goal of deposit-making and replace it with the posing of the problems 
of human beings in their relations with the world. “Problem-posing” education, 
responding to the essence of consciousness—intentionality—rejects communiqués 
and embodies communication. It epitomizes the special characteristic of 
consciousness: being conscious of, not only as intent on objects but as turned in 
upon itself . . . consciousness as consciousness of consciousness. (Freire, 2000, p. 
79) 
 
 In general, for the existentialists, communications of all kinds represent forms of 
action—from dialogical activity, to writing, producing works of art, speech-making, 
demonstrating against social injustice, and the like. Clearly, then, they would advocate 
any and all actions that would promote existential freedom for both the educator and the 
student, encompassing a variety of locations such as the classroom, the school building, 
school board meetings, and beyond into the larger community. As an individual educator 
committed to a pedagogy of freedom for both myself and my students, I choose to 
facilitate those actions that I can implement in my classroom. Above all, while my 
students read assigned materials, write reflective response papers, and produce creative 
projects of their choosing, I am focally concerned with the dialogical component of our 
pedagogical experiences together. So, I remain concerned with many students’ reluctance 
to speak up, to take the action of telling their stories, particularly because I have 
repeatedly heard students say, “I’m afraid I will say something stupid.” “I’m a concrete 
thinker, and I just want to know the “right” answer.” Clearly, these statements reflect the 
programming of obedience and conformity that pervades traditional schooling practices, 
the practices that foster the insidious state of existential oppression. So, I want to pursue 
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this pedagogy of personhood, for myself and for my students, especially in response to 
the counter-resistance of students who are not conscious to themselves and, therefore, not 
conscious to their own dehumanization as productions of neoliberal schooling policies 
and practices.  
Responsibility 
 Excerpt from class 23 field notes—April 10, 2013, on being responsible for 
one’s own thinking and doing. I thought these articles, focused on the controversial 
topics of 21st century technology, reading skills, and education would light my students 
up with more obvious enthusiasm. Typically, I like talking about technology as a seminar 
topic because I tend to assume that undergrads will have something to say about such an 
integral part of their lives, especially when that part of their lives comes under criticism, 
sometimes under real attack. Last semester’s class seemed to infuse a greater degree of 
emotion into the topic as opposed to the students I have this semester.  
 What has become most apparent to me is how much technology is woven into the 
minute fractions of their time each day. Even the more assertive, dialogically active 
students reveal the taken for granted nature of having grown up with technology and 
technology access. One student mentioned that a friend told her about some guy who 
created an app that can provide a summary of any kind of literary or other academic 
work, providing quicker and easier access than traditional short-cuts such as Cliff notes. 
What this means is that the individual learner will be even less responsible for her own 
thinking—reminds me of another student’s statement some time ago this semester: “Well, 
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somebody has to tell us what to think!” Of course, beyond the tech innovation of this app, 
its inventor stands to make a bunch of money.  
 I divided the class into 4 smaller discussion groups with the following discussion 
prompts: 
1. As a group, discuss the key theme or the topic you found the most interesting 
from the 2 readings. Discuss, and reach a consensus, as a group, on which 
topic(s) to present to the whole class. 
2. As a group, come up with 20 things you would do if you were disconnected 
from 21st century connected lifestyles. Life would be as it is for you today:  
you would be students, some working as well as going to school. But in every 
other way, concerning communication and information technology, you are 
disconnected for 1 week. What would that be like? 
 Groups talked for about 30 minutes. I browsed around each group, sitting nearby 
and listening for interesting or compelling statements. I also clarified the theme of the 
second reading because it is sarcastic in tone, meant to be satirical, and can be 
misleading as a critique of the Carr piece. While Carr takes issue with the influence of 
the Internet on our reading habits/skills, including the weakening of our ability to read 
deeply and with focus, the second piece by Bowman agrees in a sarcastic fashion and 
takes the argument to a deeper level. Essentially, Bowman is stating that the institution of 
education embodies the culture at large. As such, and pertaining to neoliberal culture, 
long gone is mainstream validation of the arts and humanities as critical to pedagogy, 
human development, and to the perpetuation of democratic societies. In other words, if 
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ours is a culture of technology, then education becomes a culture of technology, as well, 
aligning its standards, methods, and policies with the power interests entrenched in 
commercialization, globalization, and the economization of society. Therefore, the 
institution of education must follow suit in order to mold the right kinds of workers for 
the neoliberal marketplace. 
 As to 20 things they would do during a week of disconnection, some responses 
were more meaningful than others, admittedly from my entirely subjective point of view. 
What was missing, for my sensibilities, was: (a) the exercise of students’ imaginations 
and (b) a sense of personal responsibility for meeting this hypothetical challenge by 
choosing possibilities from a deeper connection to individual freedom. 
Less meaningful: 
 suntanning, eating, sleeping, shopping 
More meaningful: 
hiking, puzzles and board games, reading books or magazines, coloring, other 
artistic activities, playing guitar or other musical instruments, writing a letter, 
being outdoors in nature 
I made the following suggestion: 
How about having some deep and amazing conversations with a group of friends, 
together and face-to-face? 
Then, the following questions arose: 
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“How can we reach our friends if we can’t text them?” [I suggested taking a 
walk/drive to their houses.]  
“What if we don’t know where they live?” [Try to find out for next time.] 
 Amidst all this, I noticed a couple of students on cell phones, amazing to me 
within the contexts of this conversation—and here they are, texting, right in the middle of 
it all. Finally, without looking directly at either of the students with phones in their laps, I 
said to the group that anyone using cell phones should stop because of all days and of all 
topics of conversations taking place at this time, texting is not only a poor choice, but it is 
an irresponsible choice. Frankly, I found this assertion of authority somewhat difficult 
because I do not want to be perceived as a figure of authority as such a perception 
complicates my dedication to a humanizing philosophy of education. At the same time, I 
am responsible for this pedagogical experience as instructor. For what are these students 
responsible, then, in the context of their own pedagogical experiences? 
 
We are left alone and without excuse. This is what I mean when I say that man is 
condemned to  be free: condemned, because he did not create himself, yet 
nonetheless free, because once cast into the world, he is responsible for 
everything he does. (Sartre, 2007, p. 29) 
 
 Sartre’s conception of responsibility can be understood as the partner, often the 
burden, of existential freedom, with responsibility assuming a kind of ethical value in that 
consequences, sometime positive and other times negative, always emerge from the 
individual’s exercise of her freedom to choose and act. The ethical dimension lies in the 
individual’s consciousness of herself as a freedom and the acceptance of responsibility 
for how she uses her freedom. While Sartre emphasizes the notion of individual 
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responsibility as it relates consequences applied to oneself, he also acknowledges the idea 
of responsibility as it extends toward the situations of others in the world. Responsibility, 
therefore, often leads to a sense of “anguish” (Sartre, 2007, p. 25) because of the many 
ways in which acting in freedom and being accountable/responsible for one’s actions 
affect not only one’s own life, but the lives of others.  
 
First, what do we mean by anguish? Existentialists like to say that man is in 
anguish. This is what they mean: a man who commits himself, and who realizes 
that he is not only the individual that he chooses to be, but also a legislator 
choosing at the same time what humanity as a whole should be, cannot help but 
be aware of his own full and profound responsibility. (Sartre, 2007, p. 25)  
 
 Likewise, and even in terms of his nationalistic concerns surrounding the situation 
of oppressed people dehumanized by colonization, Fanon’s existentialist orientation 
resonates with Sartre’s conceptions of freedom and responsibility. Moreover, his 
advocacy for violence against the oppressor resonates as a choice for which the oppressed 
person is responsible in terms of outcomes that impact his own life, as well as the lives of 
others.   
 
Fanon’s thought is clearly existentialist in that he shares, with other existentialist 
thinkers like Jean-Paul Sartre, a belief that the human condition is to be free—in 
the sense that existence precedes essence—and to be fully responsible for the 
exercise of that freedom. The  nature of that freedom lies in the capacity to choose 
and to act . . . Denial of that freedom is considered to be self-deception—bad 
faith—and is, clearly, considered as an ethical failure by Fanon. . . . So, for Fanon 
freedom and responsibility are not just an ethical neutral description of the human 
condition. They are also a positive ethical position. It is an ethics which takes 
truth as fundamental, not received truth or any form of doxa, but rather truth as an 
honest examination of one’s self and the world. (Pithouse, “Fanon’s 
Existentalism” section, n.d.) 
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 In terms of neoliberal dehumanization and its impact upon the condition of 
educator existential oppression, the educator’s acceptance of responsibility—as advanced 
by Sartre and echoed by Fanon—as a human ethic attached to existential freedom is 
inescapable for the educator who awakens to her existential attitude of freedom. At this 
point, and going forward, whatever she chooses to do carries with it an implicit and even 
greater realization of her responsibility to herself, to her pedagogical praxis, and 
certainly, to her students as the human others with whom she importantly interacts. While 
there is no excuse, according to the existentialist, for denying one’s freedom, the 
condition of existential oppression must first be relinquished in order to truly realize the 
power and responsibility of freedom. As an educator practicing a pedagogy of freedom 
and humanization, I recognize my freedom in the undergraduate classroom and the 
responsibilities that I hold there. At the same time, I also recognize the responsibilities of 
my students, as free (whether they, themselves, realize it or not) human beings, to choose 
how they will learn and how they will interact with me. Essentially, and ideally, if we 
consciously live our existential freedoms and responsibilities to ourselves and to one 
another in this classroom space, we are choosing and acting to resist neoliberal 
educational ideology, and we are reclaiming ourselves—teacher and students alike—from 
the self-negating state of existential oppression 
A Few Words on Existential Authenticity  
 Excerpt from class 9 field notes—February 13, 2013, on students 
representing more authentic selves through the Reflective Writing project. A 
breakthrough session today. I feel animated at the possibilities students have shown in 
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their presentations of their first Reflection papers. This is the autobiographical 
assignment: “How My Schooling Experiences Have Contributed to the Shaping of My 
Identity.” Animated in that the classroom dynamic actually felt alive today—with 
engagement and interest. The first volunteer was one of my “class leaders,” seemingly 
confident and not afraid to speak in front of the group. The audience of peers, 
demonstrated clear attention. I did not notice peripheral activity of any kind going on. 
We are starting to break down the walls and build a community, I think. In fact, I said at 
the end of this class, that I think we have experienced something of a breakthrough today. 
One student suggested that I assign this paper earlier. I responded that it would be 
difficult to do that because the students would have no grounding into the readings or 
into the nature of this class to respond, with sufficient understanding and clarity, to the 
prompt. The idea is well-taken however.  
 How do I feel personally as the instructor who, for the past class sessions, has 
written about my frustration with a wall of silence from these students? I feel animated, 
gratified, and even a little justified in my existential approach. It is not about me per se; 
rather, I think it is about the individual student being given an opportunity to really 
“exist” in a learning space, to really be, to feel safe showing self, and to take a chance 
and dive into the waters of the unknown; will it feel cold and forbidding? Or will it feel 
like a warm embrace of affirmation and validation? Based on their presentations, a sense 
of authentic self-reflection and personal evaluation was palpable to all in the room on 
this day. Some brief portraits: 
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 Presenter—the confident young woman who revealed that her educational 
background encompassed the various arts. Did these humanistic learning experiences, 
integrated with the hard subjects, inform her personality/identity evolution? She thinks 
so, having developed inner confidence through exposure to many different ideas and 
experiences. So, she exhibits a kind of worldliness that comes through experiencing 
multiple points of view and lived experience. 
 Presenter—the sensitive artist —brought in a lot about some negative schooling 
experiences, involving being held back; shaming through denial and punishment, along 
with problematic family dynamics, including divorce.  
 Presenter—felt apart from the proverbial group throughout her schooling 
experiences because she was advanced and kind of isolated; because she was given 
different work to do that made her feel different, alienated from the rest of the class. 
 Presenter—from a small town family who wanted to control her choices; but she 
had to decide to go against being held back in order to go forward with her own evolving 
choices about who she wants to be and the kind of career she wants to pursue. 
 Presenter—the student who has consistently his submitted papers late; the one 
that I don’t necessarily believe in terms of his storied excuses; but he volunteered to 
present. I was surprised because I was expecting that he had not submitted his paper by 
2pm today—the deadline for submission. He talked a lot about being criticized by others, 
friends and family, for wanting to be an educator. In other words, why not go into 
business, medicine, or law where you can make much more money? He talks about this 
having been an ongoing theme in his life. Something that he’s been wrestling with; in 
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other words, do what he believes he wants to do, or acquiesce to the outside pressures of 
unsolicited advice from others? He seems to be on course with doing what he thinks is 
right for him. I don’t know what to make of this person—he has a gift for articulation. I 
also sense anger in him, something I cannot really know or pursue. I think he will 
continue to surprise me this semester—with erratic writing submissions and then possibly 
some stellar work. 
 Presenter—talked also about the pressures of family desires/expectations versus 
her own personally felt calling for being an educator. The existential choice of taking a 
stand against the family expectations is apparent and seemingly necessary to move 
forward, to move beyond. 
 What are my dynamics, as instructor, in this student presentation process? I 
notice that each presenter directs primary attention to me. I do listen intently. I 
remember, at times, thinking about my listening process—being conscious of it. I was 
listening for connections between experience and identity shaping as well as for 
connections between oppressive schooling experiences and existential confusion. 
Listening for examples of personal choices made—evidenced by stories involving 
choosing education versus going into business. Listening for rebellion, listening for 
responsibility for one’s point of view. Listening for patterns among the students’ stories. 
Listening for their authentic voices coming out of their usually shielded personas. 
 I am more cognizant of my bringing the existential, philosophical focus to the fore 
in this class (as opposed to last semester). I think this awareness relates to my doing this 
very research, working to align my choices and actions with what I say this research is 
188 
	  
	  
about. I want to infuse the learning environment with the existential attitude, a 
philosophical attitude of self-awareness and becoming. I target my students in this way. 
How can I more effectively target myself as the subject/researcher? Does the process feel 
authentic to me?  
  Existential authenticity, from a Sartrean perspective, is a concept that embodies a 
kind of moral interplay between individual freedom and responsibility. On this view, 
authenticity is a far more profound concept than a singular notion of being true to oneself 
by adhering to one’s supposed beliefs and value system. Instead, existential authenticity 
implicates the individual’s understanding of her existence as undetermined and random in 
its inception, yet totally free, rendering the individual fully responsible for how she 
accepts and acts on her freedom. If she denies or ignores the moral ground of freedom 
(Beauvoir, 1976) to which she has been born, such an individual is living in bad faith and 
cannot claim to be authentic. Sartre (2007) states, “Those who conceal from themselves 
this total freedom, under the guise of solemnity, or by making determinist excuses, I will 
call cowards” (p. 49). 
 On the other hand, Sartre states, “[those] who try to prove their existence is 
necessary, when man’s appearance on earth is merely contingent, I will call bastards” (p. 
49). In fact, in the name of freedom, Sartre (2007) claims his right to “pass judgment” (p. 
49) on those who would ignore it or abuse it. “But whether cowards or bastards, they can 
be judged only on the grounds of strict authenticity” (p. 49)  
 Therefore, for Sartre, to deny existential freedom in the name of determinism or 
to claim some special property or reason as the basis for one’s particular existence in the 
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world is to live inauthentically. In contrast, the individual who strives toward authenticity 
is the one who chooses to advance her existence as a project of freedom, holding 
complete responsibility for doing so regardless of the contingencies that impact her 
choices and actions and the consequences that result from them. It is important to stress, 
then, that authenticity is not an absolute or measurable concept that can be standardized 
or objectified across any and all circumstances and conditions. Rather, it is a human 
conception that relies on human perceptions, understandings, and judgments which, in 
and of themselves, are subjectively based. In all this, then, the only certainty regarding 
human authenticity as an existentially moral undertaking is the individual’s awareness of 
her existential freedom and her pursuit of that freedom with utter and complete 
responsibility.  
  I am free and responsible for the ways in which I choose to teach and interact 
with my students, but am I authentic? I cannot make this claim. But no longer 
existentially oppressed, I can surely continue to strive toward (my emphasis) authenticity 
in the pursuit of my project. I suggest that those educators who suffer existential 
oppression today cannot fathom the notion of authenticity as an existentially moral 
component of their current pedagogical projects. How would Sartre pass judgment on 
them? I imagine he would claim that those who do not choose themselves above the 
system of dehumanization to which they are tethered are denying their own freedom and 
are, thus, guilty of bad faith. The other existentialists noted in this study have expressed 
similar sentiments about the denial, negation, or rejection of freedom, and especially in 
the face of oppression. For these existentialists, there is no room for excuses, even in the 
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world of neoliberal education. Therefore, it is the educator who believes in a humanizing 
pedagogy of personhood who will (my emphasis) choose to resist existential oppression 
because it is the only authentic choice available to her. 
Final Reflection 
 A brief compilation of field notes—the ongoing pursuit of a pedagogy of 
freedom and personhood. If I stay grounded and avoid the self-deception of bad faith, I 
will trip and fall, but I will hold myself steady to the extent that I will not drown in 
conformity and existential self-alienation. If I have traveled this far, and have covered 
this much ground, then I must stay on this path of my teaching/learning journey. I must 
pursue this pedagogy of personhood as resistance to educator existential oppression and 
as the expression of personal integrity and pedagogical freedom. 
 When I am teaching, I am being myself, but I am also performing. I am in the free 
action of my doing. I am dancing my dance of freedom, not tied to the puppeteer’s 
strings, whether they originate within the dysfunction of family or in the dysfunction of a 
neoliberal, bureaucratic school system that would make me one of its herd followers. For 
some, the conception of being a follower is more nicely nuanced as being a team player, 
making the “following” sound desirable and politically correct, but I know better. Once 
the dance of freedom is experienced, no other music, no other dance steps will do. It’s my 
music and my dance. I can perform as I feel it permeate my body, and as my psyche 
wishes to reveal itself to those with whom I am dancing. In the classroom, I dance with 
my students. More often than not, I lead. But I still try to offer them the lead, and 
sometimes someone will take it. I am right there though, ready to glide into the next step; 
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ready to assume the lead if needed, and yet ready to hand it back. It’s a flow of back and 
forth, trusting and hoping, leading and following, but always wanting them, the students, 
to experience the freedom of leading for themselves. 
 In this chapter, I have presented a picture of existentialism as a philosophy of 
humanization, specifically as it pertains to the individual’s pursuit of a pedagogy of 
personhood and rejection of the dehumanization of educator existential oppression. 
Moreover, I have illustrated, through illustrative field notes, serving as existential data, 
how existential oppression has also taken hold of many students, the result of their K-12 
schooling experiences within the anti-human structures of neoliberal education. 
Nonetheless, I continue to focus on the possibilities and praxes of freedom with which I, 
along with other educators who have awakened to their existential attitudes, can intervene 
productively in the world of neoliberal education. The next chapter, Chapter V, concludes 
this study by posing and responding to questions that address the educator’s potential 
leap from existential oppression to the existential attitude; the educator’s pedagogical 
application of her existential attitude; the issue of personal and pedagogical authenticity; 
and the implications of a pedagogy of personhood for the individual, for community, and 
for the future of education. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Four Existential Questions 
 This final chapter is framed around four questions that point to possibilities of 
self-liberation for the educator who will choose to embrace and manifest her existential 
attitude in her pursuit of a pedagogy of personhood. I couch the discussion of these 
questions primarily in the theories of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Beauvoir, and Sartre as 
these individuals are indelibly associated with existentialism as a philosophy of human 
existence, while also referring to Fanon and Freire where applicable. Notably, I add the 
voice of Van Cleve Morris to this group, a scholar whose work on existentialism in 
education has provided valuable insights into existentialism as a philosophical foundation 
for teaching and learning since the mid-20th century. Overall, these four questions point 
to an overarching proposition: How can the existentially oppressed educator recover and 
embrace her freedom (personally and pedagogically) through an existentialist approach to 
her project of education; that is, through a pedagogy of personhood?  
How does the individual educator make the leap from a state of existential 
oppression—a state of being in which she remains acquiescent to the neoliberal 
educational agenda—to the existential attitude of resistance and future possibility 
intended toward the reclamation of her personal and pedagogical project of 
freedom? 
193 
	  
	  
 Throughout this study, I have posited a general assumption that the average, 
contemporary public school educator is mired in a situation of existential oppression 
whether or not she, herself, has consciously named it as such. Existentially attuned or not 
to her state of unfreedom—prescribed to and restrained as she is—I suggest that the 21st 
century, K-12 educator is yet aware that she has agreed to a socially constructed contract 
with the neoliberal regime, a contract that requires her uncritical and silent compliance 
with a teaching mandate that positions her as an object to be manipulated and controlled; 
that is, if she wishes to continue working within the system. I make this claim based on 
my own experiences in the drill and test era of public education, further supported by the 
experiences of numerous educators with whom I have worked over thirteen years in K-12 
education as well as those I personally know still working in the field today, and certainly 
on the current literature that both documents and critiques the encroachment of neoliberal 
ideology into the institution of education (see Chapter II on this last point).  
 As discussed in Chapter IV, the standardizing culture of neoliberal education, in 
which the individual educator willingly or unwillingly subordinates herself to the crowd 
mentality, is not unlike the situation described by Kierkegaard across many of his 
writings where he decries the crowd’s uncritical adherence to the socially constructed 
narrative of his time (19th century Denmark). “[A crowd] in its very concept is the 
untruth, by reason of the fact that it renders the individual completely impenitent and 
irresponsible, or at least weakens his sense of responsibility by reducing it to a fraction” 
(Kierkegaard, as cited in Solomon, 2005, p. 32). Nietzsche’s (2001) discussion of the 
“Herd instinct” (p. 114) resonates with a similar disdain for those who follow blindly, 
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unconscious of their own subjective bearings. As Nietzsche (2001) puts it, the individual 
sacrifices personhood to functionality as determined by the dominant culture of a society 
that then dictates “the needs of a community and herd” (p. 114). Refer back to Chapter IV 
for a more expanded discussion of Kierkegaard’s and Nietzsche’s views on the 
submissive and conforming nature of the crowd as it bears relevance to the 21st century 
educator’s situation of existential oppression in the neoliberal world of education.  
 Also, in Chapter IV, I explained Nietzsche’s theory of master versus slave 
morality as it relates to the individual’s conception of personhood. In other words, does 
the individual educator understand herself as free and self-determining (master morality) 
or as controlled and manipulated by an ideology (morality) of oppression (slave 
morality)? We can correlate the contemporary educator’s internalization of existential 
oppression to Nietzsche’s conception of slave morality, indicative of the individual’s 
adaptation to and acceptance of suffering through her experience of dehumanization and 
objectification. On the other hand, we can make a connection between Nietzsche’s 
conception of a master morality and the existential attitude, both of which point to the 
individual’s stance as a self-affirmed and self-empowered individual, not dependent on 
the opinions or dictates of others. 
 Using his own distinctive language and theoretical contexts in Being and 
Nothingness, Sartre (1984), in philosophical alignment with the discussions of 
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche in Chapter IV, also alludes to the conforming nature of a mass 
mentality that uncritically falls in line with the socially and politically constructed 
narratives of a given time and place in history. On this point, Sartre (1984) addresses the 
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individual’s acquiescent state of mind amidst the “historical situation” (p. 561) that is 
constituted by the dominant “political organization” (p. 561) or “determined economy” 
(p. 561) of one’s milieu. Sartre (1984) contends that the individual “apprehends it [the 
compelling or oppressive situation at hand] in its plenitude of being and because he can 
not even imagine that he can exist in it otherwise” (p. 561). Therefore, not only does the 
oppressed educator lose herself in the anonymous sameness of neoliberal education’s 
mentality of standardization, she is also susceptible to the internalization of existential 
oppression through her very abdication of her own imagined selfhood. With the dynamics 
of existential oppression at play in this way, the individual educator who is unable to 
imagine or envision possibilities of freedom is clearly not awake to an existential attitude 
that would need (my emphasis) to express its dissatisfaction with the neoliberal status 
quo in order to be, to exist, in the fullness and freedom of personhood. As such, Sartre 
(1984) asserts that in order for the individual to release herself from existential 
oppression, she must forego the “common opinion” (p. 561) of the crowd and, alluding to 
Kierkegaard, look inward in order to reflect upon and imagine an alternative path that is 
more authentic to her project of freedom. Sartre is saying that, at the culmination point of 
the journey from existential oppression to intentional self-consciousness, the individual 
decides that the given is intolerable and that alternatives for freedom must be chosen.  
 On all these points, I propose that the contemporary educator’s existential attitude 
arises from a newly conceived consciousness (Sartre) of self as a freedom that turns 
inward (Kierkegaard) in self-affirmation, to ultimately be manifested through her will to 
power (Nietzsche), projected outwardly into the world as a function of her commitment 
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to her life/work project. On this view and specific to the educator’s situation of existential 
oppression in this present age of neoliberal schooling, we can consider how the educator 
can come to terms with her existential attitude; in essence, by finding herself in it (my 
emphasis), as discussed in Chapter IV. To reiterate, Solomon (2005) reminds us that the 
existential attitude does not indicate an a priori consciousness of self or a pre-determined 
essence of being to be chosen. Rather, the self-consciousness that is the existential 
attitude demands that the individual create herself as “an ideal, a chosen course of action 
and values, something one creates in the world” (Solomon, 2005, p. xvii) according to her 
situation as she judges it and decides what she will/must do about it. On this view, the 
existentially oppressed educator, upon finding herself in the existential attitude of 
existential necessity and possibility, can choose to reclaim the subjective integrity of her 
personhood and restore to her pedagogical praxis an attitude of resistance and 
rehumanization. With this proactive attitude of self-awareness, the individual educator 
can emerge as the value creator of her own life, choosing how she will live and what she 
will do. As such, she is positioned to recognize and name possibilities and alternatives 
toward which she can choose to move forward in her project of personal and pedagogical 
freedom. “After all, when one becomes self-conscious, one is present as a person in any 
situation; the mechanisms of denial and detachment do not work” (Greene, 1973, p. 5). 
 Referencing Beauvoir as addressed in both Chapters III and IV, and transposing 
her theories to the current situation, I suggest that the educator’s only possibility of 
release from existential oppression lies in her absolute recognition of her will to 
freedom—not simply as an existentially moral undertaking, but as the only undertaking 
197 
	  
	  
with which to emerge and stand as a viable human being. On the other hand, if the 
educator does not choose her freedom, Beauvoir would assess the situation as one of bad 
faith, symbolizing the educator’s denial of her own subjective truth as a particular 
individual. From Beauvoir’s perspective, then, coming to terms with the existential 
attitude is coming to terms with one’s will to freedom, the existentially moral ground 
from which to break through internalized oppression, self-alienation, and resignation to 
living in a state of unfreedom. “My freedom must not seek to trap being but to disclose 
it” (Beauvoir, 1976, p. 30).  Whether we call it the will to freedom, existential 
awareness, or the existential attitude, the individual educator must want the integrity of 
her selfhood and her project of freedom more than the paradoxical security of unfreedom 
and the lie of anti-human education to which neoliberalism attaches. She must see the 
possibility of freedom as more essential and more available to her existential project than 
resignation to the status quo. The “how” of coming to terms with one’s existential 
attitude becomes self-evident: once the educator chooses herself and the integrity of her 
project over the system that oppresses her, the experience of personal freedom—or the 
initial, dynamic upsurge of release from internal bondage—makes choosing in freedom 
not only possible, but absolutely necessary because to stay in the same place is no longer 
an option. The only choice for the existential attitude, in action, is to go forward in 
possibility. 
 
The truth is that in order for my freedom not to risk coming to grief against the 
obstacle which its very engagement has raised, in order that it might still pursue 
its movement in the face of failure, it must, by giving itself a particular content, 
aim by means of it at an end which is nothing else but precisely the free 
movement of existence. . . . But this act of passing beyond is conceivable only if 
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what the content has in view is not to bar up the future, but, on the  contrary, to 
plan new possibilities. (Beauvoir, 1976, pp. 29–30) 
 
Nevertheless, and not to be construed as a simplistic notion of self-imposed positive 
thinking strategies, nor as a light-bulb moment of freedom in which an automatic sense of 
power over others or over the present realities of neoliberal education is suddenly 
revealed, the educator’s existential attitude rests in her freedom to choose and act from 
her inner resources of self-affirmation, thereby translating her inward reclamation of 
personhood into a pedagogy of personhood. The success or failure of the educator’s 
resistance to neoliberal education, at any given moment, might then be seen as the by-
product of a more fundamental task of authentic self-reclamation regardless of the 
circumstances at hand. 
How can today’s educator, in a real and practical sense, use her existential attitude 
to advance her personal and pedagogical freedoms, either within or outside the 
neoliberal educational environment? 
 Beauvoir recommends that action must be taken in order to begin the process of 
moving forward toward freedom, of transcending one’s present state of oppression. 
From Beauvoir’s perspective, to transcend one’s present situation is not some kind of 
metaphysical, abstract concept. Rather, it signifies a real and deliberate choosing of 
purpose, vision, and action that aims toward a future, or in de Beauvoir’s (1976) words, 
the “act of surpassing” (p. 27) oneself in the movement forward toward new possibilities. 
This idea of forward movement can be viewed in the contexts of both productive and 
resistant forms of action; productive in terms of choosing alternative paths away from the 
199 
	  
	  
present reality of existential oppression, and resistant in terms of staying in place (as 
opposed to leaving the physical situation), but with a confrontational attitude of 
intransigence to the oppression that holds sway there. While neither form of action 
promises a guarantee of swift and absolute freedom, Beauvoir yet privileges action aimed 
toward freedom as the only authentic response to oppression because “there is hardly a 
sadder virtue than resignation” (p. 28).  
 In a real and practical sense, I suggest that Beauvoir would likely sanction any 
and all doable acts of resistance the individual educator might choose, either within the 
bounded space of her classroom or in the broader, communal space of the school building 
because, for her, the expression of existential freedom is a moral undertaking that lies in 
taking action to overcome or move beyond one’s situation of oppression (see Chapters III 
and IV). In terms of productive actions that might be taken in the classroom space, the 
educator could choose to focus on teaching strategies that emphasize dialogical 
relationships with her students as opposed to current drill and test strategies that 
depersonalize and monotonize the teaching/learning process. She could structure the 
Socratic seminar process within her instructional frameworks to foster critical and 
creative thinking processes, communication skills, and classroom community. Such 
humanistic processes and skills call to mind Freire’s (2012) “problem-posing” (p. 79) 
method of education addressed in Chapters III and IV, exercised to inspire and stimulate 
“the emergence of consciousness and critical intervention in reality” (p. 81), along with 
his particular emphasis on education as a “praxis” (p. 79) of liberation (also addressed in 
Chapters III and IV): “the action and reflection of men and women upon their world in 
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order to transform it” (p. 79). Clearly, the educator’s pursuit of a pedagogy of 
personhood, manifested through productive action as well as in acts of resistance, 
represents a philosophy of education that can be said to be a praxis of human liberation.  
 Another area of productive pedagogical action, intended to counter the 
narrowness and monotony of prescribed curriculum content, would involve a greater 
emphasis on the arts. Many contemporary critics of No Child Left Behind (NCLB), 
specifically noting Diane Ravitch in Chapter II, have denounced the marginalization, if 
not elimination, of the arts and humanities in public education as a real and present deficit 
in the educational development of students at all ages and stages of schooling. Certainly, 
we can look to Maxine Greene’s entire body of work, also noted in Chapter II, to support 
her advocacy of the arts and humanities as it informs her existentialist philosophy of 
education. Advocates of the arts and humanities encourage a renewed emphasis on 
artistic projects that would provide an alternative avenue from which to approach static 
core curriculum content with creativity and imagination, humanistic skills that are of 
great import to human development. Here, I am talking about all kinds of artistic genres: 
visual, literary, musical, theatrical, etc. While these various suggestions of pedagogical 
forward movement, to be undertaken in the classroom, might raise cynical eyebrows 
regarding the “doability” of such strategies, once again, Beauvoir would respond that the 
will to freedom must be expressed in action. As such, these classroom-based strategies 
constitute productive actions grounded in humanistic ideals and skills, reinforcing a 
pedagogy of personhood that benefits both teachers and students.  
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 Beyond the classroom, taking individual action could mean voicing resistance to 
the neoliberal agenda at staff meetings as well as in private meetings with administrators. 
It could mean writing critical letters to school board members and voicing open criticism 
in the public debate of school board meetings. Even so, if her situation of oppression is 
impenetrable—whether in the bounded space of her classroom, or in the more public 
spaces of school meetings and board rooms—then the individual educator may yet have 
to choose another path upon which to tread in her movement forward toward freedom. If 
such be the case, and in her desire and commitment to transcend that which is intolerable 
in the given situation, the individual educator might choose to leave that situation in order 
to pursue more genuine possibilities of existential and pedagogical freedom. I use the 
following passage in which Beauvoir speaks of the horror of life imprisonment to 
symbolize the imprisonment that neoliberal educational policies and practices impose 
upon the existentially oppressed educator. Here, the talk is not only of willing freedom 
through productive actions (like humanistic teaching methods), but also of revolt under 
more extreme circumstances when productive actions are not enough to penetrate the 
walls of neoliberal oppression. 
 
Life imprisonment is the most horrible of punishments because it preserves 
existence in its pure facticity but forbids it all legitimation. A freedom cannot will 
itself without willing itself as an indefinite movement. It must absolutely reject 
the constraints which arrest its drive toward itself. This rejection takes on a 
positive aspect when the constraint is natural. . . . But it again assumes the 
negative aspect of revolt when the oppressor is a human freedom. . . . The prison 
is repudiated as such when the prisoner escapes. But revolt, insofar as it is pure 
negative movement, remains abstract. It is fulfilled as freedom only by returning 
to the positive, that is, by giving itself a content, through action, escape, political 
struggle, revolution. Human transcendence then seeks, with the destruction of the 
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given situation, the whole future which will flow from its victory. It resumes its 
indefinite rapport with itself. (Beauvoir, 1976, pp. 31–32) 
 
 Linking to Beauvoir’s theory of productive action and the negative basis of revolt, 
I now understand my leaving the public school system, in 2011, as a negative act of 
revolt, my chosen response to my situation of educator existential oppression. I can also 
claim that I subsequently translated my personal act of revolt to productive action by 
resuming my commitment to education in another realm. Furthermore, and as noted 
throughout this study, I have resumed my agenda of resistance to neoliberal education by 
advancing my own pedagogy of personhood in the university classroom, speaking my 
subjective truth as I engage my students in the study of education (see Chapter IV). While 
I do not claim that my chosen path is unique, it serves as a specific example of one 
educator aiming to move her existential project forward by re-evaluating it, relocating it, 
transforming it, and by all means, reclaiming it. The underlying existential motivation has 
been, and continues to be, the need to nourish an inner sense of wholeness that speaks to 
personal integrity; in effect, to dispose of the unwelcome psychic stranger that is self-
alienation, what I think of as the force behind the disintegration of my inner being while 
suffering from the effects of educator existential oppression.  
 Both individually orchestrated, productive movements forward and independent, 
isolated acts of revolt constitute a kind of leaving, a parting of ways that is embodied 
physically, psychologically, and philosophically. But there are other kinds of revolt that 
bring up visions of aggression and violence, such as the kinds of revolt advocated by 
Fanon, even Freire, in their discussions of colonization and the whole-sale oppression of 
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a people and its culture. Could we ever consider revolt against neoliberal oppression in 
this way, as a collective show of force, including physical violence, against the neoliberal 
institution of education? In my view, aggression and violence are certainly not called for 
in this context. I am not sure that Fanon would disagree as the constructs of educator 
existential oppression in a wealthy country like the United States—where people are not 
forced to become teachers—are far more nuanced than the imposition of colonization 
over a nation, its people, and their entire way of life as discussed in Chapter III, 
“Existentialist Perspectives on Oppression and Personhood.”   
 What are some other ways in which the individual educator, as well as collectives 
of educators, might choose to act for personal and pedagogical freedom? I offer the 
following questions to reflect my own notions of forward movement in real-world 
contexts, of actions that might be chosen and through which the individual teacher or 
group of teachers might express their existential attitudes of resistance and possibility to 
neoliberal oppression. What about teachers going on strike? Even though we do not have 
unions in my state, would a teacher strike effectively and meaningfully symbolize an act 
of revolt constituted by a group of teachers in solidarity for the cause of existential 
freedom? What about teachers collectively agreeing to call in sick on a pre-designated 
school day? Would a group of teachers, large or small, ever agree to do this? Or, would 
their fear of going against the system, potentially losing their jobs, prevent them from 
taking this more extreme action? Furthermore, and emphasizing the centrality of 
individual freedom, choice, and responsibility to existential theory, is group action really 
a viable form of resistance against institutionalized oppression, especially when this form 
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of oppression is ostensibly sanctioned by school and government leaders? The later Sartre 
has something to say about this. 
 In his article, “From Waiting for the Bus to Storming the Bastille: From Sartrean 
Seriality to the Relationships that Form Classroom Communities,” Blenkinsop (2010) 
asks how a disconnected assemblage of people in a series (i.e., teachers) can give rise to 
an authentically aligned “group-in-fusion” (p. 187)?  “In the group-in-fusion, each self-
actualizing being witnesses his/her personal goal align itself with that of the other 
members of the group to form a common goal” (Blenkinsop, 2010, p. 188). Based on 
later theories outlined in Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason (1978), Blenkinsop 
argues that an oppressive situation in which the individual’s freedom is at stake becomes 
a common denominator around which individuals are motivated or inspired to act as 
subjects together, rallying around a challenge in which each individual is invested. Such a 
situation suggests a common source of alienation that provokes a response in kind. In 
Critique, Sartre addresses the individual’s emerging awareness of alienation as reaction 
to the “practico-inert” field of existence (Blenkinsop, 2010, p. 187) which, I submit, can 
be aligned with everyday, existential facticity. Against the facticity of life itself and with 
awareness of the practico-inert field as the site of unbridled impediment, a group of 
individuals—fused together in mutual purpose—may be born.  
 
It is also out of this new awareness of the practico-inert field that the genuine 
group, as distinct from the series, arises in response to a constraint that is no 
longer tolerable, and which causes individuals to adopt a new approach towards 
each other and the series. (Blenkinsop, 2010, p. 187) 
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 Based on this rationale, we would have to assume that today’s K-12 public school 
teachers, as an assemblage of individuals working in the practico-inert field of neoliberal 
education, do not constitute a group-in-fusion. Instead, they constitute the series, an 
assemblage of individuals not aligned in a common goal of freedom, as explained by 
Sartre. On his view, we must also assume that, as a series of disconnected individuals, 
they do not yet experience existential oppression as sufficiently and collectively 
intolerable! Having worked in the public school system for thirteen years, I can attest to 
the fact that I have never witnessed calls for a collective teacher strike or an organized, 
mass sick day.  
 Ultimately, as befits a philosophy that privileges individual existence at its core, I 
defer to the individual educator’s will to freedom and the exercise of her existential 
attitude to pursue her pedagogical project of personhood. Regardless of the uncertain 
viability of convening a successful group of educators-in-fusion that will collectively and 
effectively oppose the neoliberal educational regime, it remains imperative that the 
individual act on her own accord in her quest for personal and pedagogical freedom, 
choosing to do so both inside and outside the neoliberal educational environment. 
Can the Individual Educator who is in Pursuit of Personal and Academic Freedom 
Be Authentic? 
 What does it mean to be existentially authentic?  
 Sartre writes about authenticity in relation to his discussion of bad faith, described 
as “. . . that consciousness instead of directing its negation outward turns it toward itself. 
This attitude, it seems to me, is bad faith (mauvaise foi)” (Sartre, 1956, p. 87). In other 
206 
	  
	  
words, to go against oneself is to go against one’s moral ground of existential freedom, 
denying one’s subjective truth and, thus, choosing and acting from false or superficial 
premises that do not support authentic freedom. While the individual may rationalize 
such choices and actions as convenient or necessary, they are still inauthentic if they are 
not executed from a disposition of existential freedom that signifies a wholeness of such 
values translated into action. On this view, the individual self is disintegrated, as opposed 
to being whole and integrated, because the negation of self renders itself partial, 
fraudulent, and therefore, inauthentic. In essence, through this denial of self as a freedom, 
resulting in this disintegration of personhood, the individual becomes “other” to herself 
and, consequently, experiences alienation. In Existentialism is a Humanism, Sartre (2007) 
clarifies the necessary connection between existential freedom and what it means to be 
authentic.  
 
Consequently, when, operating on the level of complete authenticity, I have 
acknowledged that existence precedes essence, and that man is a free being who, 
under any circumstances, can only ever will his freedom, I have at the same time 
acknowledged that I must will the freedom of others. (Sartre, 2007, p. 49) 
  
 All the existential thinkers addressed in this study—from Beauvoir, Fanon, and 
Freire to Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Sartre—link notions of human authenticity to 
existential freedom and the individual’s self-conscious disposition to choose and act in 
congruence with that freedom and the responsibility that attends to it. Similarly, but in a 
more simplistic manner, Morris (1966) succinctly defines authenticity as “the awareness 
of one’s freedom” (p. 46), linking existential authenticity to the intention with which each 
of us responds to the various situations in which we find ourselves.  
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We are individually confronted in every waking moment by phenomenal 
situations to each of which there are numberless responses we could give. But the 
responses must rise as possibilities in our imagination before they can play a role 
in genuine choosing. Moreover, no choice is possible unless the free subjectivity 
is aware of the act of choosing as such. . . . “Choice” means selecting from 
alternatives in a state of awareness. (Morris, 1966, pp. 46–47) 
  
 With existential freedom, subjective awareness, and choice constituting a basis 
from which to understand existential authenticity, the individual educator who inwardly 
experiences the need and intention to be authentic to herself and her project will choose a 
pedagogy of personhood over workplace objectification and dehumanization. However, 
the struggle to be authentic, personally and professionally, is not an easy or time-limited 
undertaking. In fact, I suggest that it is a lifelong process with which each of us must 
wrestle, hopefully getting better at it as we go along. The struggle to be authentic 
represents a paradoxical striving that calls up, for me, the paradox of existential freedom 
attached to the limits of responsibility. “I must strive for personal authenticity in order to 
be ok with myself. In reverse, I must be ok with myself in order to meaningfully achieve a 
sense of personal authenticity” (Lieb, excerpt from class 28 field notes, April 29, 2013). 
Regardless, if it is freedom and authenticity the educator seeks, she must continue the 
struggle by choosing to move forward with her existential project of personhood, leaving 
behind the vestiges of existential oppression. 
What are the Implications of a Pedagogy of Personhood for the Future of Education 
and the Human Community? 
 Throughout this study, I have advocated for a pedagogy of personhood as a two-
fold proposition: (1) as resistance to educator existential oppression and (2) as the site of 
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possibility for personal and pedagogical liberation from existential oppression. Ideally, 
and given time, I would add that the institution of education, itself, might also be 
liberated.   
 Essentially, I am proposing a choice between two visions of education and 
pedagogical practice: education as humanization—via a pedagogy of personhood—versus 
education as dehumanization—via a pedagogy associated with oppressive policies and 
practices. Stated another way and specifically using the language of the present, historical 
moment, I am proposing a choice between existential education versus neoliberal 
education. Stated as such, the choice sounds clear and straightforward enough. However, 
the way to envisioning the implications and possibilities of choosing a humanizing 
pedagogy of personhood is far more complicated than it might initially seem. This is 
because our educational system is now, more than ever, entrenched within the nation’s 
economic and technological infrastructures. This scenario is borne out by neoliberal 
policies and practices that have effectively reformulated schooling as a training ground 
for programming/producing a corps of future workers prepared to represent the nation in 
the 21st century global marketplace: technologically proficient, concrete-thinking, 
authority-yielding, consumption-focused, and profit-oriented. (Refer to Chapter II for a 
detailed review of the critiques launched against neoliberalism as an ideological business 
model imposed on the institution of education). Thus, the neoliberal vision of education  
is a totalitarian vision that implicates our collective submergence under dictatorial 
regimes of authority, oppressive institutional structures, and dehumanizing social systems 
that negate personhood individually and collectively.  
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 In contrast, an existential vision of education focuses on the subjective nature of the 
individual as the centerpiece of the educational endeavor. Within this vision, a pedagogy 
of personhood validates and stimulates each individual’s development as a self-creator, 
value creator, meaning maker, and goal setter in terms of defining her existential project. 
For the individual educator, a pedagogy of personhood implicates not only her subjective 
stance, but the necessity of bringing that stance to the classroom. I am talking about 
holding, expressing, and living her humanity with her students so that all involved will 
experience teaching and learning as a praxis of humanization; a praxis through which 
individual personhood is affirmed and relationships are forged. “This kind of teaching 
obviously brings into play the more personal and intersubjective kinds of rapport. . . . it 
[freedom] is the only vehicle in which genuine communion , in Buber’s word, can be 
effected between teacher and learner” (Morris, 1966, p. 152) 
 What are the implications of a pedagogy of personhood as it relates to the 
individual student? In Chapter IV, using selected class field notes, I have illustrated the 
dilemma of the contemporary student’s indoctrination into the neoliberal mindset through 
her conditioning to standardized education as the normative function of the 
teaching/learning process and of student development as a whole. Specific field notes 
reveal the visible effects of this conditioning, which I have suggested might be 
understood as a kind of existential oppression for some students, particularly as it impacts 
students’ ways of being and engaging in the pedagogical process. Initially, many such 
students unequivocably state that their learning priorities encompass concerns about 
grades and job preparation. In essence, the pedagogical moment of engagement and 
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discovery is not nearly as valuable or significant as is the prospect of completing the 
degree and obtaining a secure and well-paying job. Ironically, with this kind of single-
minded utilitarian mindset (the neoliberal attitude, so to speak) in place, many students 
demonstrate, and sometimes clearly state, their feelings of discomfort with the potential 
experiences of self-discovery, self-revelation, and critical analysis that are typical of a 
more open classroom environment. In other words, and at least at first, the pedagogical 
structure and physical environment of my existentially oriented classroom, designed 
around principles of personal and intellectual freedom, is a foreign concept to many 
contemporary undergraduate students. As such, I have learned that it takes some time and 
the building of trust for students to adjust and feel “safe” in a pedagogical space of 
freedom. Nevertheless, and consequently, as an educator committed to this pedagogy of 
personhood, I consistently ask myself how I can continue to foster a more meaningful 
and deeply existential learning experience for the student? Morris (1966) states, “If 
education is to be truly human, it must somehow awaken awareness in the learner—
existential awareness of himself as a single subjectivity present in the world” (p. 110). In 
this instance, Morris’s statement calls up the notion of the existential attitude as it 
pertains to the subjective stance of the student in the existential classroom. From the basis 
of this claim, Morris provides a portrait of the student who has been educated in freedom. 
 
A youngster who becomes fully aware of himself as the shaper of his own life, 
aware of the fact that he must take charge of that life and make it his own 
statement of what a human being ought to be—this is the individual who has been 
brought beyond mere intellectual discipline, beyond mere subject matter, beyond 
mere enculturation, beyond mere “fundamental dispositions,” to the exotic but 
supremely human zone we spoke of earlier, the zone of value creation where 
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selves create their own selves beyond the reach of teacher and textbook. (Morris, 
1966, p. 111) 
 
 I have addressed the implications of a pedagogy of personhood as this kind of 
pedagogical practice pertains to the individual teacher and student. Now, how might we 
connect a humanizing pedagogy to a conception of community comprised of individuals? 
In one of her earlier books, Landscapes of Learning, Greene (1977) talks about “the need 
for social praxis, about critical consciousness, about equality and equity, as well as about 
personal liberation” (p. 4), all necessary constructs for conceiving and, potentially, 
realizing education as a process of humanization. Within a pedagogy of personhood, all 
such constructs intersect, with the individual being the locus of these humanizing 
intersections. Ultimately, as individuals needing other individuals with whom to engage 
in the world—to become who each of us will continue to become—we join together to 
form community. We can only do this as affirmed individuals who are unavoidably and 
necessarily invested in the condition of being human. 
 
We all learn to become human, as is well known, within a community of some 
kind or by means of a social medium. The more fully engaged we are, the more 
we can look through others’ eyes, the more richly individual we become. The 
activities that compose learning not only engage us in our own quests for answers 
and for meanings; they also serve to initiate us into the communities of 
scholarship and (if our perspectives widen sufficiently) into the human 
community, in its largest and richest sense. Teachers who are alienated, passive, 
and unquestioning cannot make such initiations possible for those around. Nor 
can teachers who take the social reality surrounding them for granted and simply 
accede to them. . . . transformations are conceivable [and] learning is stimulated 
by a sense of future possibility and by a sense of what might be. (Greene, 1978, 
pp. 3–4) 
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 On Greene’s view, the unique singularity of the individual student (and teacher) 
develops more fully and flourishes when nourished by a community of individuals who 
come together in mutuality of purpose aligned with their individual projects as they are 
perceived to be in that moment in time. Living and learning, therefore, are evolutionary 
processes that continue to spiral over time, fed by internal energies of reflection and 
external energies provided by experiences with others. What better space for such 
flourishing than a classroom of individuals who can be inspired to construct their 
journeys by an existential educator who, herself, continues to evolve in her project of 
living and learning?  
      What is at Stake? 
 What is at stake for the future of education, for the individual, and for the human 
community? I want to introduce the concept of integrity as the emergent theme with 
which to address this question. 
 Throughout this study, I have used the word “integrity” to signify an existential 
state of inner wholeness, reflected in the educator’s self-affirmation of personhood, and 
speaking to the authentic integration of individual identity, subjectivity, purpose, 
intention, and practice as they inform the educator’s existential project. I have 
consistently referred to the educator’s integrity as it represents the holistic alignment of 
her personal and pedagogical values. While I recognize that integrity is typically regarded 
as a virtue of human character, I want to reiterate and expand upon the idea of integrity as 
a conception of wholeness, often applied to objects and natural phenomena, but which 
can certainly be applied to the existential stance of the individual and to human 
213 
	  
	  
development in general. “When it is applied to objects, integrity refers to the wholeness, 
intactness or purity of a thing—meanings that are sometimes carried over when it is 
applied to people” (Cox, 2001, para 2). In this conclusion, I intend a concept of integrity 
that enlarges upon an understanding of wholeness as it relates to the individual educator 
and her project of existential freedom, to a humanizing conception of wholeness with 
which to infuse the pedagogical endeavor and, from that context, to an understanding of 
wholeness as it represents the human experience.  
 The question remains: How can we apply the concept of integrity, in terms of its 
properties of existential wholeness and personhood affirmed, to the educational endeavor 
as a humanizing force that develops and strengthens both individuals and human 
communities? Such a conception of integrity approaches the teaching and learning 
process as a living and relational phenomenon, including—actually emphasizing—the 
immeasurable and empirically incalculable abstractions of human subjectivity and future 
possibility. On this view, the existential integrity of the teacher, as translated and 
manifested in the classroom, is fundamental to the integrity of the pedagogical experience 
as a life-affirming project. In the words of Uhl and Stuchul (2011), I am saying that, as 
educators, “Our intention [should be] to bring life and relatedness out from the 
educational shadows and silences and into the light . . . in short, to promote teaching as if 
life matters” (p. xiv). Certainly, I am presenting a conception of integrity that is infused 
with life-affirming existential values, not to be co-mingled with a twisted conception of 
integrity that seeks to validate a wholeness or consistency between an evil intention and 
its subsequent implementation. Having made this stipulation, I want to assert that as 
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individuals who prioritize freedom, we are each responsible for choosing how we will 
manifest and express our integrity—inwardly to ourselves and outwardly toward the 
world. In turn, we must each bring our sense of integrity to the social and cultural 
institutions that we, as human beings, create.  
 Unfortunately, the neoliberal agenda does not speak to the integrity of personhood 
and individual development as fundamental to its educational mandate. Instead, the 
neoliberal response to the existential situation of today’s teacher, including any 
possibility of improving her situation, is couched in the rhetoric of performance and 
investment, or business-model rhetoric. Therefore, even the idea of a pay raise is “tied to 
better training that leads to higher graduation rates and other improved student outcomes” 
(Westervelt, 2015, para 21). This and the following quote are taken from a recent NPR 
(National Public Radio) article, “Where Have All the Teachers Gone?” by Eric 
Westervelt, that explores reasons why enrollment numbers in university teacher 
education programs are dropping at such an alarming rate today. Note again the business 
jargon that infiltrates neoliberal oppressor rhetoric. Here, teachers are positioned as 
investments that must be controlled and made rigorously effective through externally 
defined and imposed standards and procedures. 
 
If we could really take control of the profession and increase the rigor such that 
teachers are effective from Day 1, I think that will prove to the public at large that 
this is an investment worth making, and one worth increasing. (Westervelt, 2015, 
para. 22) 
 
   There seems to be no recognition of human value, dignity, and integrity in the 
language of neoliberal education. As such, it is clear to me that the leaders and 
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administrator who support the neoliberal view, and who respond to the challenges of 21st 
century education with this kind of neoliberal language, have truly taken on, or 
internalized, their own dehumanization in the role of oppressor. Assuming that their 
language truly mirrors their thinking, they have relinquished the integrity of their 
personhoods, as well. Having earlier explored this particular phenomenon of oppressor-
oppressed dynamics in our discussion of philosophical conceptions of oppression, we can 
recognize the current abdication of a humane educational agenda as an all too typical 
consequence of institutionalized oppression in these neoliberal times. This being the case, 
and with personhood and integrity unaffirmed in the all-important endeavor of human 
development, I submit that education as we know it today is rendered existentially 
meaningless.  
 So, what is at stake, and what can we do about it? Existentially speaking, and in a 
broad sense, my first instinct is to respond with, “the integrity of the human condition” is 
at stake. By extension, the integrity of the human condition can only be preserved 
through recovery of the source of human integrity; that is, the individual. What I mean is 
this: If we value the integrity of personhood that flourishes in a state of existential 
freedom; and if we are concerned about what the loss or devaluation of personhood and 
integrity means with regard to the future of education and the human community, then we 
must turn our gaze back to the individual educator, looking to her as the human catalyst 
for transforming a pedagogy of dehumanization into a pedagogy of personhood and 
humanization.  
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In the end to teach as if life matters is to ground education in the healing of the 
fractured relationships we have with ourselves and the world. . . . This can and 
will occur, we believe, when teachers have the support and motivation to actively 
devote themselves to their own self-actualization. Indeed, the best teachers are 
masters of themselves as well as their subject matter. Such teachers offer their 
students a powerful model of what it means to be fully and authentically human! 
The expression of our full humanity is precisely what these times call for. We 
believe that if human culture is to flourish in the new millennia, teachers will need 
to become fearless agents of transformation. (Uhl & Stuchul, 2011, pp. xvi–xvii) 
 
Reflection: A Composite of 2013 Field Notes 
 I have acquired more nuanced insights about the importance of initiating and 
encouraging pedagogical conversations with my undergraduate students about the 
situation of K-12 education today and, in particular, the issue of educator existential 
oppression. While we address the problems associated with neoliberal education, 
especially the prescriptive and standardized teaching/testing model, I am careful to 
position hope and possibility at the center of the teaching/learning process by way of the 
existential attitude. Therefore, from the perspective of my own existential attitude, I 
discuss my existentialist philosophy of education that prioritizes the individual—student 
and teacher alike—as a freely choosing and acting subject. I teach from and about a 
pedagogy of personhood in which I, as the teacher, reveal myself as a unique individual 
who has chosen to do the work of teaching. I share stories about my family, my hobbies, 
and my philosophical musings. In turn, I ask each student to share her/himself with me 
and the other students that comprise what I believe has evolved into a genuine classroom 
community.  
 In Pedagogy of the Oppressed, specifically addressing the dehumanizing effects of 
the banking concept of education, Freire makes clear that liberation from educational 
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structures of oppression cannot be accomplished by replicating the same policies and 
methods under the banner of a new order of revolutionary leaders. On this point, Freire’s 
(2000) concern is to “call the attention of true humanists to the fact that they cannot use 
banking educational methods in the pursuit of liberation, for they would only negate that 
very pursuit” (p. 78).  
 Bringing this project to a close and summarizing what might be learned from it, I 
invoke Freire’s words as wholly relevant and applicable to the following study “results.” 
First, while educator existential oppression is not predictable or measurable in empirical 
contexts, it is a phenomenon, in human reality, that impacts the value and effectiveness of 
the educational project as a fundamentally human endeavor for both teachers and 
students. Second, this self-study indicates that the oppressed educator can choose her own 
liberation, her reclamation of personhood, only after she has confronted her condition of 
oppression with acute self-consciousness and awareness of her particular situation. It is at 
this point that she finds herself in the existential attitude, the space from which she can 
choose how she will move forward toward possibilities of freedom. She can choose to 
resist neoliberal pedagogical practices where she is or move on to pursue her pedagogy of 
personhood elsewhere. Third, and from the existentialist perspective, the self-liberated 
educator is compelled to pursue her project of freedom in whatever way doable for her in 
order to maintain her integrity and, therefore, reject the resignation and self-negation of 
bad faith. Fourth, in order to reject and cast off her own state of existential oppression, 
the individual educator must believe that her project is viable and worth pursuing, 
realizing that her power lies in choosing and acting for freedom in her small niche of the 
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world, whether or not she can ultimately effect change across the systemic structures of 
neoliberal education. Fifth, and alluding to Freire’s statement above, if we continue to 
educate according to the neoliberal model of standardization and objectification, we will 
continue to produce standardized and objectified students and future teachers. On all 
these points, and from the existentialist perspective, I conclude that it is up to the 
individual educator to choose herself by choosing a pedagogy of personhood that can 
give meaning to a situation that otherwise has no personal and pedagogical meaning.  
 From the perspectives of the existentialists addressed in this study, there are 
always possibilities in freedom. Once the individual educator awakens to her existential 
attitude of personal freedom, resistance, and possibility—choosing to pursue a pedagogy 
of personhood—she begins the process of reinvigorating and reinforcing the existential 
bond with which those of us who value freedom seek to perpetuate the best of the human 
condition. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
TEN GUIDELINES FOR WRITING SPN’S  
  
 In his book, Liberating Scholarly Writing: The Power of Personal Narrative, 
Robert J. Nash (2004) provides “Ten Tentative Guidelines for Writing SPNs” (pp. 57–
67). Explaining his insertion of the word “tentative” in the title, Nash (2004) states, 
“They [guidelines] are still evolving” (p. 56). Following is my distillation of Nash’s ten 
tentative guidelines. 
Guideline 1: Establish Clear Constructs, Hooks, and Questions.  
 A construct represents a central theme that integrates the various components of 
the research study in a coherent and organized way. A hook represents a writing device 
that is compelling, hooking the reader’s attention. The construct and hook can be one and 
the same in the sense that the study problem, itself, is framed in a compelling and 
scholarly manner. Thus, in my work, the construct/hook is the problem of the 21st century 
educator’s experience of existential oppression.  
Guideline 2: Move from the Particular to the General and Back Again . . . 
 Nash (2004) states, “. . . in an SPN, every what needs a why. Every fact needs a 
hypothesis. Every phenomenon needs a purpose. Most data need insights. Actions need 
reflection. And they all need a personal story or two to deliver them cogently” (p. 59).  
As such, the fact of existential oppression, as I have seen and experienced it, represents 
lived experience that requires interpretation, reflection, and story—moving from, or 
interweaving, the particulars of a personal, self-study to the generalizable situation of 
educator existential oppression and the possibilities of self-empowered liberation for the 
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contemporary educator who is intent on pursuing her freedom, personally and 
pedagogically. 
Guideline 3: Try to Draw Larger Implications from Your Personal Stories.  
 This guideline speaks to the SPN researcher’s intended purpose for using her 
personal experiences and reflections to speak to a specified problem that looms larger 
than her particular situation, therefore bearing implications for other individuals, for 
communities, for social institutions, and for the culture at large. Clearly, this guideline 
informs the purpose of my dissertation project since I claim throughout the study that the 
current phenomenon of educator existential oppression is an outcome of the 
dehumanizing neoliberal business model transposed into the realm of public education. 
Guideline 4: Draw from Your Vast Store of Formal Background Knowledge.  
 In terms of this study, guideline 4 addresses the importance of integrating 
philosophical inquiry and analysis (oppression, personhood, and existentialism via the 
theories of Beauvoir, Fanon, Freire, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Sartre) with scholarly 
personal narrative writing. Further, in Chapter II, I provide an extensive, critical 
discussion of neoliberal education to provide the necessary context for understanding the 
stated problem of educator existential oppression.  
Guideline 5: Always Try to Tell a Good Story. 
 Thus, narratives are instruments that help us to know about ourselves and others, 
and to  solve problems; they are also tools for us to tell others about our experiences. The 
reason  why these instruments are part of our brain’s structure is probably because they 
have conferred survival benefits on human beings since the beginning of human time. 
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The use of stories as tools has allowed us to become problem solvers, communicators, 
and survivors (Nash, 2004, p. 62). 
 I suggest that when the word “story” is used, most people infer that the story is a 
work of fiction, even if it holds implications for the human condition, which most 
fictional stories do. However, from the perspective of SPN methodology, the “story” is a 
work of non-fiction that necessarily informs and reinforces the revelation of a human 
problem, standing as personal testimony, to the larger issue under study. My story of 
personal and pedagogical oppression in the workplace, clearly aligned with traditional 
scholarly research, is not a mere personal account. Rather, it stands more in the light of 
Pinar’s notion of “allegory” (p. xv) as politically instructive. Pinar (2012) writes, 
“Indeed, as an allegorical form, autobiography becomes pedagogical political practice for 
the 21st century” (p. 48). I suggest that “SPN” could be substituted for the word 
“autobiography” in the preceding quote because, in this instance, the revelation of one 
educator’s lived experience of existential oppression and subsequent pursuit of a  
pedagogy of personhood can offer resonance to other educators in similar situations and 
possibly be instructive, as well.   
Guideline 6: Show Some Passion.  
 Relative to this kind of scholarly work, passionate investment in the problem 
under study infuses the process with subjective meaning making, along with academic 
credibility, both emanating from the perspective of the scholar herself. At the same time, 
understanding the purpose of SPN methodology as the intention of bringing the particular 
to the general so that others can relate and potentially benefit from their own respective 
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interpretations and conclusions further legitimizes the SPN as a unique scholarly 
endeavor, informed as it is by both personally lived experience and intellectual fervor. 
Certainly, I believe this work meets guideline 6 on both personal and scholarly levels.  
Guideline 7: Tell Your Story in an Open-ended Way.  
 While attempting to connect the personal to the universal, it is important to realize 
that the SPN will not resonate in the same way for all readers. Therefore, the purpose of 
the SPN is not to convince or coerce, but rather to enlighten, inform, and promote critical 
thought on the matter at hand. Specific to this study, I address the problem of educator 
existential oppression for the purpose of bringing into the light of day a pervasive 
problem that holds great import for the future of teachers, students, and the institution of 
education; one that deserves serious, critical attention. 
Guideline 8: Remember that Writing is Both a Craft and an Art.  
 Careful attention must be applied to the essential integration of properly crafted 
scholarly textual writing with the more, subjective components of narrative. The SPN 
product should represent the appropriate constellation of documented scholarly research 
with the narrative reflections of lived experiences as they inform the problem under 
discussion. Craft and art meet as the scholar/writer reflects upon, reworks, and polishes 
her writing. Throughout my study, I integrate personal commentary and broader narrative 
reflections with philosophical inquiry. In addition and very purposefully, I use excerpts 
from collected class field notes to provide the existential, narrative data that highlights 
Chapter IV. 
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Guideline 9: Use Citations Whenever Appropriate.  
 A given for all scholarly writers. In the case of SPN, the issue of appropriately 
citing sources/using relevant quotations is somewhat more nuanced. Nash (2004) prefers 
to use the term apt proof text (p. 66), short for appropriate proof text, to indicate the 
necessary inclusion of cited statements and materials to support the purpose and validity 
of the SPN—as a scholarly written product that, at the same time, validates the situation 
of the scholar/writer. 
 
Alluding to too many proof texts means that you actually have very little to say on 
your own. Alluding to too few means that you have no background for what 
others have said about what you want to say on your own. The apt proof text 
provides a context, deepens your writing, extends its implications, grounds its 
insights and, most of all, explicitly acknowledges the contributions of others to 
your thinking. (Nash, 2004, p. 66) 
 
 In my study of educator existential oppression, I liberally cite the existential 
philosophers that inform my philosophical analyses so as to provide the background with 
which to support my personal stance. Because every SPN is necessarily subjective and 
personally conceived by the scholar/writer, the issue of how much to cite ultimately 
becomes a decision of scholarly/personal balance that the scholar herself must decide. 
Guideline 10: Love and Respect Eloquent (i.e., Clear) Language.  
The SPN aims to effectively frame a substantive scholarly work within and across 
its personally narrative features. Nash (2004) states that the quality of the 
research/writing project depends on “direction, focus, organization, and clarity [whether] 
in a book, dissertation, thesis, or essay” (p. 68). The challenge for me, in using SPN as a 
research/writing methodology, is to frame scholarly, philosophical inquiry and personal 
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narrative in language that attests to the effective and essential (in my view) relationship 
between the two, such as this relationship supports my dissertation purpose, goals, and 
the foundation of authenticity with which I want to imbue this project. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
TENETS OF EXISTENTIALISM 
 
 Certain terms and phrases hold unique meanings specific to existentialism as a 
philosophical school of thought. While some of the terms in this list have assumed 
common everyday usage, their meanings as related to existential theory, specifically the 
theories of Jean-Paul Sartre, are far more complex and very difficult to understand as 
originally composed by Sartre himself. Then, we must also take into account the fact that 
Sartre was French, and his work had to eventually be translated into English. Therefore, 
most of the definitions included here are sourced from the work of Gary Cox (2008, 
2009), a British academic and Sartrean scholar, who interprets Sartre’s theories in such a 
way as to make them more comprehensible to the non-academic reader. To reiterate, the 
majority of the following definitions and explanations included in this appendix are based 
specifically on Sartre’s own writing, as interpreted (my emphasis) by Cox. There are two 
exceptions, “subjectivity” and “intersubjectivity,” the explanations of which are primarily 
based on quotes taken directly from Sartre himself. 
 Absurdity—The existential notion of absurdity is rooted in the belief that 
fundamental existence, the fact of being born into the world, has no meaning 
of its own. In the face of such absurdity, the life of the individual only 
assumes “. . . the meaning and purpose [that] each person chooses to give his 
own existence” (Cox, 2008, p. 10). Choosing, then, serves as the basis upon 
which the individual can create and ascribe personal meaning to her life in 
order to alleviate the meaninglessness of an otherwise absurd existence. 
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 Anxiety—Existential anxiety can be described as the interplay between the 
individual’s awareness of personal freedom and the exercise of that freedom 
for making choices, taking action, and being responsible for everything she 
does. Essentially, anxiety emerges from this fundamental awareness of one’s 
responsibility for the consequences that result from her freedom to choose 
(Cox, 2008, p. 14).  
 Authenticity—A person who is authentic accepts and affirms her freedom 
along with the personal responsibility that attends to it, aware that she is a 
situated being who is always choosing relative to any given situation. 
Authenticity infers that the individual acts, outwardly, in a manner that is 
consistent with her subjective stance. Existential authenticity is not some 
material goal that can be measurably achieved. Rather, it is understood as a 
lifelong project for which the individual “. . . takes full responsibility without 
regret for his past, for his present situation and for his actions within that 
situation” (Cox, 2008, p. 15).  
 Bad faith—This term represents the opposite of existential authenticity. As 
such, bad faith is indicative of living inauthentically by denying, avoiding, or 
positioning oneself as unable to choose. “In effect, not choosing is also a 
choice. However, it is an inauthentic person who seeks to avoid or deny the 
responsibility connected to her freedom, thereby exhibiting what Sartre calls 
“‘bad faith’” (Cox, 2009, p. 81).  
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 Being-for-itself—Based on Sartre’s existential philosophy, this phrase 
represents the individual’s consciousness of self as a uniquely existing subject 
in the world; as an identity shaper, a meaning maker, and a value creator. It is 
distinct from “being-in-itself” (Cox, 2008, p. 30) in that “being-for-itself” is 
predicated on the individual’s state of self-awareness while “in-itself” has no 
consciousness of its own being. 
 Being-in-itself—Sartre uses this term to indicate being (my emphasis) that 
simply is (my emphasis), the quality of being that is not attached to human 
consciousness (such as an object or creature). It is the starting point of Sartre’s 
ontology, if not his entire philosophy, because every phenomenon that Sartre 
describes ultimately depends on being-in-itself for its existence. Alternately, 
the unique property of human consciousness, “. . . or what Sartre generally 
referred to as non-being or being-for-itself, exists as the negation or denial of 
being-in-itself. (Cox, 2008, p. 30) 
 Being-for-others—This phrase captures the state of human consciousness in 
which the individual is aware of her relationship to other human beings in the 
world, both as subjects and as objects. “ Each person constantly confronts the 
existence of other people, not simply as objects in his world, but as subjects 
who see him and judge him and reduce him to an object in their world” (Cox, 
2009, p. 37). 
 Choice—Existential choice typically manifests as intentional action, 
particularly as choice can be understood as a decision made in the face of 
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multiple options for possible action. Cox (2008) states that Sartre “. . . 
explores the phenomenon of choice as the central feature of existential 
freedom. Denying determinism, he holds that people are free and that, 
therefore, their choices are genuine choices” (p. 40). 
 Existence precedes essence—“Existence (the world, being-in-itself) is 
logically prior to essence (being-for-itself, consciousness, ideas, meaning). 
Sartre holds that existence is fundamental and that essence is logically 
subsequent to existence and arises through the negation of existence” (Cox, 
2008, p. 69). In other words, each person comes to physical existence without 
a pre-determined meaning or purpose for being in the world. It is the 
individual’s unique freedom and responsibility to give meaning to her life 
through the pursuit of her chosen project. For Sartre, there is no supernatural 
purpose or force underlying human existence.  
 Facticity—Cox (2009) explains facticity as “The resistance or adversity 
presented by the world that free action strives to overcome” (p. 77). 
Therefore, the individual’s freedom to make choices and take actions with 
which to confront existential facticity is fundamental to her lived experience 
in this uncertain and contingent world.  
 Freedom—Freedom stands as the moral ground of the existentialist 
individual’s life project. With freedom to choose comes the responsibility to 
accept the consequences of one’s choices—desirable or otherwise. Existential 
freedom lies between what is in the past and the possibilities yet to come in 
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some future time. “The freedom of the for-itself [the self-conscious 
individual] consists in the perpetual opening up of the possibilities of being. 
The for-itself discovers itself in a world of possibilities that it creates by being 
a temporal transcendence towards the future” (Cox, 2008, p. 86). 
 Fundamental project—In simplistic terms, this phrase refers to the 
individual’s project of living, meaning her life path as determined by her 
choices and actions. In existentialist language, the fundamental project 
emerges from the individual’s “unique fundamental choice of himself” (Cox, 
2009, p. 108), this choice representing an existentially significant and self-
conscious response to a pivotal event occurring early in life. The individual’s 
response to this event signifies “the start of a process in which he chooses 
actions that affirm or deny his view of himself as a certain type of person. The 
actions that a person chooses in response to his fundamental choice comprise 
his fundamental project (Cox, 2009, p. 109). 
 Human consciousness as “Nothingness” (Cox, 2009, p. 21)—Consciousness is 
not a thing in and of itself. Rather, it is a relationship to or about something in 
the world, a consciousness or awareness of something. “. . . phenomena, all 
the different kinds of physical and non-physical things which comprise the 
world, are collections of appearances to consciousness” (Cox, 2009. p. 25). 
 Intersubjectivity—This term represents the various ways in which individual 
subjects relate to and interact with one another in the world. Sartre (2007) 
states,  
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I cannot discover any truth whatsoever about myself except through the 
mediation of another. The other is essential to my existence, as well as to 
the knowledge I have of myself. Under these conditions, my intimate 
discovery of myself is at the same time a revelation of the other as a 
freedom that confronts my own and that cannot think or will without doing 
so for or against me. We are thus immediately thrust into a world that we  
may call “intersubjectivity.” It is in this world that man decides what he is 
and what others are. (pp. 41-42) 
 
 
 Subjectivity—Existential subjectivity is that inherent feature of being human, 
linked to consciousness of self as a unique person in the world, a 
consciousness with which the individual attempts to attach meaning to 
personal existence. According to Sartre (2007), “Subjectivism means, on the 
one hand, the freedom of the individual subject to choose what he will be, 
and, on the other, man’s inability to transcend human subjectivity. The 
fundamental meaning of existentialism resides in the latter” (pp. 23–24). 
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APPENDIX C 
 
OVERVIEW OF EXISTENTIALISM 
 
 
Historical Background 
 Scholars and philosophers trace existential, philosophical thought as far back as 
the ancient Greeks: to Heraclitus, around 500 BCE (Graham, 2011) and Socrates, 469-
399 BCE (Nails, 2011). Certainly, the Socratic question concerning how one should live 
is foundational to existential thinking. Nonetheless, the germination of European 
existentialism is typically associated with nineteenth century philosophers and theorists, 
particularly with Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). 
“It was the Danish maverick Christian philosopher Søren Kierkegaard and the atheist and 
romantic philosophers, Arthur Schopenhaur and Friedrich Nietzsche [Germany], who, in 
their different ways, set the agenda for what later became known as existentialism” (Cox, 
2009, p. 16).  Kierkegaard planted seeds of existential theory with his conceptions of (1) 
the individual as a unique being whose personal subjectivity is her source of truth and (2) 
passionate commitment as the essential ingredient to choosing and acting upon one’s 
chosen life purpose. For Kierkegaard, passionate commitment took the form of an 
individually defined, inwardly lived dedication to Christianity. In contrast to 
Kierkegaard’s religious fervor, Nietzsche stressed individual empowerment and 
passionate commitment to a life purpose that was secular and atheistic. 
 As a viable philosophical movement—with simultaneous foundations in 
literature, the arts, and politics—existentialism achieved its height in the modern era of 
post-World War II Europe, particularly in France where existentialism was intimately 
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associated with the literary and philosophical works of Jean-Paul Sartre. Fellow 
existentialist thinkers and writers of the era included Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger, 
Simone de Beauvoir, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Albert Camus. Above all, Sartre is 
credited with embracing and advancing the term “existentialism” as a philosophical 
school of thought and philosophical/literary/political movement.  
 From the perspective of historical events, the atrocities associated with the 
Holocaust and World War II contributed to the apex of existential awareness in terms of 
human suffering and the “evils” that men and women are capable of perpetuating against 
one another. While the trajectory of modern existentialism carried over to the United 
States to some degree, it was limited in cultural affect, aligning more readily with 
American literary writers like Norman Mailer, Jack Kerouac, and other members of the 
Beat Generation who began to question mainstream norms associated with post-war, 
American culture. However, as a philosophical movement embedded in continental 
(European) culture and sensibilities, existentialism did not dramatically challenge the 
structure or nature of American philosophical perspectives or American culture, in 
general. In his book, Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy, Barrett (1990) 
addresses the disparities between continental Europe’s philosophical orientation and that 
of Anglo-American philosophy, particularly as such disparities have emerged in the 
realm of academe. In this regard, Barrett cites Anglo-American philosophical preferences 
for objective, positivistic concepts associated with analytic philosophy versus the 
continental European preference for an existentialist philosophy of lived experience, 
representing real-world concerns for both the individual and for society at large. 
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According to Barrett, American analytic philosophers of the modern era “dismissed 
Existentialism as ‘merely a mood’ or ‘a postwar mood’ ” (Barrett, 1990, p. 10), 
essentially turning a blind eye to the “concerns of the human spirit” (p. 10) because, on 
the basis of analytic principles, “philosophic truth can be found only in those areas of 
experience in which human moods are not present” (p. 10). Moreover, as a comparatively 
young nation with a very different set of historical experiences and social perspectives 
from that of Europe, the American cultural worldview remained cloaked in “youthfulness 
and optimism” (Barrett, 1990, p. 10), unable or unwilling to entertain the uncertainty and 
contingency of a more profoundly serious perspective on human existence. 
 
[Existentialism] was a philosophy that was able to cross the frontier from the 
Academy into the world at large. This should have been a welcome sign to 
professional philosophers that ordinary mankind still could hunger and thirst after 
philosophy if what they were given to bite down on was something that seemed to 
have a connection with their lives. . . . [but] Such matters as anxiety, death, the 
conflict between the bogus and the genuine self, the faceless man of the masses, 
the experience of the death of God are scarcely the themes of analytic philosophy. 
Yet they are themes of life . . . (Barrett, 1990, pp. 8–9) 
 
 To understand how an existential theory of life might have emerged, it is 
necessary to understand existentialism’s view of individual existence as a function of 
both freedom and finitude, addressed in the 19th century through the respective 
philosophies of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, both of whom placed singular philosophical 
focus on the tension between personal freedom and the uncertain and mortal nature of 
human existence. On this point, neither of the two conceived of a specific agenda or 
belief system that would yield remedies applicable to all human concerns, nor did either 
Kierkegaard or Nietzsche believe that such a system could actually exist. Moreover, 
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neither one conceived of the “problem” of existence as something outside of the 
individual—to be conquered externally. Again, the burden falls on the individual to 
decide how to negotiate human existence. “No concept or system of concepts lies at the 
center of either of their philosophies, but rather the individual human personality itself 
struggling for self-realization” (Barrett, 1990, p. 13).  
 Looking ahead to the 20th century, Sartre actually built upon and extended the 
theories of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche with his own interpretations of personal freedom, 
subjectivity, choice, action, and responsibility as they inform the individual’s life 
“project” (Sartre, 1984, p. 617). On his view—being free—I am my project, and I am 
solely responsible for the choices and actions I take to advance (or not) that project. As 
Sartre states in Being and Nothingness, “. . . the fundamental project which I am is a 
project concerning not my relations with this or that particular object in the world, but my 
total being-in-the-world” (Sartre, 1984, p. 617).  
Søren Kierkegaard 
 Kierkegaard, generally regarded as the “father of existentialism” (McDonald, 
1996, para 1), spent most of his life in Denmark, having left for about a year during his 
late teens to study in Germany. Not well-traveled, unmarried, and residing in the same 
locale for most of his life, Kierkegaard’s life was especially inwardly focused. As both a 
private individual and a public philosopher/intellectual, however, he maintained a very 
passionate commitment to his particularly personalized and subjective view of Christian 
faith, self-constructed and deliberately set apart from the religious values and practices of 
the surrounding social milieu. As such, Kierkegaard expressed his subjectively held 
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“truths” about religion, individual freedom, subjectivity, and other philosophical concerns 
with unapologetic criticality toward the prevailing culture of his time.  
 Often writing under pseudonyms, Kierkegaard’s best-known philosophical works 
include: “Either/Or: A Fragment of Life, ‘edited’ by Victor Eremita (1843); Fear and 
Trembling: A Dialectical Lyric, by Johannes de Silentio (1843); Philosophical 
Fragments: Or a Fragment of Philosophy, by Johannes Climacus (1844); . . . Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments (1846), [Climacus]” (Wartenberg, 
2008, p. 79). Although not published in his lifetime, Kierkegaard also wrote a 
voluminous number of entries in journals and notebooks, the greater part of which “. . . 
consists of reflections on a myriad of subjects—philosophical, religious, political, 
personal. Studying his journals and notebooks takes us into his workshop, where [one] 
can see his entire universe of thought” (“Kierkegaard’s Journals and Notebooks: Volume 
4: Journals NB-NB5,” 2014, para 2).  
Friedrich Nietzsche 
 Generally considered of German descent (although during his life, he claimed 
Polish ancestry), Nietzsche was a brilliant scholar, philosopher, writer, and cultural critic. 
In particular, as an atheist and existential thinker, Nietzsche viewed religion as a tool of 
the state as well as the source of power and manipulation for both religious and social 
institutions, this concern constituting an essential theme across his work. In 1869, at the 
age of twenty-four, he became a full professor at the University of Basel in Switzerland. 
However, challenged by poor health, Nietzsche resigned from this position in 1879. 
According to Wartenberg (2008), “For the rest of his life, he lived a nomadic existence, 
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wandering from Switzerland to France and Italy. In 1889, he collapsed while watching a 
horse being cruelly whipped. He never fully recovered and died the following year” (p. 
139).  
 Nietzsche wrote works of both philosophical and literary import. His most notable 
writings include: The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music (1872); Philosophy in the 
Tragic Age of the Greeks (1873); The Gay Science (1882); Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
(1883-1885); Beyond Good and Evil (1886); On the Genealogy of Morality (1887); and 
The Antichrist (1888). There was some controversy surrounding the posthumous 
publication of The Will to Power (1901) because Nietzsche’s sister, a Nazi sympathizer, 
controlled the editing process. This led to conclusions, by some, that Nietzsche was an 
early, Nazi sympathizer. However, Wartenberg (2008) refutes this view and states, “In 
fact, he [Nietzsche] was not [anti-Semitic], and broke with the German composer Richard 
Wagner, over the latter’s anti-Semitism” (p. 139). 
Jean-Paul Sartre 
 As the individual “. . . mainly responsible for both the formulation and the 
popularization of existentialism” (Solomon, 2005, p. 203) as a particular philosophical 
movement, the influence of Jean-Paul Sartre runs deeply throughout the discourse of 
existential theory. His body of work crosses multiple genres: philosophical studies, 
political treatises, and literary pieces, including plays, novels, and short stories. Some of 
Sartre’s most notable titles include (by order of publication date): The Transcendence of 
the Ego (1936); Nausea (1938); The Flies (1943); No Exit ( 1944); Existentialism is a 
Humanism (1946); Being and Nothingness (1943); Anti-Semite and Jew (1948); 
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Existentialism and Human Emotions (1957, 1985); Critique of Dialectical Reason 
(1960); and a later “study of the French novelist, Gustave Flaubert” (Wartenburg, 2008, 
p. 19), The Family Idiot (1971-72).  
 Known for his intellectual genius, love of philosophical discourse and the arts, 
along with his political activism, “Sartre was the model of the engaged intellectual” 
(Wartenburg, 2008, p. 19), particularly during and after World War II. Post-wartime, with 
his long-time partner, Simone de Beauvoir (one of the few, well-known female 
existentialists of the time) and philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “he founded the 
journal Les Temps Modernes, in which many articles on the topics of the day were 
published” (Wartenburg, 2008, p. 19). In fact, Sartre’s superior intellect and literary 
contributions were recognized with the awarding of the Nobel Prize for Literature in 
1964. However, Sartre refused the honor, preferring to avoid what he felt could have 
been regarded as political, institutional, or social complicity with a cultural construct to 
which he was philosophically—and very much publicly—opposed (Wartenburg, 2008, p. 
19). To this day, Sartre is considered the premier figure in the history of existentialism as 
a philosophical school of thought, and his contributions to the canon continue to 
underscore contemporary, philosophical understandings of what it means to be an 
individual in an uncertain and contingent world. 
